|
 |
| |
Committee systems influence on scrutiny
|
|
‘Much depends on the readiness of
the committee to act against party interest…and
the ability to mobilise the House behind them’
(Diana Woodhouse, 1994)182
|
| The use of committee powers
is not the sole determinant of effective scrutiny. Committees
are influenced by a myriad of issues such as the appointment
procedure, deputy ministers, chair-minister relations,
resources and the Osmotherly rules. |
Assembly’s unique issues
|
| Scrutiny sessions |
| In the Assembly, the Minister
is at every committee meeting. Scrutiny is mixed in an
organic way with policy development.183
They are ‘neither fish nor foul.’184
As a result it’s hard to tell when the committee
is in a ‘scrutiny’ or ‘policy’ mode.185
There are two definitions of scrutiny. The original intention
was to have ‘scrutiny periods’ where the minister
would face questions based on their ‘minister’s
report.’ A new report was expected every fortnightly
with usually 15 minutes of questions but since the Procedural
Review in November 2001 the reports occur once a month
with 45 minutes for questions. The major flaw with this
is that -although standing orders enable a member to request
a minister include an issue in her/his report- by and
large the vast majority of the minister’s twenty
to thirty pages will be of her own making.186 The minister, therefore, decides the topics upon
which she is scrutinised. Such a power is only dreamed
of at Westminster. Each week the chair could provide a
list of issues the Minister must include in her report.
Although this happens it is not the norm.187
The second view of committee scrutiny is that it is continuous
and nebulous with the minister’s report at its heart.
Every issue, however, has the potential of being converted
to mini ‘scrutiny’ session if members want it
to.188 As
the Prime Minister agreed to a biannual scrutiny session
by the Liaison committee the least the Assembly Committees
should consider is an annual scrutiny session of their
Minister. Plaid Cymru are in favour of separate scrutiny
meetings189 and Westminster has set the precedent.190 |
| Minister as Member |
| Unlike select committees whose
membership is comprised entirely of backbenchers, the
Assembly committees require the relevant Minister- by
law- to be a member of his/her own committee.191
The committees were ‘intended to be the engine
room of the Assembly.’192 The Minister is a full member. Any committee
paper that provides a critique of her polices will be
sent to the Minister also, giving her at least two days
warning of any thorny issues. NAW should seek to secure
from all Ministers that in such a situation they would
ask the clerks from not sending them the paper in question,
thereby allowing effective scrutiny and preserving the
character of the Minister. |
| The effect on scrutiny in
the Assembly was seen during the Environment, Planning
and Transport Committee’s investigation into the
Nantygwyddon landfill site. The committee’s investigation
was being used as evidence against the Environment Minister’s
alleged breach of the EU’s Waste Framework Directive.
The UK government, defending its position sought from
the Minister a critique of the EPT committee’s report,
which she herself had helped to investigate and compose.193 One solution to such a problem
has been suggested by the IWA where a committee established
a sub-committee which excludes the minister and if an
issue is judged to create a conflict of interest the committee
reforms as a sub-committee and the minister and deputy
are duly excluded.194 However, Dr Edwards AM disagrees, the
Minister presence permits ‘continuous scrutiny’
and her presence creates ‘no institutional barriers
to effective scrutiny’ the present arrangements far
from inconvenient in fact provides ‘no escape’
from committee scrutiny. 195 |
| Deputy Ministers |
| The position of so called
‘deputy ministers’ on the same subject committee,
as the portfolio they manage is unacceptable. The role
has no ‘locus in the Act,’ but they can stand
in for the Minister at functions and their roles are ‘up
to the Minister’ to determine and – as Richard
Edwards AM stated- they are a bit like a PPS.196
PPS and even ‘regular opposition spokespersons’
were banned from sitting on committees by the Committee
of Selection in 1980, resulting in the expulsion of two
MPs from their committees, passing 127 vote to 0 in the
Commons.197
It was said that the presence of such people ‘might
lead to doubts about the course of the enquiry or the
content of the reports.’198
The Assembly is the same. The Economic Development Committee,
for example, has a Labour Chair, a Labour Minister, and
a Labour Deputy Minister. The Committee of Selection decided
to exclude such people from committees due to their closeness
to the executive; the four Deputy Ministers are clearly
closer. Several members of select committees have been
forced to resign for leaking draft reports to ministers.
