Moving to a durable constitutional settlement:

Evidence for Change
Proposals for a solution

The Welsh Liberal Democrat Submission to the Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales

February 2003

Introduction

A.1 Welsh Liberal Democrats and our antecedents have argued the case for devolution to Wales for more than 100 years. We supported legislation for devolution to Wales in the late 1970s and again in the successful referendum of 1997. One of our fundamental beliefs is that, where appropriate, decisions are best made as close to people as possible.

A.2 Although the establishment of the National Assembly in 1999 has been a major step forward for Wales, we believe it to be a half-hearted attempt at real devolution.

A.3 It was the Welsh Liberal Democrats that sought the establishment of a Commission to examine the Assembly’s powers in the Partnership Agreement. As partners in the Welsh Assembly Government, we therefore welcome the work of the Richard Commission.

A.4 Our submission is made in two sections.

A.5 First, we highlight the way in which the National Assembly for Wales has been hampered by the current constitutional arrangement across all policy areas that fall within its remit. We also question the failings of the way in which Wales is funded by the UK government. The Assembly’s scrutinising abilities are considered, as are the relationships between the Welsh Assembly Government and the UK Government and between the Welsh Assembly Government and the European Union’s institutions. We also consider public perception of the National Assembly for Wales and examine the way in which our own policy priorities would be restricted should we receive another electoral mandate to participate in government.

A.6 Second, we propose a way forward. We argue for primary legislative powers, a new funding formula for Wales and the re-establishment of the National Assembly for Wales as a Welsh Senedd. It is only with primary legislative powers and a robust legislature in which to use those powers that Wales can really be free to make the decisions best suited to its citizens.

Executive Summary

B.1 This submission presents evidence which demonstrates that the National Assembly is unable to pursue its own unique policy agenda for Wales within the current constitutional framework.

B.2 The policy-making framework is restricted. The Welsh Assembly Government has been unable to enact policy initiatives, due to the National Assembly's lack of primary legislative powers, in every area of its remit. There are a number of examples of primary legislation which have been sought but not granted Parliamentary time. There are more examples of policy which could not be pursued because of the lack of power.

B.3 The mechanism by which Wales receives its funding from the UK Government, the Barnett Formula, fails to acknowledge greater Welsh needs and fulfil obligations in relation to matched funding for EU receipts. Public expenditure increases in England are exacerbating these failings.

B.4 Back bench and committee scrutiny of the Welsh Assembly Government is limited by a lack of time and resource and by the limited number of Assembly Members.

B.5 An over-reliance upon Westminster for primary legislative measures restricts the policy making abilities of the Welsh Assembly Government as there is not enough parliamentary time to meet all of its requests. This reliance upon the UK Government places additional pressure upon an already over-burdened UK Parliament.

B.6 The current constitutional settlement is not durable. In the event of different political parties holding majorities in the UK and Wales there is the likelihood of a constitutional crisis. The Welsh Assembly Government depends too heavily on co-operation with the UK Government and it would be easy for the latter to frustrate the former.

B.7 EU regions with primary legislative powers are leading the debate in calling for a greater regional contribution to the policy-making structures of the European Union. Wales is being left behind in this debate: it is less influential than Scotland.

B.8 Public opinion research demonstrates that the electorate is increasingly supportive of moves towards further powers for Wales, and that a strengthened Welsh legislature will reduce voter apathy in Welsh elections. There is a growing understanding and expectation that Wales needs a Parliament.

B.9 As well as actual restrictions to policy ambition so far, it is clear that the policy ambitions of some Welsh political parties are greater than could be enacted within the current settlement. It is possible that an electoral mandate could be granted by the Welsh electorate to a Party for policies it could not implement.

Part Two

B.10 Welsh Liberal Democrats propose the transfer of primary legislative powers to Wales across a broader spectrum of public policy.

B.11 We propose the replacement of the Barnett Formula with a revenue distribution formula, to be determined by a Finance Commission for the Nations and Regions of the UK. The Commission is to be made up of representatives of all the regions and nations of the United Kingdom and chaired by a new Secretary of State for the Nations and Regions. Our proposed UK-wide NHS contribution is highlighted as another way of raising extra Welsh revenue, with Wales being given the power to vary it.

B.12 We propose the establishment of a Welsh Senedd where the powers of the executive are separated from those of the legislature.

B.13 The Senedd would elect 80 Members using the Single Transferable Vote. The greater number of Members will allow for greater scrutiny of the Welsh Government's actions, but should be subject to review in the future. A fully independent Welsh civil service should be created to support the Welsh Government.

B.14 We propose to abolish the post of Secretary of State for Wales once a Welsh Senedd is established. Most of the post’s functions would be transferred to the Welsh Senedd and it would be replaced by a Secretary of State for the Nations and Regions, with a remit to liase with all devolved bodies in the UK and represent them at UK Cabinet level.

B.15 The role of Welsh Members of Parliament would be diminished considerably with the advent of a Senedd. We propose to reduce the number of Welsh MPs from 40 to 28, as part of wider Liberal Democrat proposals to reduce the number of MPs at the UK level to 450.

B.16 Finally, we propose a Welsh legal and criminal justice system to cater for what will eventually become a substantial body of unique Welsh law.

1. The case for reform: the restrictions of the current constitutional arrangement

The restricted policy making framework

1.1 Welsh Liberal Democrats and our Welsh Labour partners in Government have had first hand experience of the difficulties, delays and disappointments that the Assembly’s lack of powers have had upon the Welsh policy-making process. Beyond the remit covered by the Partnership Agreement, both parties share many policy proposals that would be of huge benefit to Wales and its people. We are however conscious that, under the current constitutional arrangement, we could never implement these initiatives should we be given an opportunity to do so by the Welsh electorate.

1.2 Although referred to as Ministers, the Government of Wales Act 1998 actually terms Welsh Cabinet members as Cabinet Secretaries. The language has been abandoned in practice as confusing and lacking in status but, even here, there is no basis in law.

1.3 To demonstrate clearly why the National Assembly needs primary legislative power, we draw attention to some of the policy initiatives that the Assembly has either tried to implement, or would like, but has been unable to implement.

1.4 We take each of the Assembly’s main policy portfolios to cite supporting evidence.

1.5 Primary Legislation has played an important part in health and social services policies for Wales. Jane Hutt, the Minister for Health and Social Services, supports our view. Two of the Assembly’s policy achievements in relation to health policy, establishing the Children’s Commissioner and the NHS (Wales) Bill, were enacted via Acts of Parliament as the Assembly did not have the powers to do so itself. From this, it is clear that the Assembly is unable to set its own policy agenda in relation to health.

