Summary
To date, the National Assembly
has made good use of the breadth and depth of powers
that is available to it.
However, even at this early stage, there
are clear limitations on the present settlement to address
the range of problems facing Wales. As devolution develops
the need for an extension of powers seems inevitable.
It is desirable that the National Assembly
should be fully inclusive and representative of the
major streams of political allegiance in Wales. However
the list system is not working well. If there is a requirement
that proportionality should be built into the electoral
system, some form of STV could be considered for Assembly
elections.
The present number of AMs is about right
and they could cope with some additional responsibilities.
But this is conditional on a re-arrangement of existing
work patterns to cater for the additional workload of
constituency AMs. In time, a modest increase in numbers
(up to 80) might be required.
The legal and remunerative framework
for Deputy Ministers should be reviewed.
POWERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES.
While the turnout in the National Assembly
Elections in May was disappointing and could be seen
as a lack of general public support for the devolution
project, this was not the perception on the door step.
Indifference rather that opposition is probably a better
summary of the public mood.
The electorate had a chance to vote for
"anti Assembly" parties. While the relatively good performance
by the Welsh Conservatives could be interpreted as a
possible anti-Assembly protest vote, out and out opponents
such the United Kingdom Independence Party only secured
between 2.6% (North Wales) and 4.4% (South Wales West)
in the regional list elections. Attempts to launch a
single issue anti-Assembly party floundered even before
the elections took place.
So it is reasonable to argue that devolution
is an accepted part of the Welsh political landscape.
The constitutional issues arising from
devolution are not high on the electorate’s political
priorities. Electors are more concerned about service
delivery. While Welsh nationalists frequently argue
that the failure of service delivery is due to inadequate
National Assembly powers, this is not a view widely
shared in my constituency. Consequently the decision
to extend Assembly powers should not be made on the
basis of some nationalist or constitutional crusade
but rather on the requirements of democratically accountable
governance and effective service delivery to the people
of Wales.
Why devolution?
I am a strong supporter of devolution
as it:
- Brings power and accountability closer to Welsh
people
- Allows government to be more responsive to the political
and cultural values of the people of Wales.
- Gives the people of Wales a more immediate responsibility
in seeking "Welsh solutions to Welsh problems"
- A counter-balance to the inevitable low priority
that central government will give to any peripheral
country or region with just 5% of the UK population.
- Provides Wales with a higher international profile
which is a major asset in a future of Europe of small
countries and regions
The devolution referendum result was
a close run thing. While Welsh nationalists and Tories
had strongly differing views on the merits of devolution,
their respective political parties had a uniform position.
The split on devolution runs through the middle of Welsh
Labour. As the major party in Wales, it is not surprising
that it reflects the country’s ambiguities.
In campaigning for a "Yes" in the Assembly
Referendum, the proposals on offer were probably the
best that would be likely to secure a positive vote.
This rather restricted package was opposed by both those
who did not support devolution and those who felt the
package was too timid. Paradoxically many opponents
of devolution also argued that if we were to have devolution,
we should have a more comprehensive set of proposals.
Subsequent opinion polls on devolution
suggest that extended powers for the Assembly is by
far the most popular choice with the Welsh electorate
compared to maintaining the status quo or abolishing
the Assembly, with the level of support hovering around
the 50% level.
Existing Powers
While I would have favoured a more ambitious
devolution package in the first instance and would certainly
not regard the present settlement to be the last word
on the issue, I have been pleased that existing powers
has delivered substantive and distinctive polices for
Wales e.g. free local bus transport for older people
and people with a disability, the Assembly Learning
Grants, abolition of prescription charges, the Welsh
Individual Learning Accounts, the Welsh Bac pilots,
local health boards, the Townsend Formula for NHS resource
allocation, retaining Community Health Councils, Children’s
Commissioner, Older People’s Strategy, Assembly
Investment Grants, Communities First programme etc.
On the other hand, the present arrangements
can place constraints on the development of devolution
in Wales and there is a strong case for reviewing the
present range of powers.
The Terms of Reference of the Commissions
seeks to enquire about attitudes towards extending the
breadth (range of areas that are devolved) and depth
(extent of the powers in these areas) of present arrangements.
Extending breadth of
devolution.
The present areas of Assembly responsibility
are purely arbitrary. They started as the responsibilities
of the Secretary of State for Wales at a particular
moment in time. The extent of these powers was not under-pinned
by any coherent over view or set of principles. Examples
of this are the arbitrary limits on dealing with the
planning process for energy generating installations,
with facilities below 50Mw being dealt with by the Assembly
with bigger applications going to the DTI or while the
Assembly has a number of public transport responsibilities,
it has no formal say in internal Welsh rail services.
The range of devolved powers evolved
in a fairly random way. And since the National Assembly
formation there has been some further modest ad-hoc
extension in the breath of its responsibilities in a
number of relatively minor areas.