If the confidentiality of committee reports is so important
in Westminster that a leak is a resignation matter, the
presence of deputies on committees should certainly be
one too.199 |
| Chair/Minister relations |
| Due to the permanent presence
of the Minister ‘the crucial factor determining the
dynamics of a Subject Committee is the relationship between
the Cabinet Secretary and the Chair.’200
However, has the intended role of the Chair been realised?
The National Assembly Advisory Group stated the ‘chairs
are checks on the power of the secretary (and therefore
the executive)... as they have a key role as agenda setters.’201 Relationships between the Minister and the
key agenda setter for the committee can greatly influence
the actions of the committee. |
| Some committee chairs have
a very close relationship with ministers. Particularly
co-operative relationships occur when the chair is of
the same political party as the minister. As Dr Hywel
Francis MP stated there is an ‘apparent consensus
that appears to exist between the chair and the minister’
which has lead to the Culture committee being ‘overruled
or elements within the committee’ over the Welsh
language. 202 |
| One official commented that
a former committee chair and Minister were occasionally
too close, in that the chair acted as a filter on the
information received by the committee.203
Ministerial mistakes were spotted and papers returned
for correction before the committee saw them. Accuracy
is important but there is a fine line between ensuring
only quality information is seen by the committee and
protecting a party colleague from potentially damaging
criticism from opposition members. Other concerns were
that some meetings between the chair and the minister
were conducted in an overtly party political manner. Issues
were seen through a joint party political lens and dealt
with accordingly. No doubt, such criticism would have
to be balanced by any perceived benefit the committee
received from such actions by the chair. At the end of
the day, greater co-operation and the frank exchange of
information is in everyone’s best interest. When
this was put to another senior official they too were
recognisant of the inherent dangers involved and gave
a few examples of committees where a close relationship
could be said to be present.204 However, the official said it
was for the committee members to express dissatisfaction
if they feel their chair was ‘too close’ to
the Minister. Such a situation has never arisen. These
fears were rejected by Dr Edwards AM, the current Chair
of the EPT Committee. Dr Edwards felt a good working relationship
was ‘essential’ to the work of the committee
and a good by product of the committee system as long
certain barriers were drawn.205
|
| Joint issues for Select
and Subject Committees |
| Appointment Procedure |
| As Gwynyth Dunwoody stated ‘ours is one of the
few parliaments that lets the ministers choose the people
who are actually going to question them. Now frankly,
if we are going to do the scrutiny role properly, that
ought to be a House of Commons matter.’206
Removing the whips would also enable the creation of a
truly independent career alternative for MPs/AMs.207
Who gets to be on what committee has been the cause of
pitch battles in Westminster for decades. And the whips
have a history of ‘seeking to minimise dissent and...
discourage expressions of independent thought.’208
Recently, with the Modernisation and the Liaison Committee
reports this issue has again been come to ahead.209 In contrast no single submission
to the Assembly reviews has commented on the appointment
procedure to date. |
| The procedure in both institutions
is largely informal and ‘…is heavily influenced
by the Whips.’210
However, there is a framework within which the process
formally occurs. In the Commons, the Committee of Selection
nominates members to serve on the committees and this
list is approved via a division. Technically, this committee
can amend the list. However, in practice the list that
is laid before the chamber is ‘primarily on the basis
of the list supplied by the Whips.’211
The numbers of members must broadly reflect the balance
of power in the house- ensuring a government majority
on all committees. Standing orders also ensure that MPs
are elected to serve the committee for one parliamentary
term giving them security of tenure. Outside this requirement
the ‘usual channels’ of party politics take
over. This recent exchange in the Modernisation committee
between the Nicholas Winterton MP and Lord Sheldon speaks
for itself: |
| ‘(Winterton) I want to
get that on record, that successive governments have actually
abused their power in selecting people to go onto select
committees. |
| (Sheldon) ‘Unquestionably,
that is undoubtedly true, and you are a living example
of it.’212 |
| The Assembly has a similar
system that is equally influenced by the whips and the
informal procedure will differ between parties. The Government
of Wales Act stipulates that the members elected by the
Assembly to the committees shall ‘reflect the balance
of the parties in the Assembly.’213 There is no ‘committee of selection’
however standing orders state that AMs are elected for
one Assembly term giving them the same protection as MPs.