1.6 Children’s Commissioner for Wales - The Children’s Commissioner for Wales emerged from an Assembly Health and Social Services Committee report recommending that the post be established following the findings of the Waterhouse Report. It secured all-party support in the Assembly, and yet the UK Government initially did not accept the need for such a Commissioner, with the UK Government citing a lack of Parliamentary time as the reason for not doing so. It was only through the persistence of the Welsh Health Minister and the Secretary of State for Wales that the Children’s Commissioner for Wales Act 2001 eventually worked its way through Parliament, almost two years after the Assembly first requested it.

1.7 The Assembly’s Health Committee had recommended that the Commissioner’s power should include the ability to shape policy and organise services affecting children in Wales, but this was not ultimately devolved. Even with the UK Government agreeing to pass the necessary primary legislation, the Assembly was still unable to pursue its own policy agenda in full.

Education and Lifelong Learning

1.8 Threshold performance pay for teachers - The Education and Lifelong Learning Committee expressed disappointment at the Welsh Assembly Government’s inability to set its own criteria that Welsh teachers had to meet before they could qualify for performance-related pay. The National Assembly’s Education and Lifelong Learning Committee expressed disappointment at the Welsh Assembly Government’s inability to make separate provision from England, as all the functions in respect of teachers’ statutory pay and conditions were vested in the Secretary of State.

1.9 Assembly Learning Grants - Assembly Learning Grants were achieved with difficulty because of the absence of direct powers over student support. The Assembly had to draw upon Local Education Authorities’ (LEA's) ability to pay bursaries to students and Assembly powers to support LEA expenditure. The Welsh Assembly Government would have preferred to set up the grants using statutory powers. Instead, the scheme is dependent upon the goodwill of LEAs and the ability of the Welsh Assembly Government to alter LEA revenues.

1.10 Tuition Fees – The Rees Commission report recommended that up-front tuition fees for all Welsh students in higher education should be scrapped. However, the Welsh Assembly Government has been unable to act upon this recommendation as the National Assembly lacks both the legislative power and the financial ability to do so.

1.11 Junior class sizes - The Welsh Assembly Government policy aspiration to put in place regulations to limit junior class sizes in a similar fashion to the provisions made in the Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998 that apply to infant class sizes cannot be taken forward. It remains a policy ambition, but is wholly dependent upon securing the agreement of the UK Government in the future.

Economic Development

1.12 Electricity generation – Responsibility for consenting to energy projects with a generating capacity of greater than 50 Megawatts in England and Wales rests with the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry under the provisions of Section 36 of the electricity Act 1989. The Welsh Assembly Government is a formal consultee in the process but has no statutory role. Renewable energy developments are major infrastructure developments and Welsh Liberal Democrats believe that Wales should have the power to make its own decisions on such power generation developments in Wales. Wales’ statutory commitment to sustainable development makes this a logical step.

1.13 Micro tax measures – When Economic Development Minister, Michael German lobbied the Treasury for the power to implement urban regeneration company tax breaks, following the closure of the Corus steelworks, and research and development tax credits for assisted areas. This request was refused, even though such measures would have been of benefit to economically disadvantaged areas in Wales.

1.14 St. David’s Day – The National Assembly for Wales is committed to making St. David’s Day a public holiday. The Assembly has placed a ‘bid’ for primary legislation to allow this to happen, but the UK Government has refused this request. Consequently, the power to determine bank holidays in England and Wales remains the responsibility of the Department of Trade and Industry.

1.15 Any decision relating to the status of St. David’s Day should be the responsibility of Wales alone as it has unique cultural implications for the people of Wales. It is not appropriate for the UK government to make such a decision on Wales’ behalf.

Rural Development and Wales Abroad

1.16 Foot and mouth - The foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2002 demonstrated the National Assembly’s difficulty in influencing policy development, as well as constraints to managing the outbreak in Wales effectively. With the exception of Bovine TB, Brucellosis and the Warble Fly, animal disease control is not a devolved function. In foot and mouth, the Assembly’s role was restricted to that of an agent for DEFRA. Its inability to introduce movement licences or to shape its own eradication policies meant that the Assembly could not take decisions as quickly as it would have liked. The Welsh Assembly Government therefore had to rely upon DEFRA to carry out these functions acting as its agent.

1.17 This scenario serves to demonstrate that, under the terms of the 1981 Animal Health Act, the Assembly is unable to meet new needs or set its own priorities. This would still be the case if additional functions were transferred to Wales under section 22 of the Government of Wales Act. Although the Animal Health Bill currently before Parliament provides for the amendment of the 1981 Act, it is dependent upon the UK Government allocating Parliamentary time and, even where Welsh provisions do appear in UK Government bills, instructions to Parliamentary Counsel have to be agreed with UK Government officials. These proposals remain under discussion between the Welsh Assembly Government and the UK Government, and have been for the past eighteen months.

1.18 Fisheries - The majority of fisheries primary legislation relates to the area of sea within 200 miles of the UK coast. The Government of Wales Act 1998 defines Wales as including the sea up to 12 miles from the Welsh coast. When devolution took place in 1999, the power to control Welsh fishing vessels outside the 12 mile limit was retained by the Secretary of State for Wales, and has since been transferred to the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. This means that the Assembly is reliant upon DEFRA to control the activities of the Welsh fishing fleet outside of the 12 mile limit.

Environment, Transport and Planning

1.19 Public transport - The National Assembly’s powers regarding public transport are limited. The Transport Act 2000 calls on each local authority to prepare separate Local Transport Plans and Bus Strategies. In November 2001 the Welsh Assembly Government published a strategy document entitled The Transport Framework for Wales, highlighting the need for greater transport integration. Moves towards an integrated transport policy in Wales have been hampered by this, as there are no powers to require Welsh local authorities to act together on a regional or national basis.

1.20 The Welsh Assembly Government also lacks the power to direct the Strategic Rail Authority, unlike the Scottish Parliament, or to appoint a member. This prevents Welsh Assembly Government input into the Welsh rail network and hampers its ability to produce an effective integrated transport policy.

1.21 Flooding - Following the serious floods across Wales in 2000, the Environment, Planning and Transport Minister, Sue Essex said that the Welsh Assembly Government was keen to support measures that would address the problems arising from flooding and to reduce the future problems it may cause. With six local flood-defence committees, Wales has an unusually high number of these bodies for such a small nation. However, rationalisation of the structures, as the Welsh Assembly Government would like, would require primary legislation.

1.22 National Parks - The appointment of members of National Park Authorities are subject to the arrangements set down in the Environment Act 1995, meaning that any changes in the balance of members appointed by the Assembly and by the constituent local authorities would require primary legislation. National Park Authorities will be subject to an Assembly review in the near future, one of the central issues being the adequacy of current membership arrangements. Introducing directly elected representatives is one of the steps that is currently being considered. If this were to be agreed, as was the case in Scotland in 2000, then primary legislation would be necessary for the Assembly to push its policy agenda forward.

