| Declaration |
Submission to the Richards CommissionKen Hopkins |
Are any changes needed ?1. I welcome this opportunity to comment on whether the National Assembly should be given additional powers. 2. Now, however, three years in to what is only the Assembly's first term is much too soon to make a sensible judgement as to whether it really needs them. This is particularly the case when, as will be demonstrated later, the Assembly surprisingly does not yet seem to be making full use even of those powers already available to it. 3. Understandably however, in view of our present uncertainties, the First Minister, has asked also for views on the controversial electoral system used in the election of Assembly Members. It is my considered view that as soon as possible the Commission should strongly recommend changes to a system which seriously confuses Welsh voters. They are now faced at the ballot box with the need to vote for both of what we might call Assembly Constituency and List candidates : two very different creatures, the first democratically accountable to the voters in a constituency, the other accountable only to the Party bosses drawing up the all important Party List priority order. Inevitably, such a dual member system forces parties in to irrational coalition. Built in to the present Assembly electoral system, it has also been a significant factor in making it almost impossible for the 40 Constituency Assembly Members to give the Welsh people that effectively devolved and accountable democratic government for which they so narrowly voted in the Referendum. |
Uncertainties of the Assembly's First Term4. After the predictably hung election result and the uncertain months which followed, the second First Minister, hoping to ensure some stability for his new administration, had been reluctantly forced in to partnership with the six members of what is, with the lowest vote, the smallest opposition party in the Assembly. Since then, Rhodri Morgan has had to put up with his junior partner's cynical claim to have initiated nearly all the electorally progressive policies of the last two and a half years. It has been a most uncertain and uneasy Partnership. 5. Such uncertainty has contributed significantly to undermining the credibility of the Assembly. First, we had the contrived votes of censure, the obscure points of order, the repeated votes of no confidence, all very damaging indeed to what some of us had hoped was to be a civilised forum for the rational debate of policies leading to a Better Wales. 6. Then, depressingly, under the so called Partnership, with all its easy promises of co-operation and harmony, voters are still being turned off by the infighting, by the rumour of internal wrangling, by the essential falsity as they see it of coalition government. The truth is that voters simply just cannot understand why as many as 20 List Members can be in the Assembly, not by getting the top vote in a democratic ballot box election, but through a Party nomination fixed by cronies in the Party machine. |
Comparison with Scotland7. Some commentators have made much of the need for Wales to have parity of devolution with Scotland, but five years ago in our wide public consultation, Labour's devolution policy commission found very little support for what many then judged to be the unwanted imposition of the equivalent of an additional Scottish Tax. There is little evidence'now to show that there has been any change of opinion. 8. Nor should we forget that there can be a strength in diversity, and that there is no need for devolution to be exactly the same in all parts of the United Kingdom. In Spain, for example, the extent of the devolution varies greatly between Valencia and Catalonia with both properly reflecting local wishes obtained by regional referenda. Why should not Wales now also enjoy a devolution best suited to its own particular needs ? |
Another Referendum?9. Any major increase in devolution giving the Assembly legal and taxing powers and a reduction in the number of Welsh MPs would certainly require a second Referendum. Because of the media's unflattering coverage there has been a marked decline in support for having a National Assembly at all. Supporters of
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Devolution in Northern Ireland, London and the English Regions10. We should note too that since that first Welsh Referendum, there has come a further remarkable devolution of powers, first, in Ireland, and then London. Now there is a Bill for English Regional Government. The people of Durham do not want to be left behind. With such a momentum, it now seems certain that by 2010 we shall have yet more English devolution. 11. It also means there will then be much less risk of Wales losing, as will certainly happen in Scotland, some Westminster seats and the key Cabinet post of Secretary of State. Most significantly too, such a general and democratic decentralisation of Westminster's powers now makes it very likely that we will never have the social and economic disaster of an independent Wales and the break up of the UK. |
Making Full Use of Existing Powers12. Better for Wales to take the percipient advice recently offered by the former Secretary of State, Paul Murphy, when he quietly suggested that, before asking for any.extension of the Assembly's present powers, its Members should ensure full use of the powers they already have, for example, the power to request primary legislation which Westminster is then required to consider in the context of its legislative programme. 13. All requests for Bills must of course be channelled through the Secretary of State, because he has the task of persuading the Cabinet of their priority. Four such Bills were requested for the 2001/ 2002 session, but lack of Parliamentary time meant only one was in the Queen's Speech. 14. It is however also open to any Assembly Minister or any three Assembly Members to propose a Bill for inclusion in the Secretary of State's bid. Strangely, no such proposal has yet been made. No opposition party has made use of what could be such a politically promising opportunity to complain loudly if its proposal were excluded. 15. Another promising procedure, and one already being successfully followed, is for specific Welsh clauses to be included in a Whitehall department's Bill. A good example can be seen in the latest Health Bill, which includes important clauses
16. Such an effective devolutionary procedure should be encouraged. The First Minister and the Secretary of State should give high priority to establishing a joint procedure with an appropriate co-ordinating committee made up of MPs and AMs for the preparation and introduction, whenever it be better for Wales, of suitable Welsh clauses in to Westminster Bills. |