We need to take stock of the overall
breadth of Assembly powers and to try to bring some
coherence to the situation. As a general principle,
the National Assembly should be responsible for all
internal domestic affairs except where there is a need
for broad UK or EU approach. In accepting this responsibility,
there is the clear implication that the necessary level
of funding will follow in the Welsh block.
We are some way from this at the moment,
but in the short term we should consider further devolution
for the police, fire and internal Wales & Borders
rail services.
Fire and police services have local governing
bodies which includes representatives of exclusively
Welsh interests including local government. They, and
the local rail network, interface with other services
that are already Assembly responsibilities. With the
possible exception of rail, these services seem to work
well across existing organisational boundaries. A further
devolution of responsibility would therefore consolidate
practice on the ground rather than creating a radical
new set of relationships. Rail devolution seems a logical
requirement to provide a coherent policy framework for
an integrated Welsh transport framework.
Apart from the benefits of making domestic
services more sensitive and accountable to local needs,
a cohesive transfer of domestic responsibilities will
protect the Assembly from having to react to UK policies
which have little Welsh relevance. This has happened
in many areas such as health and education. While opt-outs
have been negotiated in a number of instances (e.g.
foundation hospitals, abolition of community health
councils, specialist schools), time and energy is spent
negotiating these opt-outs instead of dealing with Welsh
priorities.
The present set of arrangements link
Wales and England particularly closely together. We
share many common problems and their solution in England
(with its bigger population and more resources in absolute
terms) can be to Wales’ advantage (e.g. National
Institute of Clinical Excellence, Food Standards Agency).
Equally opportunities can be provided to allow specific
Welsh clauses to be included in bills that may have
greater relevance to England (e.g. Education Act 2000).
But there are also instances where the
demography, geography and political culture of Wales
is different and "English solutions" are not appropriate.
Often it is more appropriate to learn from other countries
and regions in the UK (or abroad) but implementation
can be difficult as long as Wales is obliged to work
within an England – Wales framework which is heavily
England focused.
In the areas of free personal social
care (where Wales has an larger and poorer older population
) and the draft Mental Health Bill we were more in tune
with a Scottish approach but were constrained in moving
in this direction not only because we did not have the
primary law making powers to do so, but also because
England (through the UK parliament) took a different
view.
Extending depth of devolution
The lack of primary legislative powers
is also a weakness of the present devolution settlement.
To date, this has not been a massive problem in preventing
the Assembly government addressing its priorities of
promoting prosperity, tackling inequalities, building
strong & safe communities and creating a world class
Wales. This should not be a surprise as all parts of
the UK shared a common agenda of ridding us of the legacy
of Conservative rule. And the initial stages, devolution
will a common starting point of a centralised government
policy.
But at events unfurl and Wales exploits
the opportunities of devolution, legislative requirements
must inevitably diverge with different priorities asserting
themselves. The rate of this divergence is difficult
to predict. The good working relations between Labour
administrations in Westminster and Cardiff have been
able to accommodate many of the requirements for "Wales
only" solutions. But such arrangements are likely to
become more strained if there were different parties
in control of the UK and Welsh Assembly governments.
Many Labour supporters voted for devolution, even if
not convinced devolutionists, because they never wished
to see a future UK government impose policies on their
country in the way that Conservative governments of
the Eighties and Nineties did.
At the moment, the Assembly has the "right"
to its own piece of legislation in each year’s
Queen’s Speech. To date more that one piece of
legislation has been "offered" to the UK government
which then decides which one will be taken forward.
There have been instances when this process was inadequate
and it has been necessary to add Welsh requirements
onto some current bill as occurred with the Children’s
Commissioner and many aspects of the recent NHS structural
changes. It was fortuitous that the opportunity to improvise
in this way was available, but this can hardly be a
satisfactory way to proceed for the future.
The Assembly will have to change its
working patterns to incorporate primary legislative
functions into its activities. But the details will
depend on the likely annual legislative burden. It is
not possible to quantify this at the moment as Wales
shares a common legal framework with England, unlike
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Consequently a requirement
for specific Welsh primary legislation will only occur
where the England / UK Parliament has decided to take
a significantly different line to the National Assembly
or where a specific "Wales only" issue emerges which
has little relevance to most of England.
The pre-legislative examination of the
NHS Wales Act (2002) was a useful dry run for primary
legislative powers. While the bill was short and not
particularly controversial, there were points of party
disagreement and the Assembly scrutiny did produce a
number of useful observations and suggestions. Further
experience along these lines would be a useful stepping
stone towards building up the necessary expertise for
primary legislative functions.
As both the Northern Ireland Assembly
and Scottish Parliament can cope with the demands of
primary legislation, there is no inherent reason which
the National Assembly for Wales should not be able to
do so, though a review of AM numbers might be needed.