Local, Government, Finance and Communities

1.23 Local Authority plans - Freedom and Responsibility in Local Government, published on 1^st March 2002, is a Welsh Assembly Government policy statement that gives a commitment to rationalising the burden of requirements on local authorities to produce plans for the National Assembly. As some of these plans are required by primary legislation, the power to alter or remove these requirements lies with the relevant Secretary of State in the UK Government under the terms of the Local Government Act 2000. Consequently, the Assembly has no direct ability to remove requirements to produce statutory plans.

1.24 Licensing of privately rented housing - The Welsh Assembly Government is committed to developing licensing arrangements for the private rented sector. This covers Houses in Multiple Occupation and the selective licensing of landlords. Such a policy commitment requires primary legislation. It has not yet been possible to get the UK Government to agree to the necessary Bill.

1.25 Instead, UK ministers have agreed new arrangements that will enable the Assembly to introduce licensing arrangements by including much of the necessary detail through secondary legislation. This agreement with the UK Government will allow the Assembly to develop separate arrangements for Wales but, as stated by the Minister for Local Government, Finance and Communities, they lack the flexibility to develop a more comprehensive and inclusive licensing regime for Wales.

1.26 Overall progress on this policy – a manifesto commitment of both government parties - has also been very slow as a consequence.

1.27 Policing - Devolution in Wales has led to complex and cumbersome arrangements for police finance.

1.28 The financial settlement for the Welsh police forces is complicated. 49 per cent of the Police Revenue Settlement comes from the Assembly and the remainder comes from a Home Office Grant. This year the Home Office has top-sliced £21 million of the Assembly’s contribution and has allocated it to specific grants that can be bid for in both England and Wales. Although Welsh police forces can bid for this money and may get more than £21 million there is no guarantee that bids will be successful. If the National Assembly had power over policing it would be able to devise a funding formula appropriate to Wales

1.29 Sunderland Commission - The findings of the Sunderland Commission examining local government electoral arrangements in Wales recommended a whole raft of measures designed to improve the nature of local government in Wales. Included in these measures were initiatives to introduce a new proportional system to elect Welsh councillors using the Single Transferable Vote and lower the voting age from 18 to 16. Both of these recommendations could not be taken forward by the National Assembly without first securing the necessary primary legislation from the UK government.

1.30 Business Rates - The Welsh Assembly Government wants the power and the discretion to determine methods of funding local government in terms of business taxation. This would allow control of business rates to be given back to Welsh councils. The ability to do this was requested of the UK Government but declined.

Arts, Culture, Sport and the Welsh Language

1.31 Lottery Funding Streams - The Assembly’s Culture Strategy, Creative Future, includes a commitment to ensure that all lottery-funding streams have a distinctive Welsh direction. Under current legislation, the UK government’s Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) directs the UK lottery distributors. DCMS therefore determines the direction taken by lottery funding streams. The Assembly is usually consulted on them, but a specific Welsh direction can only be determined by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. This situation creates a major barrier to securing strategic direction of lottery funding streams in Wales that are appropriate to Welsh needs.

1.32 Only two of the five lottery distribution agencies operating in Wales, the Arts Council of Wales and the Sports Council for Wales, are directly accountable to the National Assembly. Wales is consulted on the policy directions of the ‘UK’ distributors, but power to direct lottery distribution agencies in Wales would allow the Welsh Assembly Government to:

• Make sure that all communities in Wales have the chance to benefit from Lottery funding.
• Set up its own new distributors or have a single distributing body.
• Vary the proportions of funding for different good causes.
• Analyse funding outcomes more rigorously in Wales by making lottery distributors effectively responsible to the National Assembly.

1.33 Welsh Language Act - The Welsh Language Act does not cover Crown Bodies, including Whitehall departments. Such departments have complied with the Act however, as if they were named bodies. This arrangement had worked effectively, but recently the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) refused to provide bilingual services of the quality expected by the Welsh Assembly Government and the Welsh Language Board.

1.34 The CRB was unable to provide bilingual clearance forms for youth workers who, as they wished to work with children, required vetting. As the forms were not bilingual, some of the candidates threatened to refuse to fill them in, creating insurance problems for the organisations for which they worked.

1.35 As a result, the Welsh Language Board has refused to endorse the Welsh Language Scheme of the Criminal Records Bureau. However, there is no legal framework in which the Welsh Language Board or the Welsh Assembly Government can compel the Bureau to make changes.

2. The Failings of the Barnett Formula

2.1 The Barnett Formula was devised in 1978 in preparation for a devolution settlement that never happened. It is used to share out changes in public expenditure plans between the nations that make up the United Kingdom based upon their relative population size. As such, any consequent changes to spending plans produced by the Barnett Formula add to, or subtract from, the block budgets at the disposal of the devolved authorities.

2.2 Following devolution to Wales and Scotland, the Barnett Formula has become a way of transferring money between tiers of government rather than transferring it internally between UK Government departments. The results are now more open to public scrutiny following devolution, making its deficiencies only too obvious: it is calculated on the basis of opaque Treasury figures.

2.3 Wales has greater needs than England taken as a whole. A formula based upon population statistics and the increases awarded to UK Government departments in the Comprehensive Spending Review is too crude, and fails to take into account crucial factors such as differing levels of health, rurality and transport infrastructure needs. An example of where the Barnett Formula fails to meet Welsh needs can be found by looking at Welsh GDP as a percentage of the UK average. Since the Formula’s instigation, the relative prosperity of the different parts of the UK has changed considerably. Wales’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 87% of the UK average in 1978. This dropped to 80.5% in 2000. By comparison, Scotland’s GDP had increased from 93% of the UK average in 1988 to 96.5% in 2000.

2.4 Crucially, Assembly budget increases under the Barnett Formula are totally dependent upon increases being awarded to UK Government ministries, whose prime responsibility is England, during the Comprehensive Spending Review. This leads to the absurd situation where largely English needs determine Welsh funding. Barnett therefore restricts the Assembly’s own spending priorities. The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee highlighted the problems associated with this arrangement even before devolution had taken place:

2.5 "It is for the Secretaries of State (for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) themselves to decide how to employ their budget in light of local priorities, although, with much public expenditure being on-going or demand led, the scope for the exercise of this discretion is limited in practice".

2.6   Perversely, although Wales has a proven need for higher public expenditure than England, the effect of the Barnett Formula is that, as public expenditure increases, the rate of convergence of spending per head between England and Wales also accelerates, effectively nullifying any small advantage Wales may have. This is underscored by the fact that increases in Assembly spending is dependent on a Comprehensive Spending Review dominated by English needs.