Damaging Effects of the List Electoral System17. Let me now turn to the damaging effect of the List electoral system used in the nomination of one third of Assembly Members. Though Labour had won a safe majority of 27 out of the 40 Constituency seats, it still could not work as a majority government because 19 out of the 20 List seats had gone to minority parties which, with their 13 constituency seats, then gave them 32 in all. Though Labour at first patiently tried to govern as a majority government, it was made impossible by the irresponsibility of the minority parties in time wasting points of order and motions of no confidence and censure. |
The Inevitability of Coalition18. After such a hung election, there could be only one alternative. The 28 Labour Members were forced inevitably in to an unwanted and unnatural coalition with the 6 Liberal Democrats. The smallest party in the Assembly, the one with the smallest vote, had thus achieved a power and influence out of all proportion to its vote. What sort of proportional representation can this be when it makes inevitable a coalition government and so hands over disproportionate power and influence to a small minority ? How can that be fair to the majority ? 19. It is salutary to remember that the same bias to a minority operates whatever PR system be used. Electoral injustice is not confined to the List system. Through compromise coalition, rooted in party deals, proportional representation systems always end up by giving disproportionate power and influence to small minority interests. What possible fairness can there be in a system which so cynically penalises the majority? |
Dutch and Irish General Elections 200220. The disadvantages of PR systems are well illustrated in this year's general elections in Holland and Ireland. In Holland, and apparently this is not uncommon, it took several weeks after polling day before the result was clear. This was to give party bosses time to get together and strike party deals, no doubt in smoke filled rooms, and then finally to agree their compromised, coalition policies. How different in the UK when, without the unprincipled barter of party policies and cynical manipulation of voting strength, the clear cut result is known within a few hours of the close of poll. 21. The same party manoeuvring was repeated in Ireland, the same pantomime of minority parties changing the policies of the majority party. All those candidates' solemn pledges, set out so openly and honestly in the party manifestos and on which the voters had so innocently based their democratic vote, were quickly changed in deals to accommodate most party advantage. 22. Such practices have all been confirmed by our own Welsh experience of party coalition. We have seen the disproportionate power of the Partnership minority party's 6 votes ruthlessly used to frustrate and negate the 27 votes of the democratic majority. At the same time, while the minority party effectively emasculates the power of the party with the most votes, the minority party members brazenly claim that the List System is the fairest of them all. |
The Essential Constituency Link23 . The List system, like other PR systems, also critically weakens the essential link between constituents and AM. In the Westminster Parliament, MPs are proud to represent all their constituents, not only those who voted for them. MPs are identified by their constituency, each representing 70 thousand or so voters who have cast their vote on the basis of the MP's promises and the policy manifesto put before them. The voters properly refer to 'my' MP, while (s)he talks of 'my' constituency. 24. Such a unique two way sense of belonging and ownership comes of course from the Parliamentary convention of an MP traditionally representing all the voters in his or her constituency however they voted, while holding regular surgeries and advice sessions, open to all. It is of the essence of Parliamentary democracy, and Constituency Assembly Members are themselves now doing their best to follow and maintain the tradition. |
Additional List Members25. It is never a role that the List Members, each claiming to represent all the voters in the 9 or 10 constituencies of a List electoral region, can realistically claim to play, though misleadingly some do try to give voters the impression that really they are just like Constituency Members. 26. Such self delusion by List Members is as unacceptable as the way in which some try to claim parity with Constituency Members. The plain truth is that List Members never suffer the stress and scrutiny of a constituency election. They never have to face, as do Constituency Members, that all important democratic ballot box accountability to the voters. 27. How different too it is for List Members, nominated to the top of a Party Priority List and thus responsible and accountable, not to the constituency voters, but to the party selection panel members who first put them there. All that List Members need do to ensure continuing re-selection is to ingratiate themselves with the Party bosses and keep that position. Voters can not understand, and thus can not trust, the dual category of membership implicit in the List system. Most Welsh voters do not want List Members. 28. Commissioners will certainly need a determined courage to stand up to the vested interests of those List Members who will not want to risk losing their relatively secure and comfortable positions. Nor should they forget that two of the Assembly party Leaders are themselves List Members, though no doubt their parties would surely want to give to them and other retiring List Members are-selection priority as candidates at least in the constituency seats that will become available. |
A Common System of Election29. Obviously, changes to an electoral system cannot be rushed. It would certainly be not realistic to expect implementation of any change in time for the elections of 2003. The Commission, however, could reasonably recommend changes be made in time for those in 2007. 30. The Commission should also now press strongly for this to be by a common form of election for all, thus ridding Wales of the confusion implicit in the List system. The Commission should make a very strong recommendation that all Assembly Members be elected in the same way. 31. The obvious change will then be for all Members to be elected by the same majority system already in use to elect the two thirds of them who are already Constituency Members. This, of course, is also the democratic majority system traditionally used, not only for the election of our MPs, but also for local government councillors in the UK. It is a system tried and tested over many, many elections. It is well understood by and familiar to the electorate, and it is now generally accepted by most British voters as the clearest and most democratic voting system of all. They are comfortable with it. It also has of course another great advantage. Majority systems abhor the compromise of coalition and very rarely fail to deliver a clear result. |
