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Evidence to the Richard Commission on the
Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly
for Wales by Professor
Richard Rawlings
| 6.1. So much for the lesser alternative of
phased legislative devolution: there are in fact many
good reasons for going direct. The vagaries of political
life can scarcely be ignored: if legislative devolution
for Wales cannot be implemented smoothly and effectively
in the conditions of Labour Party dominance when could
it be? Then there is the issue of administrative timing.
As an allowance for building up official strengths, a
transitional period of say 10 years should be more than
sufficient. Alternatively, however, the elongated timetable52 associated with the work of the Commission
could now be turned to advantage, with the aim of ensuring
that the relevant business structures and processes are
in place for an entire scheme of legislative devolution.
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| 6.2. Considerations of constitutional design
point firmly in this direction. The concept of legislative
space, at root the idea that the new devolved polity is
able to develop its own policy agenda according to its
own priorities and values, obviously is an elastic one.
From time to time, difficult questions are bound to arise
as to whether the Assembly has jurisdiction to legislate
on particular matters differently from Westminster. But
these are liable to be more pronounced the more narrowly
the devolved primary powers are expressed. The wider the
range of powers, and the more broadly they are drawn,
the less likely that constitutionally enervating boundary
disputes are likely to arise. A cleaner and more generous
cut - a constitutional design premised on reducing the
legislative grit in the political and administrative system
– should appeal to the happy Welsh Unionist. |
| 6.3. A new and positive dimension must be
factored into the equation, courtesy of the Welsh Assembly
Government. By which is meant the genuine effort at taking
advantage of the conditions of small country governance,
including by reference to all-embracing cross-cutting
themes and to more informal techniques of governance (partnership
working etc). Clearing away undergrowth, in the form of
an unnecessarily tangled web of legal provisions, with
the aim of allowing ministers, members and officials to
get on with the job in hand, is in turn a sensible bit
of horticulture. |
| 6.4. Take for example the bundle of responsibilities
that comes under the headings of the environment, planning
and transport. Integrated frameworks of ‘joined-up
government’, which range across many facets of life
in Wales, and also entail creative forms of so-called
‘partnership working’, are a touchstone of post-modern
governance under the rubric of sustainable development.
There already is a good local story to tell,53 and the early devolution of primary legislative
powers in these overlapping subject-areas would have the
benefit of helping to maintain the momentum. Especially,
it may be said, if the devolved administration continues
to aspire to be a world leader in this most contemporary
aspect of comparative public administration. |
| 6.5. The status of the ‘national’
representative institution is a relevant factor. Given
the evident struggle to win the hearts and minds of the
people of Wales, going direct has much to commend it in
terms of public perception and the general health of the
new Welsh polity. A ‘real’ not a ‘virtual’
parliament:54 there would thus be the maximum incentive for
popular engagement from the outset. Again, it is worth
keeping in mind the fast-moving constitutional and administrative
developments in Europe. Wales has been seen punching above
its weight, so playing an active role in regional networks
alongside more powerful actors like Scotland, let alone
Catalunya.55 There inevitably is however a question of positioning. |
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| 6.6. ‘Mark II’ legislative devolution
for Wales: a more straightforward model would do the job,
based Scottish-style on the twin categorisation of ‘reserved’
and ‘devolved’ matters. As shown in Annex
IV, the ‘retained’ matters in the phased
Mark I model would now be subsumed in the general category
of Assembly legislative competence. The twin flexibilities
of provision for transfer of primary powers and for decoupling
ministerial powers (in reserved matters) would again be
a major component of the system. |
52
Factor in a UK general election (manifesto commitments),
the parliamentary proceedings on ‘the Wales Bill’,
and new Assembly elections, as also a possible referendum
and changes to the Assembly electoral system, and one
could even be thinking of 2010 for a general scheme of
legislative devolution to come on stream.
53 National Assembly, A Sustainable Wales - Learning to Live
Differently (2000) and How We are Learning to Live
Differently (March 2002).
54 See in this fashion, R. Rawlings,
Towards a Parliament - Three Faces of the National
Assembly for Wales.
55 See for example, A. Scott, ‘Europe’
in J. Osmond and J. Barry Jones (Eds), Birth of Welsh
Democracy (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2003).
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