WRITTEN RESPONSES TO RICHARD COMMISSION CONSULTATIONS
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TOTAL REPRESENTATION (TR)
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A New Electoral System for Representative Democracy
A Nathan
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| John Stuart Mill warned strongly against
"the tyranny of the majority." Roger Scruton in his latest
book England - an Elegy observes at Chapter 8:
"Nothing is better known about the English than the fact
that they developed over the centuries a unique political
system, and then planted it around the globe. Yet the
nature of this system is widely misunderstood. The reason
for this, I believe, is that the commentators have misidentified
the fundamental principle on which the English constitution
rested. Almost all popular historians and political
analysts see the English system as an experiment in parliamentary
democracy. In fact, however, the key notion was not democracy
but representation, and it was as a means to represent
the interest of the English people that we should understand
the institutions of Parliament. |
| Mr Scruton of course echoes the historic
cry of "No Taxation without Representation" |
| This misunderstanding has had a damaging
influence in almost all those countries of a non-English
tradition that have adopted the Westminster model. Unfortunately
this same misunderstanding has extended recently even
to this country as a result of theoretical and abstract
indulgence by those who advocate Proportional Representation
"PR" as the preferred route to a more democratic political
framework. |
| And more importantly the inclusion in our
society recently of new ethnic and religious groups and
the emergence of an international environmentalist movement
makes it ,imperative to adjust our constitutional framework
to the new realities. Our present Constituency 1st past
the post system is not able to address the new social
realities. The clamour for a change is made more urgent
through the breakdown of the balance of two "parties alternating
in government as a result of the breakthrough of the Liberal
Democrats as a credible third force in recent General
Elections. A popular third party may paradoxically precipitate
an unrepresentative landslide victory under "1st past
the post". The Thatcher dominance in three parliaments
and the recent landslide victories of New Labour can be
examined in this light. |
| A complete change as advocated by the Liberal
Democrats to Proportional Representation 'PR" is neither
possible in the present climate nor indeed desirable.
A combination of PR and Constituency systems may prove
to be far more appealing to the vast majority of the population
provided it is simple and easy to operate. Such combination
can be achieved by adopting the "TR" - or Total Representational
Electoral System, which is proposed in this paper. |
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Total Representation "TR" is based on
the premise that every single vote cast in Elections
has to end up with representation in Parliament whether
directly or indirectly. Its purpose is to avoid the
defect of the 1st past the post system whereby votes
cast for the successful candidate are represented in
Parliament while all the rest of the votes i.e. those
cast for the unsuccessful candidates (which may very
well be more than 50 per cent of the total) are not
represented. "PR" on the other hand allows representation
to all votes cast but creates small political parties
and splinter groups resulting in weak coalition governments
where factional rather than national interests take
over, as is the case for instance today in Israel. By
combining the positive elements of both systems (PR
and 1st past the post) "TR" provide the solution.
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| In order to implement TR, Parliaments should
have two classes of MPs who are equal in every way save
for the manner by which they are elected. One class would
be the Constituency MPs "CNIPs" who would be elected on
a constituency, 1st past the post basis as is the case
today in the UK The other class, Party MPs "PMPs" would
be elected by pooling all the votes cast for the unsuccessful
candidates in the constituencies and dividing them proportionally
amongst the Parties, who would have announced before the
Election their Lists of all their Constituencies candidates
in order of priority. |
| For TR to succeed in its objective, the
ratio between the number of Constituency MPs "CNIPs" and
the Party MPs "PNIPs" is crucial. This ratio should be
around 80/20 in favour of the CMPs in order to achieve
the objective of "TR". This numerical ratio ensures the
representational strength of the CMPs and therefore, to
a degree, stable governments. The 20 per cent PMPs on
the other hand would ensure the existence of a built-in
Opposition in Parliament backed by representation. This
would be the case even if one Party were to win all the
constituencies. This built-in opposition based on real
Representative Democracy, should help to counter to some
extent the aforementioned "tyranny of the majority." |
| In summary, to implement TR the country
would be divided into electoral constituencies, as is
the case in the UK today. Candidates would be fielded
within the constituencies either as party nominees or
as independents. The votes cast for the successful 1st
past the post candidates would gain their representation
through the newly elected CMPs. The votes cast for all
the unsuccessful candidates in all the constituencies
would be pooled together and distributed proportionally
amongst the unsuccessful candidates to elect the PMPs
of the various Parties (Lists) that have fielded or sponsored
them as candidates in the constituencies Therefore all
MPs (CNIPs and PMPs) would have started as candidates
in the constituencies. |
| The merits of TR are manifestly clear and
simple to operate: voters vote for one single candidate
in the constituency. And above all, it makes up for the
basic deficiency of a pure constituency system (such as
the UK system) whereby votes of the failed candidates
are not really represented and in fact wasted and disenfranchised
causing apathy amongst sections of the voting public.