Referenda and MP numbers
It debatable that a further referendum
is needed to approve the acquisition of primary legislative
powers as the Assembly already has law making functions
and the acquisition of primary legislation powers is
only a extension on this. On the other hand, a move
towards tax raising powers should require a referendum
as this would be a qualitatively new activity. There
is little demand for tax raising powers at the moment
though some nationalists argue for such powers in principle
and to secure parity with the Scottish Parliament.
The acquisition of primary legislative
powers alone should not affect the numbers of Welsh
MPs in the House of Commons. It will be necessary to
retain their present numbers to deal with budgetary
concerns and to inform policy which will give rise to
the Barnett consequentials which comprise the Welsh
Block.
The recent reconfiguration of the role
of the Secretary of State for Wales and the assimilation
of the Wales Office into the Department for Constitutional
Affairs makes it even more important that Welsh MP numbers
are maintained and Assembly powers enhanced.
However if the Assembly was to acquire
its own tax raising powers a further rebalancing of
MP numbers and the role of the Wales Office would seem
logical.
ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY FOR WALES.
It has been an advantage that the composition
of the National Assembly broadly reflects all substantial
shades of political opinion in Wales. This has given
it a legitimacy to speak for Wales on devolved matters.
Voting systems
However the means of achieving this diversity
of opinion leaves a lot to be desired.
It has been particularly galling for
Labour Party supporters to see candidates who have been
heavily trounced in constituency elections re-emerging
as members of the Assembly via the regional list. And
in this role, these AMs have parity of esteem in claiming
to represent those very electors who have already rejected
them once!
One of the most consistent claims for
proportional representation voting systems is that every
vote counts. But under the present list system, supporters
of a party that does well at a constituency level are
effectively disenfranchised in the regional list election.
The 36.6% of the electorate who voted Labour in the
regional list election in this years Assembly elections
did not return a single representative!
It also needs to be acknowledged that
Wales is, at a minimum, a four party democracy. With
a first past the post voting system, this could result
in parties with significantly less than 50% of the vote
ending up with a massive majority (e.g in the most recent
Assembly elections, Labour won 75% of constituency seats
with 40% of the constituency vote). This would undermine
the credibility of the Assembly as an inclusive and
representative voice of Wales.
If the present list system is generally
unacceptable and if electors value a clear link between
their representatives and their constituency, the possibility
of single transferable voting (STV) in multi-seat constituencies
could be considered.
In deciding on future Assembly constituency
configuration, it may be necessary to consider whether
it would be best to align them with either unitary authority
boundaries or UK parliamentary seats. As most of day
to day Assembly work involves working internally in
Wales, it is probably better that Assembly constituencies
are coterminous with unitary authority boundaries with
one seat per 45–60,000 electors.
Most unitary authorities would be two
seat constituencies. Bigger authorities such as Cardiff,
Swansea and RCT might be sub-divided to give two or
three seat constituencies while smaller unitary authority
areas might have to be amalgamated. Alternatively bigger
multi-seat single constituencies could be considered
for cities such as Swansea and Cardiff to more accurately
reflect the diversity of opinion in those conurbations.
STV would be a new voting system but
it is used in some trade union elections such as the
National Union of Mineworkers and so it would not be
totally alien to Welsh political culture.
Number of AMs
The number of electors needed to elect
an Assembly Member (AM) would depend of the number of
AMs it was felt were needed to undertake the necessary
duties. As things stand at the moment, constituency
AMs in particular have a difficult job managing a constituency
workload (usually done at weekends) and keeping pace
with the Assembly agendas which regularly gives less
that one weeks notice of forthcoming business. The move
to a three week committee business cycle is welcome
but it is too early to assess its impact on overall
Assembly work demands.
So long as there is some re-organisation
of Assembly work timetables, the present number of AMs
is probably sufficient for the present work load and
even for a reasonable agenda of primary legislation
responsibilities. However a quality output will not
be sustainable with the present numbers if current work
scheduling and work practices remain unchanged, particularly
if one party is largely composed of constituency AMs.
Deputy Ministers
The Commission should give some thought
to the role of Deputy Ministers. For most of the first
term of the National Assembly I was Deputy Health and
Social Services Minister.
As well as standing in for the Minister
at speaking and other engagements, I also had responsibility
for developing policy in a number of specific areas
such as a strategy for older people in Wales, waiting
time management, representing the Assembly Government
on the Miners Compensation Monitoring Committee and
Chairing the Project Board for Video Conferencing in
the NHS. These duties involved a considerable amount
of time but the legal and remunerative framework for
this work was far from clear, as the Government of Wales
Act did not make any provision for Deputy Ministers.
I feel there is a need for Deputy Ministers, particularly
in the highest workload departments. Consequently we
need further clarification of their role in Assembly
governance.
25/6/2003
Footnote
This submission reflects my personal response to the
Richards’ Commission consultation papers. As such
it should not be seen as necessarily the views of either
the Wales Labour Party or Aberavon Constituency Labour
Party.
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