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Introduction
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| ‘Today is a crucial day in the life
of the House of Commons… we are embarking on…
changes that constitute the most important parliamentary
reforms of the century.1
(Norman St John-Stevas, Leader of the House, 1979)2 |
| ‘[The Assembly’s Subject Committees
are an attempt] to combine the traditional scrutinising
role of the Commons Select Committees with the perceived
advantage of local government committees which were presumed
to encapsulate the principles of inclusivity in policy
development.’ (J Barry Jones, Director, Welsh Governance
Centre, 2001) 3 |
| This dissertation will compare the committee
powers of two very different institutions: the House of
Commons and the Welsh Assembly (NAW). I will attempt to
see if the departmental ‘select committee experience’
of scrutiny over the past twenty four years has anything
to teach the Assembly subject committees of today. Have
the Act and the Assembly standing orders enabled the
culture of ‘accountability and inclusivity’
(promised by Alun Michael)4
and the commitment to ‘arrangements’
for ‘effective scrutiny of decisions’ (as promised
by the National Assembly Advisory Group)? 5To
date, Assembly committees’ ‘scrutinising of
the Administration… is patchy.6 The powers the committee has, along with
mitigating factors such as the committees’ appointment
procedure are the only tools to hold the executive in
check. I intend to look at the scrutiny function of the
post-1979 Departmental Select Committees and the Assembly’s
subject committees. Both breeds have a very similar scrutiny
function. Both committees have to hold an executive to
account; both committees have to quiz ministers over policy
decisions and the spending of billions of pounds.7
The modernisation of the House of Commons has promoted
a series of reform proposals. Equally in Wales two official
reviews of the Assembly’s operations have been commissioned.
It seemed timely, therefore, to analyse the calls for
reform of committees in Wales and Westminster, to compare
the ‘powers of scrutiny’ in these two levels
of government.8 |
| Scrutiny powers are closely involved with
the policy-making role. When developing policy and questioning
former policy you need to have the powers to secure information
and witnesses. Scrutiny powers, therefore, are central
to all of the various roles of the committees and are
not just associated with the scrutiny of the executive
(- namely the Welsh Assembly Government- WAG). The purpose
of this dissertation is to give examples of ‘best
practice’ in scrutiny by analysing Parliament’s
experiences since Norman St John Stevas formally established
Departmental Select Committees in 1979. However, the roles
of each type of committee are far from identical. Assembly
committees have a formal policy making and pre-legislative
scrutiny role quite unlike parliamentary select committees.
Such a difference in purpose will fundamentally affect
any comparison. However, both types of committees have
- since their inception- an overt scrutiny function.9
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| Methodology |
| I will be limiting myself to analysing
the experiences of Departmental Select Committees, the
Public Accounts Committee and the Assembly’s subject
committees and Audit Committee. The methodology behind
this is simple. The systematic scrutiny of executive actions,
ministerial decisions and quangos occurs largely in Wales
and Westminster within the ‘departmental / subject’
committees and comparing like with like is vital for a
balanced approach. It is true that as the table in appendix
A shows, the Assembly’s European Affairs committee
can be compared to the Foreign Affairs Committee but the
later deals with issues that the Assembly has no official
role in. Whereas the subject committees act more like
a ‘conveyor belt’ dealing with similar issues
to their Westminster counterpart but further ‘up’
or ‘down’ that belt. Intergovernmental relations
are based on this fundamental assumption.10
Equally, the Assembly’s Legislation committee is
comparable only with the Deregulations committee in the
Commons and its actions are important but the systematic
scrutiny of government action is not as present as the
subject committees. Finally, the Assembly’s Equality
of Opportunity committee is unique in the UK and has no
counterpart in Westminster. Those are the reasons for
excluding the committees from the dissertation. |
| I will firstly compare the constitutional
framework of each institution as the choices made and
the actions taken in committees are radically effected
by the constitutional context in which they take place.
I will then compare the powers of these two breeds of
committee. The most important are clearly the power to
send for persons and the power to ‘send for papers
and records.’ The dissertation will mostly be taken
up comparing the use of these two core powers in the Assembly
and Westminster. The power to send for persons will look
into calling elected members, officials and private citizens
and see if Westminster has anything to teach the Assembly.
The power to send for a papers will detail what lessons
Westminster has learned from issues like confidentiality,
the Osmotherly rules, inter-departmental correspondence.
The committees’ ancillary powers such as the power
to appoint specialist advisers and ‘adjourn from
place to place’ will also be analysed to see what
effect they can have on scrutiny. Finally, in order to
set the wider context in which scrutiny occurs, the last
chapter will analyse the various factors which influence
how and whether committee powers are used. These issues
include the method of appointing members, the political
balance of power on the committee, constitutional conventions,
actions by government departments, and the support for
members. |
| In my position as a researcher for almost
three years to a member of the National Assembly for Wales
I have been in the advantageous position of being able
to see things ‘from the coalface.’ As a result
of my work I have also conducted numerous semi-structured
interviews with Assembly members and officials- some lasting
several hours. Some of those interviewed asked for their
contributions not to be attributed. |
1 Gavin,
Drewery, ‘The New Select Committees, 1989, (2nd
edition) Clarendon Press, p13.
2 First report of
the Procedure Committee,’ The working of the Select
Committee system’ Vol 1, 1990.
3 John Osmond, ‘Carving
Out a Distinctive Position’ in Inclusive Government
and Party Management, (2000) p 158.
4 Alun, Michael, foreword
to Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales
(Welsh Office 1999)
5 Martin, Evans, Evidence
to the Procedural Review, ARP 02-01 (p6), 2000, p4.
6 John Osmond, From
Corporate Body to virtual Parliament,’ The State
of the Nations 2003, Imprint Academic, Robert Hazell
(ed), p24.
7 The Committee Systems
of the House of Commons, Stationary Office, (2001), p18 |
8 Namely
the Review of Procedure and the Richard Commission.
9 Public Standing
orders 152(4) and the Assembly’s standing orders
9.7
10 Deil, Wright, ‘Understanding
Intergovernmental Relation,’ (third edition), p3.
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