Back to National Assembly for Wales Homepage Subject Index  The Richard Commisssion
       
     
   
 
Welsh Assembly Government News * Members * Consultation * Calendar of events * Library of evidence * Frequently asked questions * External Links * Contact us
*
 

Evidence to the Richard Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales by Professor
Richard Rawlings

3.  Northern Ireland Excursion

3.1. Now let us journey to Belfast. The Northern Ireland Act 1998 contains not two but three categories of primary legislative power, as illustrated in Annex II to this Memorandum.
3.2. The ‘excepted matters’ listed in Schedule 2 of the Northern Ireland Act broadly mirror the ‘reserved matters’ of the Scottish legislation as the things of UK-wide concern that are for central government.22 Notably, however, this first main category is also ring-fenced, in the sense of no power of transfer by Order in Council. An Act of Parliament would be necessary. As regards the second category – the ‘reserved matters’ listed in Schedule 3 - these in fact are matters on which the Assembly can legislate, but only with the consent of the Secretary of State and Westminster.23 Turning this round, the devolution statute retains in part the (much-criticised) method whereby the Secretary of State can legislate for reserved matters by way of Order in Council, although subject now to consultation with the Assembly.24 The third category of ‘transferred matters’, where the Assembly enjoys full primary powers, comprises all other matters. As one would expect, this is more narrowly drawn than its functional equivalent of ‘devolved matters’ under the Scotland Act.
3.3. As regards the distinctive middle category, flexibility is a crucial element. By means of an Order in Council, and with the consent of the Assembly, any reserved matter can be made a transferred matter, and vice versa.25 Perhaps it hardly needs saying that this relates to the ‘peace process’ in Northern Ireland, whereby such sensitive and vital matters as public order and policing, as well as the criminal law, can be the subject of transfer if things go well. Yet there is more to it than this. It may be for example that a reserved matter is not envisaged as suitable for transfer. Placing such a matter in this category preserves the flexibility for the Assembly to legislate on it, which may be useful say in relation to ‘cross-cutting issues’, as also to transfer parts of it, if for example administrative circumstances change.
3.4. From a Welsh perspective, the general idea of a flexible intermediate category is one that could be read across. Building on the practical experience of making subordinate legislation, as also of inputs into the lawmaking process at Westminster, and constructed on the basis of the Assembly expanding into new or additional areas, there would thus be established another framework for organic change. To this effect, allowing the Assembly to make particular pieces of statute law would give Members and officials the opportunity to acquire the skills and refine the procedures necessary for drawing up, processing and implementing primary legislation in these fields.
3.5. To adapt the famous saying: legislative devolution is visualised here ‘as a process, not an event’.26 Effectively a ‘map’ would be provided of the areas that over time the Assembly could be expected to colonise for the purposes of exercising primary lawmaking powers. In turn, during what would then be ‘phased’ or ‘rolling’ devolution, one could envisage some additional allocation of subordinate lawmaking powers, with a view to thickening up Assembly competencies in relevant fields, including under so-called ‘Henry VIII clauses’ to change statute law.27 There would also be time and place for further enhancement of the policy-making capacity etc of the local administrative machine, in the face of the limited and limiting historical legacy of the Welsh Office.28 In summary, if Members of the Commission are minded to conclude that full-sized legislative devolution is too much for the Assembly to swallow all at once, then Northern Ireland too offers up some useful comparative lessons in constitutional design.
22  See for detailed comparison, B. Hadfield, ‘The Nature of Devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland: Key Issues of Responsibility and Control’ (1999) 3 Edinburgh Law Review 3. The tripartite categorisation – see Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 4 - derives originally from the Government of Ireland Act 1920.
23  Northern Ireland Act 1998, ss. 8, 15.
24  Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 85: it otherwise has to be done by Act of Parliament.
25  Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 4. Cross-community support is required for the Assembly resolution.
26  R. Davies, Devolution: A Process not an Event (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1999).
27  Discussion of the so-called ‘Rawlings principles’ also bears no repetition here. See R. Rawlings, ‘Quasi-Legislative Devolution: Powers and Principles’; Assembly Review of Procedure (2002), chapter 4; and Welsh Affairs Select Committee, The Primary Legislative Process as it affects Wales.
28  A key strand in the local devolutionary development: as discussed in the evidence to the Commission from the Permanent Secretary, Sir Jon Shortridge.