The Business Minister after consulting the Business Committee
tables a motion (list) of AMs to be elected to a committee.
The lists are subject to the normal influence of political
party machinery. Standing orders make no provision for
an AM to request they be placed on a certain committee;
it is entirely in the gift of the party. |
| What can the Assembly learn
from Westminster? The reforms of the select committee
membership procedure have been growing in number in recent
years. In the Assembly too, the Deputy Presiding Officer
has expressed his desire for the removal of the power
of the whips in choosing committee membership.214
Liaison Committee in March 2000 recommended a ‘three
wise men’ procedure, which has gained little support.
The proposal was for the House in ‘the early weeks
of a [new] Parliament’ to appoint a chairman of Committees
and two Deputy Chairmen of Committees.’215
These would be senior and respected MPs and would work
in a ‘non partisan’ way sifting through the
MPs applications to join committees and present the final
list to the House. This idea was rejected by the Modernisation
Committee, chaired by the Leader of the House Robin Cook,
preferring an independent ‘Committee of Nominations’
chaired by the deputy Speaker. This too was voted down
on the 14th May 2002. The Assembly should consider
implementing Mr Cook’s suggestion. However, some
opposition was raised. Some MPs feared a ‘gerontocracy’
where the nomination committee- dominated by senior MPs-
would block new MPs,’ but mostly MPs were motivated
by party allegiance over backbench unity.216
As Eric Forth MP stated: ‘tribute was rightly
paid to the current custodianship of the Government Whips
Office for an abler and much fairer representation of
the minority parties…’217 The Speaker too was unhappy
about the potential ‘politicisation’ of his
deputy.218
However, William Hague in 2000 pledged Tory support for
such a committee.219 Clearly, with such a small membership
new AMs need not fear a gerontocracy but Assembly reforms
will need to ensure a ‘win win’ situation where
any benefits of whip involvement is not lost by their
removal. However, as Maxwell Hyslop MP stated ‘there
is no fool proof system except the personal integrity
of every member.’220
As Westminster has proven the NAW must give serious consideration
to an independent method of appointing chairs. |
| Post-election delays |
| As the next term begins, however,
there are a number of issues that have arisen in Westminster
that could occur in the Assembly. The Liaison Committee
reported in 2000 of long delays setting up the committees
after an election. For example it took over six months
for the committees to be set up in 1983. It took over
five months in 1987 and over two months in 1992, enabling
some committees to meet just before breaking for the summer
recess. Clearly, the periods are reducing. The reasons
given for these delays are a mixture of procedural ineptitude,
executive arrogance, and political conspiracy.221
Such delays could happen with the Assembly, however standing
order 8.3 says ‘After each ordinary election
the Assembly shall elect members of all committees’
so such delays could in no ordinary sense of the words
‘after each ordinary election,’ be longer than
a few weeks.222
Following on from the call by the Liaison committee
and Renee Short- Chair of the Social Services Committee,
the NAW must ensure that any delay in determining a post
election cabinet does not unduly delay the establishment
of committees. 223 |
| Appointing chairs |
| It is up to the newly appointed
select committee to appoint its chair but only ‘if
they have the guts to do it.’224 The convention remains that a new chair must
have the backing of the Whips. Although there have been
exceptions. Via informal means, pressure on the whips
and a rebellion by backbenchers the government had to
back down. Both names were reinstated on amended lists
and approved by the House; both Committees reinstated
them as ‘Chairman’ at their first meetings.225
Again we see the strength of will among members is essential
for scrutiny. |
| The Assembly has a more formal
method of appointing chairs, which is more open to political
patronage. The committees do not choose the chairs. The
Assembly vote for a ‘panel of chairs’ from which
the chairs of each subject committee shall be drawn.226
This is not like the Liaison Committee; the panel does
not publish reports on any issue it is merely an internal
panel for discussing procedural issues of joint concern.