An Assembly and Cabinet Too Small32. Removing the List Members leaves us with only 40 Assembly Constituency Members and an even smaller Cabinet than now. That would be unrealistic and impossible for a National Assembly with an annual budget, which will soon rise to £12 billions. Contrast this with Carmarthenshire County Council which now has 74 councillors, or Gwynedd with 83, to scrutinise and monitor expenditure of gross annual revenue budgets for 2001 /2002 of £225 and £ 160 millions each. 33. Nor in fairness should we forget the 108 Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the 128 Members of the Scottish Parliament. How confident and proud such numbers now seem in contrast to our modest and apologetic 60 ! Are we ashamed to be Welsh ? Must we always be a poor second or even third best ? 34. The very damaging and inevitable consequences of such a small number of Welsh AMs have been an impossibly small Cabinet, Ministers greatly overburdened and no less than 10 Assembly and 5 Regional committees, each with a membership much too small to give proper and close scrutiny to detailed policy papers or to monitor adequately the performance of Cabinet Ministers. Why should we have less than the Ulstermen and the Scots ? Why should we have a National Assembly for Wales on the cheap ? 35. Why did we have to begin in our Welsh Cabinet with a Minister for Finance, who, bearing a weight of responsibility probably second in importance only to that of the First. Minister, also had to bear a Stakhanovite burden, not only for Local Government but also for the ultra sensitive Equal Opportunities portfolio ?. Again, why must we now have a Health Minister who, as if that were not enough, has also to answer for Social Services as well ? Why too, on top of all this, has each Cabinet Minister to carry a constituency case work even heavier because the health, education and local government functions, previously matters for MPs, have now all been devolved to the Assembly ? |
The Need for Scrutiny35. Everyone would agree that things are now obviously much better than when the Secretary of State and a couple of Ministers had control of the Welsh Office budget, and were accountable to MPs. Now however it is of the utmost importance that the Assembly annual spend, soon to be £12 billions, should be effectively tested, adequately scrutinised and closely monitored. How can this be properly done by 60 AMs ? It is a new and very real challenge. It must not be ignored or for political advantage dismissed as extravagance. 36. Already reference has been made earlier to the stark contrast in numbers between - our 60 Assembly Members, the 128 Members of the Scottish Parliament and the 108 Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The comparison is relevant for, even if we concede that Scotland has twice our population, we should remember that N. Ireland has about half. The Commission must recommend that we do not sell Wales and its people short. 37. Commissioners should emphasise that it is not just a question of population : the real issue is what should be the minimum number of Members to make sure that our National Assembly is working efficiently and effectively and giving a close, annual scrutiny to the spending of such huge sums of public money. 38. A 40 member Assembly could certainly not do it, nor, as we can now see, has it been possible for the present 60. There is no doubt too that the original, unfortunate and timorous decision to limit our National Assembly to such an unrealistic number reflected the political anxieties of the Referendum campaign when its opponents pilloried the Assembly as an expensive talking shop. The damaging result has been that Wales has ended up with by far the smallest devolved administration in the UK, and one now quite inadequate to get best value from its greatly increased budget. The Commisioners have the chance to put things right and ensure our National Assembly has enough Members to do its job. |
One Woman and One Man39. If the Assembly is to do that and the Welsh people are not to have a weak and inadequate Assembly, then its Members should be increased from 60 to 80. This is a modest increase and probably the smallest possible to be fit for purpose, yet is still so very much less than what has already been agreed for the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. 40. The Commissioners should grasp this unique opportunity and recommend strongly that each of the 40 constituencies should be represented by one woman and one man Assembly Member. Coincidentally, by such a change, Wales would achieve a perfect gender balance in democratic representation. It would be a perfect gender balance laid down by statute, and cross party. It would be an historic demonstration of our Welsh commitment to equal opportunity, and a splendid example to the Regional Assemblies which will now almost certainly be soon established in England on our Welsh model |
A Stronger Assembly for the New Wales41. It would also make possible an increase in the size of the present very small Cabinet and of the over burdened Assembly Committees. The close scrutiny and sharp monitoring of Committee reports and Ministerial decisions would very soon be better informed and much more effective. The result would be a more democratic and a more accountable National Assembly. 42. Because the election of our National Assembly Members would then all be by the same majority system, the voters, every four years would not be confused by the names of distant and mysterious List Members on the ballot paper, but would know each woman and each man as their own Constituency Members. They would have the democratic opportunity to bring them all to account at the ballot box. 43. Thus the National Assembly would become the new engine to transform the quality of our lives. To do that properly, it must be running effectively. The suggested changes in the electoral system linked to a comparatively small increase in the number of Assembly Members, would be much more effective, and would also significantly strengthen devolution. Very soon it would make our National Assembly indispensable to the new Wales, and provide a splendid exemplar for the English regions to follow. Let us show them the way. |