2.7   For this reason, it has been argued that the Barnett Formula is leading to convergence of the health budgets of England and Wales. Year-on-year growth in NHS provision is lower in Wales than in England because of the formula, even though the health care needs of Wales are greater.

2.8   In his evidence to the Treasury Select Committee in 1997, Lord Barnett, the architect of the formula, admitted that it was out of date, commenting that a "Barnett Formula Mark II" taking into account needs, income per head and expenditure per head was needed. Lord Barnett is also quoted as saying that he had "always assumed that its use would be temporary, until a more sophisticated method that took account of needs could be devised".

2.9 A Centre for Reform report said of Barnett "its non statutory non needs-based character may be a destabilising force" in the devolution settlement. This has certainly been the case in Wales. On 10^th November 1999, the National Assembly supported an amendment to the motion noting the draft budget stating, "Attempts to revitalise Wales are frustrated by the deficiencies of the Barnett formula", placing it at odds with the stance taken by HM Government in favour of retaining Barnett.

2.10 In the Comprehensive Spending Review of July 2000, the UK Government awarded money to Wales to cover match funding for European Structural Funds in addition to the provisions made by the Barnett Formula. This followed the political angst that arose around the EU matched funding debate in the National Assembly, the outcome of which cost the then First Secretary his position. Assembly Finance Minister Edwina Hart stated, "For the first time, we have been able to persuade the Treasury to provide additional amounts for structural fund programmes over and above the Barnett consequential". In awarding this additional money to compensate for the shortfall in European Structural Fund match funding, we believe that HM Treasury effectively acknowledged that the Barnett Formula was unable to meet the spending needs of the National Assembly for Wales. The CSR of July 2000 also saw additional provisions being made above the Barnett Formula to provide matched funding for Common Agricultural Policy Pillar two funding.

2.11 G. Bristow and N. Blewitt highlight the fact that the amount that Wales receives from EU structural funds is reduced as ERDF receipts are determined by the population-based Barnett formula rather than by eligibility. The EU and UK allocation mechanisms are at odds with one another. The EU allocates on the basis of need, contrary to Barnett’s population-based mechanisms.

2.12 We share the view of Professor Kevin Morgan who believes that the major threat to the integrity of post-devolution Britain could come from the burgeoning conflict surrounding the Barnett Formula.

2.13 To summarise, Welsh Liberal Democrats believe that the Barnett Formula fails to meet Welsh needs, it fails to take into account the change in the Welsh GDP and it restricts the National Assembly for Wales’ ability to determine its own spending and policy priorities. If a future UK government had fundamentally different priorities, this could give rise to major conflict.

3. The limitations of backbench scrutiny

3.1 There are too few Assembly Members to allow Assembly Subject Committees to meet on a weekly basis. Weekly meetings are needed to ensure that both the policy-making and scrutiny roles of AMs are given adequate time. The Chair of the Health and Social Services Committee has drawn attention to the fact that many Assembly Members sit on more than one subject committee, making it impossible to timetable more frequent committee meetings.

3.2 This point serves to highlight Welsh Liberal Democrat concerns that the current structure and make-up of the National Assembly for Wales is inadequate in providing effective and rigorous scrutiny of the Welsh Assembly Government and its actions. More subject committees are needed to ensure the effective scrutiny of Welsh Assembly Government Policy.

3.3 There are nine members of the Welsh Assembly Cabinet under the provisions of the Government of Wales Act 1998. They are complemented by a further five deputy ministers, although they have no official status under the Act. Collectively, 14 Assembly Members are therefore involved in running the Welsh Assembly Government. When the roles of Presiding Officer and Deputy Presiding Officer are taken into consideration, a total of 16 Assembly Members, or 27 per cent of the total, are unable to scrutinise the work of the Welsh Assembly Government either through their participation or required impartiality.

3.4 Not including the Assembly’s regional committees, there are 14 Assembly committees, each with its own chair. The table on the following page lists those Assembly members that do not serve in the Cabinet or work in the Presiding Office, indicating their committee workloads.

3.5 The table demonstrates that:

• 14 of the 49 (29 per cent) Assembly Members listed below sit on more than One Subject Committee
• 13 of the 49 (27 per cent) Assembly Members listed above sit on more than three committees in total
• Two of the three Assembly Members that do not sit on a Subject Committee have responsibilities as Assembly Group leaders
• Not one Assembly member fulfils the role as a backbencher without any Committee or Governmental responsibility

* Does not include Regional Committees

3.6 This evidence indicates that the National Assembly’s ability to ensure effective Government scrutiny is significantly reduced by the limitations placed upon its committees by the limited number of "backbenchers". With 14 committees to fill, all of which must reflect the Assembly’s political balance, it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of Assembly members sit on more than one committee.

4. The Wales-UK relationship and its current implications

4.1 The Secretary of State for Wales currently serves Welsh interests in the UK Government. He provides a Welsh voice in relation to the formation of policy at the UK level and is charged with making devolution work smoothly through membership of the Joint Ministerial Committee between the UK government and the devolved administrations. Crucially, he is responsible for taking through the Parliamentary provisions in primary legislation that relate to Wales.

4.2 So far, it has been the practice of the Welsh Assembly Government to convey to the Secretary of State for Wales its "bid" for primary legislation where it believes that it is necessary to allow it to progress with its own policy agenda. In turn, the Secretary of State conveys these requests to the UK Government who will then make parliamentary time for some, but by no means all, of the requests from the Welsh Assembly Government for primary legislation. Experience shows constraints upon parliamentary time will not allow all Welsh requests to be granted.

4.3 As demonstrated (pages 7-13), Welsh Liberal Democrats believe that the reliance upon the UK Government for primary legislation restricts the ability of the National Assembly for Wales to set a policy agenda tailored to the real needs of Wales. It places a burden on the UK Government’s own policy programme, with time having to be found to address Welsh needs. Providing Wales with the ability to determine fully its own priorities is not merely a way of allowing Wales to set its own agenda. It is also a way of easing the burden upon an already over-stretched Westminster Parliament. Even UK Government initiatives fail to find Parliamentary time on occasion, as was the case with the Labour Party’s desire to find a solution to the fox hunting issue in the last Parliament. Individual Private Members Bills stand virtually no chance of becoming law unless the individual concerned comes near the top of the members’ ballot to determine priority.