The influence of the whips and the party machine can again
be exercised here. The membership of the panel must reflect
the balance of power of the Assembly.227
Ministers cannot become chairs. Each party negotiates
through the Business Committee who and what party gets
which committee. Ron Davies was famously forced to resign
from the Economic Development Committee after a tough
scrutiny session with the then First Minister, Alun Michael.
During these sessions he has proved his ability to skilfully
extract information from wary civil servants and act as
an effective scrutiniser of government. As the Plaid Cymru
AM, Phil Williams stated ‘I pay tribute to…
the Chair, Ron Davies. It was due to how those [committee]
meetings were handled, with a judicious mix of informed
pugnacity and constructive discussion that the right questions
were asked and the right answers given.’228
Such a situation is, however, isolated and the Deputy
Presiding Officer has expressed a wish to remove party
political element from chair selection.229
However, no official evidence submitted to the two reviews
has mentioned this as a problem. NAW should see that chairs
are appointed for one Assembly term thereby giving them
the security to scrutinise without fear of pressure from
WAG. |
| Osmotherly Rules 230 |
| As we have seen in ‘send
for papers’ these ‘rules’ are important
for scrutiny in Westminster and Wales. As the civil service
is not devolved each civil servant in Wales is ultimately
accountable to the Cabinet Secretary in Whitehall. The
new Clerk to the Assembly was ‘technically signed
off by the Prime Minister.’231
As a Welsh civil servant stated in his submission to the
Procedural Review ‘there were plans for a welsh ‘Osmotherly
rules’ but ‘thankfully the view did not prevail.
(Either that or we never got round to it!).’232 There appears to be no plans for a Welsh version
of these rules to guide the civil servants on how to act
in front of the committees. No doubt it has been used
as a rough guide. |
| The rules’ effect is
to undermine the informal scrutiny methods preferred by
Select Committees. As Edward du Cann MP stated ‘…a
poor miserable document. Its whole flavour is wrong.233
The attitude of whoever wrote it is wrong.’ Rule
thirty, for example, prohibits officials from not giving
evidence or answering ‘questions in the field of
political controversy.’234
But ‘are not most governmental matters politically
controversial?’235
Prof. Hennessy’s belief that they are ‘twenty
five pages of how to say I can’t answer that question
may I to refer you to my Minister?’ is particularly
accurate.236
Although in reality- and luckily for scrutiny purposes-
these rules have been ‘honoured more in their breach
than the observance.’237
The OPO must do all it can to discourage the development
of a welsh version. However, as one civil servant stated
‘that the [present committee system] works owes much
to Ministers’ commitment to open government…
creating a climate in which officials can speak frankly
and constrictively without forfeiting the Minster’s
confidence. It’s a more grown up politics…’238 |
| Committee Resources |
| The ‘paucity of select
committee resources undermines their capacity to be fully
informed on relevant aspects of government policy.’239 In comparison to the Assembly
Westminster has made little progress. As the Procedure
Committee stated in 1990 ‘The most ambitious proposal
for the expansion of the scale of Select committee support
was… the establishment of research units for each
committee, additional secretarial and research allowances
for committee members, and salaries for committee chairmen
and members.’240
Sir John Weller MP on the other hand saw the need for
‘a few extra resources, like a fax machine’
for the chairmen of committees.241
The Liaison Committee in 2002 again called for a ‘central
unit of specialist support staff to be in place in the
next financial year.’ This has so far lead to nothing.