Were a system like this adopted years ago for example
in Israel it might have created the necessary strong government
needed in every stage of its peace process with the surrounding
Arabs. |
| TR as outlined above can be adapted and
modified for any country but especially to emerging democracies
or old democracies with changed circumstances. I have
prepared brief proposals on the practical applications
of TR to the prevailing political circumstances at present
both in the UK and Israel. These are the two countries
I know well and whose political developments I have been
closely watching and following for the last fifty years.
It is especially interesting to examine these two applications
as they would be coming from the opposite directions the
one moving from Constituency Representation to TR in the
UK, the other from PR to TR in Israel. |
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TR as Applied to the Reform of the House
of Lords.
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| Much as the system of Total Representation
"TIC' may sound attractive, the political climate in the
UK today is such that it is wishful thinking to expect
either the Political Parties or public opinion to rush
to adopt it for changes in the House of Commons. However
following the recent flurry of discussions about the future
of the House of Lords, this may prove to be an opportune
juncture to apply these principles. The following is an
attempt to push forward this debate. |
| A case can be made for the adaptation of
TR for an entirely elected House of Lords made of say
200 members. Half of them would be elected at the time
of the General Election (call them "Party Lords) and the
other half by direct election to be held say every six
years (call them "Regional Lords"). |
| Boundaries would be drawn to produce 100
regional constituencies, which would elect the Regional
Lords on a lst past the post method. Their behaviour and
bias naturally would reflect their regional allegiance
in a manner similar to American Senators. Their fixed
longer term of say 6 years (or two years after the General
Elections when called) would ensure continuity when the
other half i.e. the Party Lords would be elected at the
time of the General Election to the House of Commons,
as explained below. By elections would be held when vacancies
occur amongst the Regional Lords. |
| The other 100 Lords (Party Lords) would
be elected as a by-product of the General Election to
the House of Commons. Commons MPs would be elected directly
in exactly the same way that is followed today. The successful
MP is the one who gains absolute majority of the votes
in each constituency. Thus the voters who constitute these
majorities will have gained their representation in the
House of Commons. The voters that are not directly represented
are those who voted for the unsuccessful candidates. It
is the lack of accounting for these votes and the consequent
absence of their representation in parliament that lies
at the heart of the electorate's disillusion with the
Westminster type of democracy. The proposed TR system
is calculated to rectify this defect, stimulating a direct
interest from every voter who would feel his/her vote
counts. |
| The election of the Party Lords would work
as follows. Each House of Commons constituency candidate
who offers himself or herself up for election should belong
to a Party or a List. Each List would form an alliance
with one other List before the date of the Election to
pass any votes, which are not utilised by-one List to
its allied List. Each of these Lists would have to offer
the names of all their candidates in an order of priority
up to say 120 names. For example, the Liberal-Democrat
party would put Charles Kennedy as No 1 on the list and
XYZ as number 120. The Foxhunting list would put Mr Red
Coat as their No 1. and Mr. Hornblower as No 10 being
the last one of the List because they only chose to contest
a small number of constituencies, say 15 in total. |
| The successful constituency candidates
will gain their places in the House of Commons by using
the number of votes, which are cast for them and constitute
their majority. The votes cast for the unsuccessful House
of Commons candidates would then be added together and
allocated to the different Party Lists. The total number
of these votes would be divided by 100 and the product
number X would be the number needed to elect a Party Lord.