5. The Durability Argument

5.1 The current constitutional arrangement is not ideal. However, it does allow the Welsh Assembly Government limited scope to initiate primary legislative measures through the Secretary of State for Wales. Much is made of our ‘success’ at securing primary legislation, in particular by those who argue there is no need to confer further powers on the Assembly. However, once the practical and philosophical implications are examined, it becomes clear there is a significant democratic distortion of relying on The Palace of Westminster to pass legislation on the Welsh Assembly Government’s behalf.

5.2 The first principle to remember is that of the separation of powers – ie ‘constitutional checks and balances’ between the executive, legislature and judiciary. Although it is clear that such separation does not exist in either system as yet, nevertheless a kind of separation of powers has emerged of quite a different, and more disturbing kind.

5.3 When the electorate vote for AMs in Wales, the outcome produces a government formed by the largest, or coalition, of parties. That government is then ‘mandated’ by the electorate to carry out an executive programme of legislation in Wales. For some of it, it has to rely on legislation passed in Westminster.

5.4 However the government in Westminster is formed by the largest party in the House of Commons. Notwithstanding the idea that the parties in government could be different, there is also the point that controversial legislation intended for Wales could be ‘whipped though’ the Commons on a large majority, which the party or parties in Government in Cardiff could not have done if they had a much smaller majority. It is also the case that the legislature which scrutinises the laws resides in a different place to where the executive carries out the law’s functions.

5.5 Therefore the ‘legitimacy of the mandate’ could be intentionally manipulated by relying on primary legislation in Westminster and, of course, the legitimacy of the executive to govern on powers effectively ‘conferred’ on it by a legislature elsewhere is also open to question.

5.6 The UK-Wales relationship has been built upon concordats between Welsh Assembly Government Ministries and their UK Government counterparts. The fact that the current arrangement has been able to function, in as far as it can, is largely due to the current UK Government being drawn from the same political movement as the largest party in the Welsh Assembly Government. What would happen in the event of the respective governments of the UK and Wales being drawn from different political parties is an important question. We do not believe that the existing concordats, which have no legal basis, would prevent a constitutional crisis from occurring. The current constitutional arrangement under such circumstances would not be easy to sustain.

5.7 When this scenario occurs, ideological differences between UK Government and the Welsh Assembly Government will diminish considerably the Welsh Assembly Government’s already limited ability to enact policy. There is no obligation upon the Westminster Government to enact primary legislation on the Welsh Assembly Government’s behalf.

5.8 The official opposition party in Westminster has already demonstrated its capacity for attempting to amend legislation that represents the will of the National Assembly. It tabled a significant number of amendments at the Committee stage of the NHS Wales Bill, of which Welsh MP Roger Williams said:

5.9 "I was critical of them because they showed a misunderstanding of the devolution principle and settlement. It is not in the interests of devolution for the primary legislation to contain such fixed requirements that they give the Assembly no discretion to use its powers to make the organisations responsive to the needs of the people of Wales".

5.10 If the Opposition is willing to table amendments to Wales-specific legislation that undermine the will of the National Assembly then it is reasonable to suggest that, if it formed the UK Government, the passage of Welsh primary legislation would prove difficult.

5.11 Since the mid nineteenth century, the Conservative Party has never had majority support from Wales, yet has governed Wales more than any other Party in the 2oth Century, albeit through the UK Government. The National Assembly has allowed Wales a political structure that is more representative of its collective will, but the persistent reliance upon Westminster for primary legislation means that, at some stage in the future, Wales could again have major decisions made on its behalf by an administration that is not representative of its electorate and which is in conflict with the National Assembly. We believe this to be unacceptable.

5.12 The Parliamentary Select Committee on the Constitution supports our conclusions. It clearly questions the long-term implications of the informal contact that has been built up between the two administrations, saying that it would be difficult to sustain when different political parties run administrations. They believe that relations therefore need formalising and that such preparations are necessary.

6. Wales and the European Union

6.1 It is clear that those regions which command legislative competence are leading the debate about regional participation in the EU.

6.2  The Treaty of the European Union has raised the profile of the ongoing debate as to the level of involvement that those regions should have within the EU and its policy-making process, especially its obligations to enhance the role that sub-national regions play in the government of the EU. Specifically, the decision to create a Committee of the Regions and the practice allowing representatives of sub national governments to sit in the Council of Ministers with or on behalf of national ministers, have served to raise the profile of Wales and Scotland.

6.3  Although the issue of subsidiarity currently centres on the division of competencies between the EU and its member states, there is much evidence to suggest that the role played by sub-national regions will become increasingly important and influential. For instance, the preamble to the Treaty on the European Union advocates the idea that that decision-making should take place "as closely as possible to the citizen".

6.4 Constitutional regions - regions that command considerable legislative authority - have already begun to mobilise themselves politically in relation to EU issues. The sub-national regions of Bavaria, Catalonia, North Rhine-Westphalia, Salzburg, Scotland, Wallonia and Flanders came together to sign the Political Declaration by the Constitutional Regions in May 2001 in an attempt to ensure that their voices were heard in any debate about the future of the European Union. Their demands included their direct participation in the preparations for the 2004 Inter Governmental Conference and a formal distinction between the competences of the EU and those of its member states and constituent regions.

6.5 The Political Declaration by the Constitutional Regions was followed in November 2001 by the publication of another resolution. 51 EU regions, including Wales, expressing similar sentiments, signed this resolution. These regions described themselves as regions with legislative power and also included those regions that signed the Political Declaration by the Constitutional Regions.

6.6 We assert that the emergence of the Constitutional Regions and Regions with Legislative Power suggests that the former grouping carries more influence than the latter. Without primary legislative powers, Wales’ ability to influence the EU regionalism debate is diminished. We believe that, the greater the legislative power, the greater the influence. Wales is in danger of being left behind whilst more powerful regions drive the agenda forward.

6.7 The developments referred to above point to an issue that may become more apparent in the future as the debate progresses. More relevent at present is the ability of the devolved UK legislatures to influence the UK Government’s EU policy process. Under the devolution settlement of 1999, EU policy-making remains a "reserved" UK matter, but an understanding emerged from the outset that, as devolved powers and EU legislative competence often overlapped, the devolved legislatures should have a voice within the UK’s EU policy-making framework.

6.8 It is only right that the National Assembly for Wales should expect to implement EU policy initiatives that relate directly to devolved matters through its own legislative process, rather than that of the UK Government. This approach has been formalised through the signing of the Concordat on Co-ordination of EU policy issues, although it has no legal force. Individual Welsh ministries have also developed their own informal channels of communication with their UK Government counterparts to ensure that they are kept informed of EU policy developments. We are concerned that there is no legal underpinning to this.

