Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements

of the National Assembly for Wales

Supplementary Submission by

Dr Denis Balsom

Evidence Session Builth Wells

8^th May2003

• The fall in electoral participation in the 2003 Assembly election from 46% in 1999 to 38.1% is disappointing. The issues raised in this submission do not address this issue specifically, other than to re-assert a general view that electors tend to engage with the electoral process more readily when their vote is deemed to be important. The most keenly contested constituencies had the higher turnouts, but a sense that the overall election result was also highly marginal did not seem to prevail or engender greater involvement.

• A case can be made however that, if the present system were better understood, some of the issues raised in the previous submission, such as dual candidacies, were addressed public confidence, and hence participation, would be greater.

• The outcome of the constituency election proved to be even more disproportionate than that held in 1999.

• The continuing strength of the member – constituency link was demonstrated by the victory of Dr John Marek standing as an Independent in Wrexham against an official Labour Party candidate following his de-selection. Whether a less well-known or established candidate could have succeeded in similar circumstances is perhaps doubtful, but the retention of first past the post allows the relationship between member and constituency to be strong and, on occasions, to be beyond party.

• The 2003 election provided little evidence that the defined electoral regions had become accepted as distinct political communities to which electors relate easily. The post-election call for North Wales to be represented in the Cabinet illustrates this lack of coherent identity. The appointment of a Member from Colwyn Bay is unlikely to reassure those from Gwynedd and Ynys Mon, or vice versa, that their concerns are being articulated in any sense other than the Member is not from Cardiff.

• The allocation of additional members through the regional election corrected, in part, the disproportionality of the constituency contest, but the distribution of seats via five artificial areas remains a less effective method of applying a corrective than using an all-Wales list.

• The outcome of the 2003 election reinforces the previous point that political parties do not share an equal commitment to contesting the regional list election. The Labour Party group in the Assembly is now entirely constituted of constituency members, whilst that of the Conservatives comprises one constituency member and ten regional members.

• The Labour Party campaigned explicitly for supporters to vote Labour twice, even though in most regions a second Labour vote would be wasted rather than encouraging electors to think about how their vote could be used most effectively.

• The nomination of five regional party lists may produce the election of relatively weak candidates in one region, concurrent with more experienced politicians being excluded elsewhere. An all-Wales list would require the parties to nominate their top-up members, post election, and allow issues of geography, gender or ethnicity to be addressed, as well as ensuring that a party can mobilise those it considers its most talented.

• Although a number of minor parties put up lists in each region, unlike in Scotland, no candidates were elected. The difficulty in minor parties surmounting the threshold for representation in Wales is exacerbated by two principal factors. One, the degree of party imbalance produced by the constituency election, and secondly, by the fragmentation of the AMS election into five regional lists. A national, all-Wales list, could not address the first issue, but would allow minor parties to maximise their appeal and personnel and compete more effectively in an attempt to secure representation.

• Taking the distribution of results from the 2003election (though voting patterns may differ under different rules) the impact of an all-Wales list for a 60 member Assembly and that for an 80 member Assembly can be compared.

• If the Commission were to make any recommendation to increase the number of AMs, these additional Members should be elected from the list rather than from constituencies. The allocation of a greater number of list seats increases the likelihood of the final outcome of an Assembly election being more proportional than currently achieved.

• The result of the 2003 election has reinforced the case for an all-Wales list. A single, national AMS election would:

• Electors in the List election should cast a single vote for a party by name. The parties may wish to publish a list of their pool of candidates before the election, but the elector would only vote for a party by name. After the election, the parties would nominate their additional members, who might include defeated constituency candidates.

• Issues concerning the representation of social minorities, such as women, youth, ethnic minorities and the disabled, should be matters addressed by the political parties in their nomination procedures.

• Post election, alongside nominating policy spokesmen etc. parties would also announce the names of AMs assuming particular responsibilities for various parts of Wales.