Each List would claim as many such Xs as they have secured
and the balance would be given to the List, which it had
previously allied itself with. Each List would have to
obtain altogether at least 5 per cent of the total unsuccessful
votes to qualify, otherwise it would have to cede its
votes to its allied List. |
| These new Party Lords gained by each List
would be allocated by priority to those candidates who
appear in a numerical order on that List. For example
Charles Kennedy would be allocated the first available
seat if he failed to secure a seat through the constituency
i.e. if he failed to be 1st past the post in his constituency
and so on. On the other hand, an independent Martin Bell
would gain his seat as an Independent Constituency Member
of the Commons but if he failed to secure the constituency
his votes would pass onto any pre-allied list of his choice.
(Mathematically this would happen to all one name Lists.)
The Liberal-Democrats under this system might gain proportionally
a bigger number of Party Lords if for example they came
a poor third after Labour and the Conservatives since
their votes, having failed to secure constituency seats
in the House Of Commons, would all count towards their
list of Party Lords. |
| By-elections would continue to take place
under the present system for Constituency MPs but without
utilising unsuccessful votes in between Parliaments for
electing Party Lords. Similarly by-elections would be
held for Regional Lords in case of death or resignation.
On the other hand when a List Seat of a Party Lord becomes
vacant through death or resignation, the next unsuccessful
available person on the same original List automatically
would accede to the vacant seat without a by-election
taking place. |
| This system redresses the balance especially
when one party in the Commons secures a huge majority,
as is the case today with New Labour. The Party Lords
of the minority parties (say, today the Conservatives
and Liberal-Democrats) would have an added representative
weight in the Revising Chamber when ignored in the House
of Commons. These Party Lords will act in much the same
way as traditional backbenchers or at least as backbenchers
used to behave before the Party Whips took over. |
| The system also gives voice to ethnic,
religious and other groups in our new multiracial and
pluralistic society. The Party Lords of ethnic or religious
background would have secured their places indirectly
as a result of the General Election for the House of Commons.
Candidates in the General Election, who offer themselves
up in the different constituencies, have to think carefully
before over emphasising their factional or ethnic interest
in order to gain the support of a majority in those constituencies.
Similarly Regional Lords have to canvass all the voters
of their Regions. Thus National or consensus programmes
rather than ethnic sectional or factional policies will
prevail drawing sentiments towards national integrated
interests rather than emphasising and encouraging sectional
strife. |
| Implied in the above-proposed reform of
the House of Lords is the absence of the Law Lords who
if such reform is carried through could find their places
more comfortably in a new Upper or Supreme Court. In any
case a clear and visible separation of the Legislative
and the Judiciary may prove to be commendable. On the
other side Religious Lords or Bishops would not fit happily
in elected Parliaments ex-officio. Their places in an
elected House of Lords would look strange and out of place.
The country at large may feel more comfortable to see
religious leaders confining their contributions and moral
authority to the Houses of the Lord. |
| Alternatively both categories could be
retained in the new House of Lords and would be appointed
in the way they are appointed today more by way of an
interim stage rather than a long-term objective. |
| PROPOSAL FOR A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM
FOR ISRAEL |
| BACKGROUND |
| The present system is out of sync with
the realities of the social and political life of the
country. When conceived and introduced it fitted the social
framework of the time. It is now utterly out of date.
Everybody says so, but owing to a variety of reasons and
vested interests, its reform is pushed aside. However
the delay is becoming manifestly harmful to the future
stability of Israel and the ability of its government
to function in the best national interest. Even more importantly
it paralyses every effort or initiative to bring about
peace with the Palestinians. To that end a strong and
stable government is needed, backed by a stable majority
in the Knesset and not resting on fluid coalitions of
self serving factional small parties within it. The root
of the problem lies in the present Proportional Representation
System (PR). |
| On the face of it the System looks great;
Democracy at its best where every vote counts. In practice
it breeds small parties based on narrow sectional interests
that tend to take precedence on national issues. Ben-Gurion
together with some eminent supporters (Moshe Dayan, Shimon
Peres, Yitshak Navon and others) tried and failed to change
over to a Constituency based system. Once rejected by
the country at large it was very difficult to revive its
fortunes. An attempt was then made to give the government
an added strength through the direct election of the Prime
Minister giving the office a sort of French presidential
like status. This too proved to be unworkable as it obviously
clashed with the sovereign authority of the Knesset. So
this patching up is dropped now therefore going back to
square one of pure PR which is clearly harming the objective
of a government needing to take decisive measures at home
and speaking with one voice abroad. In recent years the
Knesset was dominated by two major parties more or less
balanced in strength in the House and in the country.