6.9 If the EU is considering a matter over which primary legislative competence is devolved to the Scottish Parliament, then the UK Government may be bound to consider the Scottish position on that matter, otherwise it will undermine the whole concept of devolution. No such situation arises in the case of the National Assembly for Wales which, without primary powers, has a lesser role in the development of UK Government EU policy than Scotland. Professor Drew Scott of the University of Edinburgh, who also suggests that "the primary legislative competences of the Scottish Parliament conceivably could place it in a more powerful position that the NAW with regard to the UK European policy process", again supports our assertion.

7. Public Perceptions

7.1 The Welsh electorate is becoming more positive in its attitude towards devolution. There is a clear body of research evidence that it regards the National Assembly for Wales as lacking influence and power, and that it should have greater influence.

7.2 This is shown by the recently published findings of the Electoral Commission report, Wales votes? Public attitudes towards Assembly elections. Their findings clearly show that, since 1997, there has been a growth in support for a Welsh Parliament. Whereas in 1997 only 19 per cent of those surveyed expressed a Parliament as their Constitutional Preference, 39 per cent supported the idea in 2001. When compared to those who favoured no elected body over the same period, there is a substantive drop from 40 per cent to 23 per cent.

7.3 This research is supported by the findings of an HTV/NOP poll conducted in November 2002. Those who expressed support for either a Welsh Parliament with law and tax raising powers or a Welsh Parliament with no tax raising powers totalled 43 per cent. This compares to only 29 per cent who said that Wales should return to being governed by Westminster.

7.4 Those who favour the status quo have remained largely static over the same period, with 28 per cent favouring an Assembly in 1997 compared to 26 per cent in 2001.

7.5 This demonstrates an increasing desire on the part of the Welsh electorate for Wales to have primary legislative powers.

7.6 Electoral Commission findings also clearly indicate that the Assembly is generally regarded as an administrative rather than a political institution, with only 17 per cent of the Welsh electorate believing that the National Assembly has the most influence upon the Government of Wales. Significantly, 54 per cent think that the Assembly ought to have more influence.

7.7 The same Electoral Commission research also concluded that it is thought appropriate that a body exists to make decisions for Wales, but that it is a body that has so far failed to live up to its potential. The report states that:

7.8 "It is indifference towards the Assembly that appears to be at the root of low turnout and ignorance of it, rather than opposition to the principle of devolution".

7.9 The HTV poll conducted in November 2002 also clearly points to likely indifference in the forthcoming elections to the National Assembly for Wales. Only 37 per cent of those questioned said they were certain to vote.

7.10 The only way in which a Welsh legislature can live up to its potential is if it is given primary legislative powers. We believe that, if a Welsh legislature is fully empowered, the Welsh electorate will view it as being more relevant and that this will also help to tackle the potential for low turnouts in Assembly elections.

7.10 Politicians of all Welsh Political parties are joining the growing demands for more powers for Wales. As well as Welsh Liberal Democrats, Welsh Labour politicians such as Alun Pugh have been calling for a Welsh Parliament. The Welsh Conservative David Melding has also voiced calls for Wales to be given further legislative power. Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach has also called for a primary legislative parliament for Wales.

8. Restricted Ambitions

8.1 The Welsh Liberal Democrat policy programme for Wales contains policy proposals that have been designed to meet specific Welsh needs. The same can also be said for Plaid Cymru which is also pressing for primary legislative powers. Welsh Labour politicians are also moving in this direction. In the event that any of these parties are given an electoral mandate to influence the policy programme of the Welsh Assembly Government, their ability to influence that agenda will be restricted, as some of their proposals would require there to be a Welsh Legislature with primary legislative powers. The likelihood of getting all of these measures onto the UK Government’s legislative timetable would, for reasons already discussed in this paper, be limited.

8.2 Even with an electoral mandate, these parties would be unable to deliver their policy programme in full due to the constraints of the current constitutional settlement.

8.3 This section of our submission presents a selection of Welsh Liberal Democrat policy proposals in those areas where the current National Assembly for Wales has some, but not all, legislative responsibility. A brief rationale for each policy is given, with an explanation as to why it could not be enacted by the Welsh Assembly Government, even if the will to enact them existed in the Assembly chamber.

Health and Social Services

8.4 Free Personal Care – Welsh Liberal Democrats are committed to introducing free personal care for those who require it. We believe that no one should be forced to sell their home or use their savings to pay for the care that they should expect as a right in a civilised society.

8.5 Again, this policy proposal remains little more than an aspiration until the UK Government gives Wales both the power and the necessary funding to be able to carry out such a measure. Again, Scotland has been able to implement such a measure due to its primary legislative power and more generous financial settlement.

8.6 It is possible under current powers to raise the upper capital limit before which people are forced to pay for personal care. However, this falls well short of our aspiration of free care for all.

Education and Lifelong Learning

8.7 Tuition fees - Welsh Liberal Democrats are committed to removing up-front tuition fees for students in Higher Education. We believe that up front charging for education discourages some individuals, particularly from poorer backgrounds, from pursuing their goals and aspirations through Higher Education.

8.8 The Scottish Parliament succeeded in removing up-front tuition fees. Wales is unable to do the same however. Even if Wales did have the power to enact such a measure, it would be unlikely that it would do so with the current funding mechanisms in place. Wales simply does not receive a fair share of UK resources under the Barnett Formula.

Economic Development and Trade and Industry

8.9 Micro-tax measures - Strict European Union rules forbid EU member states from issuing subsidies to businesses within their respective countries as it is deemed to be in breach of competition laws. UK wide tax breaks are also forbidden, but micro-tax measures to assist industry in specific localities are permitted.

8.10 Wales has been hit hard by economic decline. Welsh Liberal Democrats would implement micro-tax measures in those areas of Wales that have been hardest hit by economic setbacks. These powers, such as the ability to provide urban regeneration company tax breaks and research and development tax credits for assisted areas, currently lie with the UK Government. We do not believe it is appropriate for the UK Government to retain these powers when a Welsh legislature is much closer to the economic problems faced by Wales and has a much better understanding of them.

Agriculture and Rural Affairs

8.11 State Veterinary Service – Welsh Liberal Democrats wish to secure Welsh direction over the State Veterinary Service in Wales whilst remaining part of a UK structure.

8.12 The National Assembly for Wales has no formal powers relating to the State Veterinary Service (SVS), which is directly accountable to the Department for the Environment, Fisheries and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). This caused huge problems during the Foot and Mouth Outbreak of 2001 when the Welsh Assembly Government was unable to offer direction and guidance to the SVS. A reliance upon DEFRA therefore led to delays in decision making, making Welsh attempts to tackle Foot and Mouth in Wales less effective than they would otherwise have been.

