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Committees’ Ancillary Powers
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‘You have the outstanding committees…
they introduce a number of innovations, very valuable,
confirmation hearings for example, no authority,
of course, but nevertheless it’s a valuable
thing.’ (Lord Sheldon, 2001)156
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| Committees have powers other than those
to call for persons and papers. These are essential for
maximising the powers of scrutiny. The powers to appoint
specialist advisers, adjourn from place to place and to
scrutinise public appointments all help to keep the executive
in check. |
| Expert/Specialist Advisers |
| The use of advisers is a key tool in achieving
effective scrutiny of government. Standing orders allow
for the appointment of specialist advisers to both committees.157
The use of specialist advisers in Westminster is varied.
The most effective committees routinely employ either
a series of specialist adviser or one adviser for a long
period and only one committee had decided not to use them.158
The job description is not set in stone. As Professor
Garel Rhys (former adviser to many select committees)
stated, ‘the precise role depends largely on the
Clerks and the Chairman of Committees.’159
The advantages are clear, most advisers being academics
with expert knowledge in areas usually associated with
economic or scientific matters can be utilised for other
tasks. Analysing evidence, helping prepare member’s
briefs or draft reports and being available to give advice
to members. The Energy and Treasury and Civil Service
committees, for example, all have their own ‘panel’
of advisers which ‘often endure over several sessions
or even Parliaments, while others are incline to a policy
of ad hoc appointments.’160 Sir Peter Emery, chair of the
Procedure Committee, recommended the employment of ‘eminent
barristers’ to create the brief for members on particularly
complex or important matters where they would be cross
examining experts or Secretaries of State.161
And as Anne Davies stated the Treasury committee, once
equipped with advisers ‘felt able to match the Treasury’s
ability to forecast… and had considerable impact
on the treasury both psychologically and in terms of information
demand.’162 |
| The Assembly may wish to consider a specialist
panel; however, there has been some resistance. The reasons
given centre round the rather spurious argument that the
members of the committees would become mere ‘rubber
stamps’ approving committee reports whose recommendations
come from the specialists’ pen. The idea that one
specialist could somehow dupe committee members into agreeing
with his or her own ‘particular view’ is a far
fetched and the Procedure committee admits to finding
no evidence for such a thing.163
As Charter 88 stated ‘the vital preparatory work
of the NAO is not a threat to the Public Accounts Committee;
it strengthens it.’164 |
| By contrast the Assembly committees have
only appointed advisers in an ad hoc fashion. Some advisers
have been invaluable others have been of little real help.165 In the long term the establishment
of the Members Research Service will mitigate the use
of specialist advisers.166 Most of the MRS are highly qualified and
the majority are new to the workings of the Assembly.
A recent meeting of the Culture committee saw the Minister
and several committee members criticise the inaccuracies
of an MRS paper.167 This however, will quickly change.
Several members and officials have said previous specialist
advisers have been experts in their field but unable to
communicate such information effectively to the committee.168 One adviser, for some reason,
did not seem to provide any useful input to the work of
the committee even after having been called on to do so.
Finally, some advisers seem to have had no firm understanding
of the Assembly and its roles which in turn reduced the
effectiveness of their role. Such problems have
undoubtedly affected the experience many members have
had from them. Most advisers, however, have provided excellent
and invaluable advice. Some consideration should be given
to how Assembly committees can learn from the Westminster
experience. For example, creating a physical space for
them in the Assembly’s committee secretariat where
they could work from would do a great deal to help be
an integrated part of the secretariat. The creation of
a ‘standing army of parliamentary experts’ should
not be dismissed.169
The longer a specialist advises a committee the better
able s/he is to know how to help achieve its aims.170 |
| Public Appointments |
| The desire to have some role in public
appointments is evident more in Westminster. Both Tony
Benn and Gerald Kaufman have been long campaigners for
a power to call on the government not to confirm
an appointment.171
Lately, several select committees have been holding ‘confirmation
hearings’ after major public appointments.172
Although they have no statutory role to play and the government
need not listen to their conclusions, the fact that they
are taking place means that are ‘proving increasingly
influential.’173
The Chancellor of the Exchequer has also commented on
the ‘rightness’ of the hearings but rejected
any formal role.174
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| Ironically, although not found in the Act
or in standing orders the subject committees have a power
to be consulted on all public appointments. Paragraph
4.7 of the Ministerial Code stipulates that ‘The
relevant subject committee has a role in the scrutiny
of those public appointments for which it has oversight.