242The Assembly has certainly achieved
the former and has furnished the committees with all but
additional salaries for committee members. |
| The creation by the Assembly
of a Members Research Service (MRS) must be the single
biggest boost to security that has placed Assembly committees
in a far stronger position than select committees.243
The MRS will have unrivalled access to a panel of expert
researchers specialising in the committees work. MRS is
split into four subject areas and produces brief and background
data. It bears a remarkable resemblance to Bennet and
Pullinger’s plans published in 1992.244
The first few meetings have been bumpy with the culture
minister complaining about the standard/quality of the
research.245 Some members have complained
that it is producing more reading material rather than
condensing the existing paperwork.246 One Chair also sought to introduce
a ‘chair filter’ ensuring that a committee member
had to get their approval before asking the MRS to investigate
something.247
The MRS will clearly improve the ‘collective memory’
of the committees as the permanent researchers join committee
clerks, deputy clerks, and administrative assistants as
the support network for the subject and standing committees.
An addition to this would be to enable the existing budget
for specialist assistance to be used for additional clerical
assistance. For example a committee could be allowed to
keep any previous years underspend to enable it to afford
additional assistance. This idea was supported by the
Defence committee who wanted some ‘surge capacity’
to be able to call on more staff ‘at time of high
pressure.’248
Such innovations should give the clerks more time to be
the strategic planners and enablers they were intended
to be. |
| National Audit Office |
| The use of the National Audit
Office staff/reports has been a key issue in recent times.
The high level of scrutiny provided by the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC) and Assembly Audit committee are largely
due to the detailed reports the NAO compiles. Nationally,
the NAO has over 900 researchers/auditors working for
it; the majority of them are qualified accountants. As
Hennessy stated ‘the tradition of meticulously filleting
files continues, conducted by a battalion of relentlessly
tidy minded accountants… who fashion ammunition to
place in the hands of MPs… kept lamps in the Treasury
burning late.’249
In a letter to the chairman of PAC from the Auditor-General,
Sir John Bourn, confirmed his willingness to consider
‘secondees, short term or even medium term’
from the NAO to help out departmental select committees.250
The Defence Committee wanted two and but got only one
secondee during 1980.251 In the interests of effective scrutiny, all
Assembly Committees should seize on such an opportunity.
A secondee from the Auditor General for Wales’ office-
available for use by other committees- would significantly
improve the quality of expert advice available and compliment
the work of the MRS. Since a previous Westminster government
approved such a scheme the Assembly should easily be able
to adopt it.252 |
| The use of NAO reports by
committees should also be seriously considered. As Norman
St John Stevas stated ‘it’s ridiculous that
[they] should be confined to PAC. They’re there to
serve the general well-being.’253
Any MP or AM can request the NAO investigate a matter
for them and report back. However, the Audit committees
can only request detailed investigations into issues.254
The Public Accounts Committee acts as a gatekeeper to
all NAO reports. Only with the permission of the PAC can
another committee take evidence on it.255 This is the same in the Assembly. Such a
position should be amended to ensure that the Audit committees
get ‘first refusal’ to take evidence on a report.
If they decline then it should be made available to other
committees. If they accept, once their report is published
it should again be made available to other committees.
As the Defence Committee stated ‘we were unable to
persuade the PAC’ to ask for an NAO report on defence
that had not been given to the PAC. As a result they were
unable to use the completed NAO report to scrutinise the
government even though the report complimented an area
they were currently studying.256 Some caution should be taken,
however, as in the early years, committees discovered
that some internal documents were being marked ‘not
to be shown to the NAO.’257 |
Recommendations
- Ministers should refuse to accept delivery of committee
papers that are written for the purposes of scrutinising
them.
- The Appointment of AMs to committees should be independent
and not involve party whips.
- Deputy Ministers should not be allowed to sit on
the committee that scrutinises their department.
- The Appointment of Committee chairs should also
be independent and for a one Assembly term (4 years).
- Delays in the choosing of cabinet members must not
delay the establishment of NAW committees.
- Consideration should be given to the establishment
of Scrutiny sub-committees of each subject committee
for the purposes for discussing scrutiny issues without
the Minister being present.