8.13 To give the Welsh Assembly Government direction over the SVS in Wales would again require a Westminster Act.

Environment, Transport and Planning

8.14 Integrated transport - Welsh Liberal Democrats are committed to an integrated transport system in Wales. We would establish a Welsh Passenger Transport Authority with responsibility for the whole transport network in Wales. It would co-ordinate services and ensure that integration occurs. It would have the power to punish operators that fail in their commitments; to enforce transparency on operators; to administer travel concessionary schemes; to carry out public transport capital infrastructure projects. It would also include in its remit air transport and sea ferries, as well as trains and buses. However, primary legislative power is needed to establish it.

8.15 Building Regulations - Welsh Liberal Democrats would develop an escalating standard of energy conservation and installation of solar and other heat conservation to ensure that all new homes built in Wales were energy efficient.

8.16 We believe that such a move would not just save energy, but would also allow Wales to take the lead in moving towards sustainable housing, fulfilling and enhancing the current National Assembly for Wales’ statutory commitment to sustainable development.

8.17 We could not enact this policy under the current constitutional arrangement as control of building regulations remains with Westminster.

Local Government and Housing

8.18 Local Government Finance - Welsh Liberal Democrats would relax controls on council spending to allow councils to borrow to invest in improvements to their services. We are also committed to allowing councils to raise their own funding through fair and accountable means by replacing the Council Tax with a local income tax and the Uniform Business Rate with a locally determined tax on land values.

8.19 We have long argued that councils are better placed to determine their own spending priorities and manage their own finances than other tiers of government, and that such a move enhances local accountability. We also believe that local taxes should be determined by the individual’s ability to pay rather than by the size of their house.

8.20 Any alteration to local government finance to take this policy forward would require an act of primary legislation from the UK Government.

8.21 Local electoral arrangements – Welsh Liberal Democrats would implement the recommendations of the Sunderland Report on Local Government Electoral Arrangements in full, including measures such as the introduction of the Single Transferable Vote for elections to all councils in Wales and the reduction of the voting age to 16. We would also go beyond the Sunderland Commission and reduce the minimum age for candidates to 16, as opposed to 18.

8.22 We believe that STV will produce councils that are representative of their electorates and that by engaging young adults in the political process we are ensuring that their voice is heard. Such a move would again require the UK government to legislate on Wales’ behalf.

8.23 National Parks – Welsh Liberal Democrats would democratise National Park authorities by ensuring that half of the members are democratically elected. We would also establish a new National Park based around the Boundaries of the Cambrian Mountains Environmentally sensitive area.

8.24 These proposals would ensure local representation and improved accountability of the national park authorities and would offer the protection of National Park status to one of Wales’ most beautiful landscapes.

8.25 Scotland has already reviewed its national park authorities and has altered their structure. In Wales however, any decision to democratise National Parks or create new ones remains the prerogative of the UK Government.

Arts, Culture and Sport

8.26 Assembly Sponsored Public Bodies - Welsh Liberal Democrats wish to establish a National Assembly led review of the functions and effectiveness of all ASPBs and bodies associated with Arts, Culture and Sport in Wales to examine the extent to which greater integration of those organisations can be achieved to promote greater joint working and co-operation.

8.27 Should such a review support the rationalisation of these ASPBs, the Welsh Assembly Government would be unable to take this forward without primary legislation as many of the ASPBs were set up by Acts of Parliament.  

9. The Welsh Liberal Democrat Solution

9.1 In this section we outline the changes that need to be made to resolve the problems and failings identified in section one in order for the National Assembly to meet the needs of Wales and its people.

9.2 Welsh Liberal Democrats have long been committed to a Federal United Kingdom. This stance underpins our commitment to confer primary legislative powers upon Wales and its legislature. Such a legislature should, subject to the agreement of the Welsh people via a referendum, be able to vary income tax levels in Wales.

9.3 We envisage a new constitutional settlement with a clear division of powers between the government and the legislature from which it is drawn. An independent Welsh civil service should support the Welsh Government, with a greater capacity for policy-making than at present, allowing it to focus on Welsh solutions to Welsh problems.

9.4 We believe that this legislature should be truly representative of those that elect it, with greater equality between its members, more influence for the voter and less influence for the Welsh political parties.

9.5 The legislature should be supported by a UK-wide funding formula that takes into account the true needs of the nations and regions. This would enable it to operate effectively and, over time, we would also seek to give Wales additional powers to raise its own money.

9.6 We will highlight those policy areas in which the Assembly should have primary legislative authority.

9.7 We will then outline our detailed proposals for a new funding formula for Wales, based upon need.

9.8 With the advent of primary legislative powers to Wales, we will argue that Wales will need its own legal and criminal justice system to allow it to deal adequately with a body of Welsh Law that will become uniquely Welsh.

9.9 Finally, we will outline our proposal for a Welsh Senedd, a re-established National Assembly for Wales, that would be able to meet the demands and rigours of the policy delivery mechanisms needed to deliver primary legislation in an effective manner.

10. The Transfer of Primary Legislative Powers to Wales

10.1 To remove the restrictions currently faced by the National Assembly in relation to policy making, Welsh Liberal Democrats propose that primary legislative powers should be transferred to a Welsh Legislature in the policy areas that follow. We include those areas that the Assembly already has considerable influence over in order to present a definitive list of competences:

• Agriculture
• Arts
• Building Regulations
• Criminal Justice and the Courts
• Economic Development
• Education
• Environment
• Fire Service
• Fisheries
• Food Standards
• Forestry
• Health
• Housing
• Local Government
• National Lottery in Wales
• Natural Heritage
• Planning
• Policing
• Prison Service
• Social Services
• Sport
• Statistics, Public Registers and Records
• Substance Abuse (Drugs)
• Tourism
• Trade and Industry, specifically:
  • Planning control over renewable energy generation that exceeds 50 terrawatts
  • Ability to determine bank holidays (e.g. St. David’s Day)
  • Ability to employ micro-tax measures to assist industry in specific parts of Wales
• Training and Lifelong Learning
• Transport, specifically:
  • Bus policy
  • Greater strategic control over the railways
  • Road networks
  • Ports and harbours
• Welsh Language

11. Funding Wales

11.1 Welsh Liberal Democrats propose that Welsh funding needs should be met within the context of a Federal UK and that the Barnett Formula should be replaced with a new needs-based funding formula that meets disparities throughout the UK. We also propose that a devolved Welsh legislature should have the power to vary income tax in Wales by up to three per cent, providing it with the ability to raise additional revenue should it feel the need to do so.