No appointment shall be made by an Assembly Minister
without consultation with the relevant subject committee
through its two nominees.’175
In practice, however, the committees have held no ‘confirmation
hearings.’ In reality one of the committee’s
nominees is always the chair. Some committees however
have decided to appoint four nominees with one committee
appointing thirteen members to the panel to ensure complete
committee involvement.176
The later has a lot to say for it. The way the two ‘formal’
nominees have been chosen was from the start decided between
the political parties. The reason for this was simply
to ensure political balance, however, a by-product has
been that each party’s member has followed the party
line. To date, the committee’s role in this process
has never been discusses as an item on any of the subject
committees agendas.177 This could be due to the fact that the Minister
has ‘ultimate responsibility for public appointments’
and could out rank the committee if s/he so wished.178
No particular appointment has been questioned and the
committee cannot be said to have publicly held the executive
to account. Select committees, with no formal powers in
this area, have done a better job than their Assembly
counterparts in the scrutiny of public appointments. The
Environment, Planning and Transport Committee is the only
Assembly committee that has taken some steps to ensure
maximum involvement by including all its members as ‘nominees.’179
The Assembly should amend the Ministerial Code to ensure
entire committees can scrutinise public appointments.
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| Adjourn from place to place |
| Select Committees have the power to convene
from place to place and ‘to sit notwithstanding any
adjournment of the House.’180 Such a power is useful so as to ensure they
can meet even during recess. Assembly standing orders
enable committees to meet in recess also. The EPT and
the Agriculture committee met during the East recess of
2001 during the Foot and Mouth crisis. Such action is
ahead of Westminster and should be greatly encouraged.181 |
| Recommendations |
13. NAW Committees should seek to maximise
the potential of specialist advisers by either employing
one on a permanent basis or being open to more varied
kinds of specialists such as Barristers.
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14. A permanent panel of experts to advise
the committees on numerous issues should be considered
especially in light of the committees’ strong
policy making roles.
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15. NAW has an enviably strong role in public
appointments- one of the few powers greater than Westminster.
Committees should be encouraged to make consider appointments
in a full committee session with al members deciding
the committees view.
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16. Creating a place inside committee secretariat
for all specialist adviser to enable them to effectively
contribute to scrutiny as an integrated part of the
secretariat.
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156 First Report of
the Modernisation committee, evidence, October 17th
2001, para7. My emphasis.
157 8.14 Committees may appoint expert
advisers in accordance with procedural and financial guidelines
issued by the Presiding Officer. 139 (3)(b) to
appoint specialist advisers either to supply information
which is not readily available or to elucidate matters
of complexity within the committee's order of reference
158 This being the Home Affairs Committee
from 1983-1990 did not employ one specialist. See Second
report from the Procedure Committee, 1989-90, HC 19,para
85.
159 Second report from the Procedure
Committee, 1989-90, HC 19, para 86
160 Ibid, para 87 |
161 Ibid, vol 2, minutes
of evidence, p12.
162 Anne, Davies, ‘Reformed Select
Committees: The First Year’, The Outer Circle Policy
Unit, p27.
163 Ibid.
164 Alex, Brazier, ‘Systematic
Scrutiny- Reforming Select Committees.’ Charter 88,
16th August 2000 p18.
165 Interviews with author, January-February
2003.
166 See Appendix D.
167 See Culture committee minutes
of the meeting of 05/feb/2003.
168 Interviews with the author, January
2003. |
169 Second report from
the Procedure Committee, 1989-90, HC 19, para 91.
170 Giddings, Philip, the Agriculture
Committee, in Drewery, Gavin, ‘The New Select Committees’
(1989) p59.
171 Peter, Riddell, ‘Parliament
Under Blair,’ Politicos Publishing, (2000) p216-217.
172 See quote at beginning of chapter.
173 Liaison Committee, Shifting the
Balance: unfinished business, vol 1, para 90.
174 Ibid.
175 Ministerial code, version 6, para
4.7 page 15 emphasis added
176 Environment, Planning and Transport
committee, Report to Plenary under standing order 9.9,
para Local Government and Housing Committee,
report to Plenary under standing order 9.9 page 4 |
177 Interview with
an official, January 2003.
178 Ministerial Code, version 6, para
4.5, page 15
179 Environment, Planning and Transport
committee, Report to Plenary under standing order 9.9,
para 5.14
180 Public Standing orders 139(3)(a)
181 Adrian, Kay, ‘Effectiveness
Thorough Consensus,’ in Building a Civic Culture,
2002, p176-7. |
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