These are Labour and Likkud. On and off they made up the
rump of precarious coalitions. National interest apart
it is in the interest of both these Parties to introduce
the new proposed system which barring violent future social
changes in the country might from their point of view
guarantee them continued existence as alternative parties
of government representing two wider ideological movements.
It is in their power to pilot the successful introduction
of this system in the Knesset. If adopted it might eventually
force many of the small factional Parties to align themselves
with Likkud or Labour leaving only those medium-size Parties
with full national programs with aspiration to replace
one or the other. The new system does not eliminate the
possibility of coalition governments altogether but inherently
it minimises such possibility occurring. |
| The movement to the proposed new electoral
system "TR" must be accompanied by a joint campaign of
the two big parties to explain to the supporters of the
smaller Parties or political factions and of course to
the country at large that the system is democratic and
fair. The door must clearly be explained and seen to look
open at least for medium size parties to grow into major
parties in the future by having their voices clearly and
continuously heard through representation in the Knesset,
which the new system allows. And last but by no means
least the new system has also to be constructed to meet
the specific challenge of a population made of disparate
Jewish religious and cultural segments living together
with a sizeable Arab minority. |
| MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
OF TOTAL REPRESENTATION "TR" |
| The basic principle of this system of Total
Representation (TR) is based on the premise that every
single vote cast in the Knesset election has to end up
with representation in the Knesset whether directly or
indirectly. Its purpose is to avoid the defects of the
Constituency 1 st past the post system whereby (as e.g.
in the UK) votes cast for the successful candidate would
be represented in the Knesset while all the rest of the
votes (which may very well be more than 50 per cent of
the total) are not represented. At the same time it also
avoids the defects of the PR system which results in small
parties and week coalitions. |
| In summary this proposed system of Total
Representation (TR) is based on the following principles: |
| 1. It is simple to operate. Voters
vote for one single candidate in their respective constituencies. |
| 2. It preserves some elements of
the present Proportional Representation System "PR" and
endeavours to combine it with a Constituency 1 st Past
the Post principle. |
| 3. It seeks to integrate the Arab
voters into the body politic of the country through inter
dependence to a degree on Jewish votes in certain constituencies
and vice versa. |
| 4. Through its operation it helps
to relegate sectional interests to national interests
and it draws politics towards the centre away from extremism. |
| 5. And above all it makes up for the basic
deficiency of a pure constituency system (such as the
UK system) whereby votes cast for unsuccessful candidates
are not represented and in fact disenfranchised causing
apathy and a feeling of helplessness amongst sections
of the voting public. |
| How this TR System adapted for Israel
would in practice operate. |
| According to this system, the same number
of 120 Members of the Knesset is maintained. However it
can equally and efficiently apply for any desired revision
of the total number. Out of the 120 members, 100 will
be designated as Constituency Members (CMK) and 20 are
designated as Party Members (PMK). This ratio of 100 to
20 can only be slightly varied in order to be effective.
CMKs are elected directly by simple majority one in each
of the 100 constituencies in the same way for example
as the British MPs are elected i.e. by 1st past the post.