A Finance Commission of the Nations and Regions

11.2 We propose that this new formula should be agreed through a Finance Commission for the Nations and Regions (FCNR). The FCNR should have a constitutional status that enshrines the principle of equity of finance across the regions and nations of the UK and it should have a duty to agree the rules governing revenue support and borrowing. It should be chaired by a new UK Cabinet Minister for the Nations and Regions, who would replace the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. The composite members of the FCNR should be drawn from representatives of the National Parliaments and Assemblies of the UK. All conclusions of the FCNR would require the consensus of its members before any revenues were released.

11.3 In its first year of existence, the prime focus of the FCNR would be to establish a new Revenue Distribution Formula (RDF) to replace the Barnett Formula. This formula would take account of health, poverty and education indicators, and available tax bases. It would also consider the problems of providing services in areas with widely dispersed populations. Such a formula would take into account all spending in the nations and regions by the UK Government and the European Union, regardless of whether this constituted revenue made available to sub-UK levels of government. The resulting RDF would therefore re-base the current distribution of expenditure to reflect needs.

11.4 Once established and, in conjunction with the Comprehensive Spending Review, the FCNR would then use the RDF to allocate new expenditure to the nations and regions of the UK. This new system would be considerably fairer than the current system as Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales would receive the new revenue on the basis of need. The same would also be true of the English regions, with their disparities also being recognised by the FCNR.

Tax varying powers

11.5 Subject to a referendum of the Welsh people, Welsh Liberal Democrats propose that a Welsh legislature should have the ability to vary the level of income tax in Wales by up to three per cent. This would provide Wales with an additional funding stream should additional revenue be required to meet its spending and policy priorities.

The NHS Contribution

11.6 The Liberal Democrats are committed to the introduction of an NHS contribution, a new earmarked tax that would replace National Insurance Contributions. The revenue raised by this tax would be exclusively for the National Health Service. The RDF outlined previously would determine the Welsh share of this NHS contribution. Additionally, we propose that a Welsh legislature should be given the power to increase the rate of the NHS contribution on employees, but not employers, providing it with another revenue-raising option.

12. A Welsh Senedd: a new policy delivery mechanism for Wales

12.1 We propose, that in order for primary legislation to be successfully enacted in Wales, a new legislature with the ability to scrutinise as well as deliver Welsh Policy is required. Our preferred model is a Welsh Senedd.

An Executive Model

12.2 We envisage a Welsh Senedd where the powers of the executive are clearly separated from those of the legislature.

12.3 A clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislature would therefore serve to end confusion indicated in section one, making the Welsh executive more accountable to both the electorate and the Senedd from which it is drawn. In separating these powers, Welsh Liberal Democrats do not wish to undermine the valuable input that committees can make to the policy making process. We would seek to maintain the committees’ input and formalise such channels, allowing them to propose amendments to Government initiated legislation and develop policy ideas of their own. Committees should be allowed to evolve in their own way, with members deciding how they are going to use them. Ultimately however, it would be the Welsh Government that would be accountable for all of the policy initiatives emerging from the Senedd.

Enhanced scrutiny

12.4 This separation of powers would also enhance the ability of the subject committees and individual elected members to scrutinise Welsh Government policy and hold it to account. But, for it to work effectively, there must be an increase in the number of elected representatives.

12.5 We have already demonstrated that the current sixty members are unable to cope with the demands of scrutiny and accountability that the current devolution settlement places upon them. As such, it is extremely unlikely that sixty elected representatives will be able to contend with the additional workload that primary legislative powers would bring. We therefore propose that the Welsh electorate should elect eighty members to the Senedd in the first instance. This should be subject to review with the Senedd having the right to increase, or indeed reduce, the number of elected representatives that it deems necessary to allow it to function effectively.

A proportional electoral system

12.6 Power should be vested with people and the representatives that they elect, not with the machinery of political parties. As such, we believe that a Senedd should be elected using a proportional voting system to ensure that the will of the Welsh electorate is broadly reflected in its the political make-up. Our preferred option is the Single Transferable Vote, whereby the electorate elect local representatives in multi-member constituencies. Such a system maintains the constituency link, which we believe to be an important aspect of democracy.

12.7 This system would also place Welsh parliamentarians on an equal footing, removing the current division between regional and constituency Assembly Members. The system would also benefit the electorate, removing the need to vote twice in Welsh elections and ending the confusion surrounding the current system.

12.8 In the absence of the Single Transferable Vote, we believe that the proportionality of regional members to constituency members should be equivalent at least to that of Scotland, namely 7 members elected per electoral region as opposed to the current four.

An independent Welsh civil service

12.9 An independent Welsh civil service should support the Welsh Government. It would be impractical to maintain a UK wide civil service with the advent of primary legislative powers in Wales. Dual accountability would also fail to work, as the lines of accountability, and possibly responsibility, would become blurred.

12.10 For these reasons we support a fully independent and impartial Welsh civil service with clear lines of accountability and responsibility to Wales, with a greater capacity for specific Welsh policy-making.

12.11 We propose to create a Welsh Public Service Commission with a remit to ensure political neutrality and appointment on merit. The Commission would report to a Welsh Senedd Committee. Every civil servant’s first duty would be to a written UK Constitution (which Liberal Democrats propose) rather than a Senedd Ministry or Minister.

Abolishing the post of Secretary of State for Wales

12.12 With the advent of a strongly empowered Senedd, Welsh Liberal Democrats do not envisage a continued role for a Secretary of State for Wales. All of the functions currently held by the post holder would be transferred to the Senedd. However, we believe it is important that the Nations and Regions of the UK maintain an input into UK affairs and policy making. We therefore propose that, at a UK level, there should be a Secretary of State for the Nations and Regions, charged with liasing between Westminster and the devolved bodies of the UK.

Reducing the number of Members of Parliament

12.13 An additional consequence of these proposals would be a diminished role for Welsh Members of Parliament. Welsh Liberal Democrats believe that the current number of Welsh MPs would be unjustified with the advent of a Welsh Senedd. We propose that upon the Senedd’s establishment, the number of Welsh MPs should be reduced. Based upon the Liberal Democrat proposal that there should be 450 MPs in a Federal UK Parliament, we propose that around 28 of these should be Welsh MPs.

13. A new legal and criminal justice system for Wales

13.1 Since the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales, a unique body of Welsh law has started to develop. This body of Welsh law will become considerable with the establishment of a Welsh Senedd with primary law-making powers.

13.2 Welsh Liberal Democrats propose that the devolution of primary legislative powers to Wales should be accompanied by the creation of a new Welsh legal and criminal justice system.

13.3 We believe that, once established, one of the Senedd's first tasks should be to establish a Commission to develop a legal and criminal justice system to meet specific Welsh legal needs.

13.4 Initially, the Senedd will operate within the current legal and criminal justice framework. One the Commission reports its findings and the necessary structures are established, there will be a hand over to new Welsh institutions.