Electing an Enlarged Welsh Assembly
Simon King
University College, London WC1H 9EZ
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2. Simulations
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In 2002, the Welsh Assembly
government instituted a Commission to review the powers
and electoral arrangements of the National Assembly.
Part of its remit was to consider whether the size of
the Assembly is adequate to allow it to operate effectively
and whether the means of electing the Assembly adequately
represents all significant interests in Wales. Commentators
have suggested that if the size of the Assembly were
to be increased that it should go up from 60 to 80 members.
What follows is an exploration of what might happen
under various methods of electing a National Assembly
for Wales if it were expanded from 60 to 80 members.
We take the election results of the two elections held
so far under AMS, in 1999 and 2003 as well as the 2001
Westminster contest and simulate them under different
electoral systems.
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The calculations are based
on three scenarios:
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A.
B.
C |
Welsh voters divide just as
they did in the 1999 Assembly contest.
Welsh voters divide just as they did in the 2001 Westminster
election.
Welsh voters divide just as they did in the 2003 Assembly
contest. |
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Several systems are considered.
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- 80 single member seats elected by first-past-the-post
(FPTP).
- (a) 40 double member seats with each
elector having two votes (FPTP).
(b) 40 double member seats with each elector having
one vote (FPTP).
(c) 40 double member seats with each elector ranking
candidates by number and seats allocated using the
Droop quota (votes ÷ (seats + 1)) (STV).
- 40 single member seats (FPTP) and 40
AMs elected on regional lists.
- 40 single member seats (FPTP) and 40
AMs elected on a national list.
- 60 single member seats and 20 AMs elected
on regional lists.
- 80 members elected on national list
exactly proportionately using the Hare quota (votes
÷ seats).
- 80 members elected on national list
using the existing d’Hondt divisor (1,2,3,4…).
- 80 members elected on a national list
using the modified Sainte-Lägue divisor (1.4,3,5,7….)
as used in New Zealand.
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| Other systems are
conceivable. The most obvious would involve multi-member
constituencies (perhaps twenty 4-seaters) with election
by the Single Transferable Vote as used for the Dáil in
the Republic of Ireland and for the Northern Ireland Assembly.
This would produce a moderately proportional Assembly
but might provoke more individualistic politics and intra-party
conflict. It is very difficult to model its exact consequences
though it would rarely yield a clear majority for any
one party. |
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As the tables below show,
the outcomes can vary greatly both between the different
systems and between the 1999, 2001 and 2003 hypotheses.
The following calculations are subject to assumptions
which are arbitrary and in some cases plainly absurd.
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| i. |
In systems 2(a), 2(b), and
2(c), where constituencies are divided to make 80 seats
out of 40, it has to be assumed that the two halves are
identical in partisan terms. This would in fact not happen;
in marginal cases the runner-up party would certainly
pick up one or two AMs and certain parties would have
concentrated support in certain areas which would not
make for an even distribution of the vote. |
| ii. |
In system 2b it is assumed
that in certain constituencies the leading party would
show sophistication in putting up two candidates and guiding
half of its supporters to support one candidate and half
the other. Therefore in seats where the winner’s
majority is more than twice the second candidate’s
vote the second seat is allocated to the winning party.
However in 1999, in 2001 and in 2003 there were a few
seats where the margin was only just over twice the second
vote and the efforts to manage an exact division might
have failed; in most of these cases Labour would have
been the loser. Labour would perhaps win three to five
seats fewer than these tables suggest. Otherwise, the
figures have been calculated using single member constituency
results only. This underestimates the performance of small
parties such as the Greens or the UK Independence Party
who concentrated their campaigns on winning regional list
seats. |
| iii. |
If Wales were to get 41 or
42 seats in the ongoing Westminster redistribution, as
is rumoured, the need to redraw boundaries would complicate
any arrangements for the Welsh Assembly. This article
assumes that Wales will continue to have 40 Westminster
seats. |
| iv. |
The regions of Wales are based
on the five MEP constituencies used in the 1994 European
Parliament election. From 2004 there will be only four
Welsh MEPs—but that need make no difference to the
regions used for the Welsh Assembly. Where relevant it
is assumed that the five regions will be maintained intact. |
| v. |
There is no way of knowing
at all precisely how voters would order their STV preferences.
The figures for system 2 (c) make the assumption that
each party’s supporters share the same preference
ordering. Two possible orderings are offered. (A) is based
on an arbitrary set of suggestions made by diverse observers;
(B) is based on the findings of the 1999 Welsh Election
Survey. |