- Guidance should be drawn up for all committee chairs
to ensure they do not behave in a partisan way with
their Minister.
- Serious consideration should be given to requesting
a secondee from the NAO/AGW to work with committees
- Completed NAO/AGW reports should be made available
to all subject committees to take evidence sessions
on them if they so wished.
|
182
Woodhouse, Diana, ‘Ministers and Parliament, Clarendon
Press, 1994, p202.
183 Interview with Dr Richard Edwards
AM.
184 J Barry Jones, ‘Politics
and Crisis Management: ‘The Agriculture and rural
Development Committee,’ in Building a Civic Culture,
2002, p159.
185 Alan Storer and Alistair Cole,
‘Politics as Normal: The Economic Development Committee’
in Building a Civic Culture, 2002, p116.
186 Interview with an official January
2003.
187 See Committee annual reports.
|
188
Interview with Richard Edwards AM, January 2003.
189 Response by Plaid Cymru The Party
of Wales Assembly Group to the Procedural Review, ARP
05-01 (p14), 2000, p5
190 Perkins, Anne, Blair agrees to
scrutiny by MPs, Guardian, 27/4/02.
191 Government of Wales Act 1998,
section 57(4).
192 Inclusive Government and Party
Management: the National Assembly for Wales and the Work
of its Committees, March 2001, p5.
193 Edwards, Richard, ‘Evidence
to the Richard Commission’ 25 November 2002, p3.
|
194
Patchett, Keith and Osmond, John ‘ Enhancing Welsh
Input into Westminster Legislation: the Institute of Welsh
Affairs’ contribution to the National Assembly’s
Operational Review, IWA discussion paper 14, March 2001,
p 7.
195 Edwards, Richard, ‘Evidence
to the Richard Commission’ 25 November 2002, p6
196 Ibid, p11-12.
197 Michael, Jogerst ‘Reform
in the House of Commons: the select committee system’
University of Kentucky, 1993, p101.
198 Cremin, Mathew, ‘The Setting-up
of the Departmental Select Committees after the 1992 Election.’
Parliamentary Affairs, p313.
199 Ian, Loveland, ‘The House
of Commons, in Constitutional Law (2nd Edition)
2000, p140. |
200
Jones, Barry, ‘Driven by Events: the Agriculture
and Rural Development Committee,’ in Inclusive Government
and party Management, Ed J Barry Jones and John Osmond,
IWA (2001), p104
201 Laffin, Martin and Thomas, Alys,
‘Designing the National Assembly for Wales, Parliamentary
Affairs, p569.
202 Evidence given to the Welsh Affairs
Committee, Monday 21st October 2002, by Dafydd
Elis Thomas, para 14-17.
203 Interview with author, January-
February 2003.
204 Ibid. |
205
Interview with author.
206 Gwynyth Dunwoody MP, ‘Breakfast
with Frost’ http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=cache:
yprbPg_bNMC:news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/audiovideo/programmes/breakfast_with_frost/
newsid_1440000/1440138.stm+anderson++%22dunwoody%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
207 David Beetham, Pauline Ngan and
Stuart Weir ‘Democratic Audit: An Inauspicious
Year for Democracy’, Parliamentary Affairs, p404.
208 Peter Bennett and Dr, Stephen
Pullinger Making the Commons Work: information Analysis
and Accountability,’ p6.
209 First Report of the Modernisation
Committee, Select Committees, 2002.
210 First Report of the Liaison Committee:
Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive.
HMSO. P ix |
211
Ibid.
212 Modernisation Committee, Select
Committees, HC 224-1, 2002, oral evidence 17 October 2001
para 8-9.
213 Section 57(8) Government of Wales
Act 1998.
214 Interview with author, January
2003.
215 First report, of the Liaison committee,
Shifting the Balance: Unfinished Business, HC 321-11,
para |
216
UCL Monitor issue 19, June 2002, page 4
217 Hansard, 21 November 2002, column
878
218 White, Michael, ‘Speaker’s
doubts halt whip reform,’ The Guardian, 5/1/02.