PMK's are elected by pooling all the votes cast for the
unsuccessful candidates in those same 100 constituencies
added together and distributed amongst the parties on
proportional basis. The system can easily operate as follows: |
Boundaries would have to be drawn to divide
the country into 100 constituencies that would elect 100
CMKs. Their behaviour and bias will naturally reflect
their regional allegiance not unlike the case with American
Senators or Congressmen. The Commission, which will draw
these boundaries, has to attempt where possible in certain
constituencies to encompass both Arab and Jewish groupings
where they neighbour each other. This task is
probably the most difficult part of the initiation of
this system and has to be entrusted to persons of the
highest reputation and integrity e.g
Senior Judges. |
| CMKs would be elected directly in exactly
the same manner as e.g. that followed today in the general
election for the House of Commons in the UK. Under this
`first past the post' system, invariably either a substantial
minority or indeed in many constituencies, a majority
of the electorate are arguably disenfranchised through
having voted for one of the losing candidates. It
is the lack of accounting for these votes and the consequent
absence of direct representation that lies at the heart
of the electorate's disillusion with the Westminster type
of democracy. The proposed TR system is calculated to
rectify this defect, stimulating a direct interest from
every voter who would feel his/her vote counts. This new
system is calculated to rectify this defect and fosters
a direct genuine interest for every voter while at the
same time answering the call for fairness through a partial
proportional representation operated automatically on
the same ballot paper and used to elect Party Members
of the Knesset. "PMKs" |
| These PMKs (i.e. Party Members of the Knesset)
will be elected in the following way. Every party that
fields constituency candidates in the General Election
to the Knesset will arrange them in a List of preference
of the same candidates for the PMKs. Each of these Lists
woul form a declared alliance with one other List before
the date of the Election to pass any votes, which are
not utilised by one List, being surplus, to its allied
List. Each of these Lists have to put up names of all
their candidates for PMKs in a similar fashion to the
one that is followed under the proportional regime today
in an order of priority up to 100 names. For example,
the Likkud may choose to put Ariel Sharon as No 1 on their
list and Mr XYZ as number 100. Labour might put Amram
Mitzna as their No 1 and so on. Both of them would also
have been nominated as candidates to represent constituencies.
All names appearing on the Pasty Lists must be those who
are the declared candidates of the 100 constituencies
in order of priority. |
| The successful constituency candidates
would gain their places in the Knesset as CMKs having
been chosen by simple majorities of the votes cast for
them in their respective constituencies. These votes thus
cast are represented by these CMKs in the Knesset. . All
votes cast for failed Constituency Candidates end up with
no direct representation. The TR system allows them their
right to be represented in the Knesset indirectly. It
is these votes cast for unsuccessful candidates in the
constituencies that should be added together and allocated
to the different Party Lists. The total number of these
votes will be divided into 20 and the product number `X'
would be the number required to elect a PMK. Each List's
total votes would then be divided by the product number
and any surplus votes on one list would be reallocated
to the List with which it had previously allied itself
with or vice versa. The transfer is made to the list with
the higher surplus of the two allied lists. Each list
must obtain altogether at least say 5 per cent of all
the votes cast for the unsuccessful candidates in the
constituencies to qualify, otherwise it has to cede its
votes to its allied List. This requirement is in fact
a mathematical requirement since 5 per cent of 20 is one.
This procedure is familiar and in fact followed in the
existing PR system as operated today in Israel. |
| The new Party Knesset Members (PMKs) gained
by each List will be allocated by priority to each Party's
published List. For example, the Likkud would allocate
its first seat thus gained to Ariel Sharon if he had failed
to gain his seat in his constituency and so on and so
forth. Under this system in the way it operates the big
parties will have the lion's share of CMKs but a smaller
share of PMKs, which would go to the smaller parties to
give them representation in the Knesset. It is this balancing
which results from the combination of Proportional and
Constituency Systems, which while supports a more stable
government does not sacrifice the absolute right of the
citizen to democratic representation. |
| By-elections will take place under this
system for Constituency CMKs but without utilising failed
votes in between Parliaments for electing Party PMKs.
Such by-elections absent today in Israel will gauge the
mood of the country in between general elections. On the
other hand when a PMK seat falls vacant through death
or resignation, the next unsuccessful available person
on the same List will automatically accede to the vacant
seat without a by-election taking place in the same way
followed today under the present system. |
| This TR System redresses the balance especially
if one Party in the Knesset secures a huge majority in
the general election, as is the case for example today
in the UK House of Commons. In such situations the PMKs
will provide an added weight to the opposition. |
| The system also gives voice to ethnic,
religious and other groups especially the Arab minority.
However those ethnic, religious or Arab MKs ( CMKs and
PMKs) would have secured their places directly or indirectly
as a result of the General Election for the Knesset having
been fielded through parties or pressure groups in the
constituencies. Candidates in both categories who put
themselves up for election in the different constituencies,
would reflect carefully and hence refrain from over-emphasising
their factional interest when canvassing in order to gain
the support of all the voters in the constituencies. Thus
National programmes rather than factional policies will
prevail drawing sentiments towards national integrated
interests rather than emphasising and encouraging sectional
strife. |