219 Hague, William, ‘Hague: Launch
of Norton Commission Report,’ 10/07/00.
220 Ann Davies, ‘Reforming Select
Committees: The First Year,’ The Outer Circle Policy
Unit, p16.
221 Crewin, Martin. ‘The Setting-up
of the Departmental Select Committees after the 1992 Election,
Parliamentary Affairs, 1993, p309. |
222
First report, of the Liaison committee, Shifting the Balance:
Unfinished Business, HC 321-11, vol 2, appendix 26, para,
18.
223 Drewery, Gavin, ‘The New
Select Committees.’ Second edition, 1989, page 422.
224 Lord Sheldon, formerly Robert
Sheldon MP, chair of the Liaison Committee 1992-1997 evidence
to the Modernisation committee’s first report, evidence,
wed 17th October 2001, para
225 http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=cache:2RJTgsSfL9QC:news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_
politics/1442839.stm+anderson++%22dunwoody%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
226 Section 57(5)(6), Government of
Wales Act 1998
227 Government of Wales Act 1998,
section 57(5). |
228
Jones, Barry, ‘The National Assembly for Wales and
the work of its Committees, (2001) p83.
229 Interview with the author.
230 The ‘official’ name
is ‘Memorandum of Guidance: Departmental Evidence
and Response to Select Committee.’
231 Lord Elis-Thomas, evidence to
the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Monday 27th
May 2002, para 924.
232 Martin Evans, Written submission
to the Procedural Review, February 2001, 02-01(p6).
233 Hansard, 16-22 January, 1981,
col. 1666.
234 Firs Report of the Procedure Committee,
Vol 1, 1990, para 150. |
235
Rodney, Brazier ‘Constitutional Practice, the foundations
of British Government (third edition) Oxford University
Press, p232.
236 Peter, Hennessy and Frank Smith,
‘Teething the Watchdogs: Parliament, Government and
Accountability,’ p16.
237 Para 157
238 Martin Evans, Written submission
to the Procedural Review, February 2001, 02-01(p6).
239 Ian, Loveland, ‘The House
of Commons,’ in Constitutional Law (2nd
Edition) 2000, p138.
240 Evidence of Professor Philip Norton
given to the Procedure Committee, Vol 1 1990 para 92.
241 Ibid
242 Liaison committee, Select Committees:
Modernisation Proposals, (2001-02) HC 692 p7. |
243
Appendix D.
244 Peter Bennett and Dr . Stephen
Pullinger Making the Commons Work: information Analysis
and Accountability,’ p28-29.
245 Minutes of the Culture Committee
on the 5/2/03.
246 Interview with an Assembly Member,
January 2003.
247 Rhodri Glyn Thomas, minutes of
the Culture Committee on the 5/2/03.
248 First Report, Liaison Committee,
1997, Appendix 6, para 10.
249 Hennessy, Peter, Whitehall, Pimlico,
(2001), p 332 |
250
Evidence given by the Rt Hon Alan Williams MP, Modernisation
Committee report, Select Committees, Wednesday 19 December
2001 para92.
251 Brothwick, R.L, ‘the Defence
Committee.’ In Drewery Gavin, ‘The New Select
Committees, 1989, page 80.
252 Peter Bennett and Dr. Stephen
Pullinger Making the Commons Work: information Analysis
and Accountability,’ p32.
253 Peter, Hennessy and Frank Smith,
‘Teething the Watchdogs: Parliament, Government and
Accountability,’ p14.
254 This itself was an issue of contention
with the Defence committee also calling for the right
to commission NAO reports. See First report, Liaison Committee,
Appendix 6, para 14.
255 Vilam Flegmann, ‘the Public
Accounts Committee: A successful Select Committee?’
Parliamentary Affairs Vol 33, 1980.
256 First report, of the Liaison committee,
Shifting the Balance: Unfinished Business, HC 321-11,
vol 2, Appendix 6, para 14. |
| 257
Public Administration and Government 1989-90, Parliamentary
Affairs, 1991. |
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