Fairbridge De Cymru is not a political group, nor does it have an official political stance on this or any other issue. However, as a group that works in Wales, we feel that we would like to express views about our experiences of working with the National Assembly for Wales in the context of the issues raised and questions put forward by the Richard Commission.

Perhaps also we have a certain kinship to the National Assembly as we too are the Welsh branch of a larger organisation!

The response that follows is divided into two sections - the first is a set of summarized conclusions from the more detailed response that follows. We would be happy to expand on this or any other information that you might require in oral evidence.

If there were two conclusions that we would put forward from all of our experience of working with the National Assembly, they would be -

• The question of whether the National Assembly should have more or less powers is secondary to the need for it to have clearly-defined powers, whether they are more or less than exist currently.

and

• The issue of funding streams is of paramount importance to the voluntary sector. The confusion over UK schemes, National Assembly schemes, as well as the involvement of local authorities and local partnerships in administering and accessing funding streams, is effectively excluding some groups from fundfing.

2. Conclusions In Brief

• The most difficulties are faced when dealing with policy areas where the division between Assembly powers and UK Parliament powers is unclear.
• The two most problematic areas are powers relating to the Home Office and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.
• Co-operation on Home and Communities matters does take place currently but there is a danger of a damaging split if the UK and Welsh Assembly Governments are controlled by different parties.
• Further powers for the National Assembly could create a climate where the political needs of Wales would be taken more seriously by UK organisations.
• There needs to be a legal definition of Westminster's powers over Wales with the expectation that all other powers belong to the Assembly.
• Moving to a Parliamentary model does not automatically mean that confrontational politics will be required.
• Consideration needs to be given to how the Westminster ! Cardiff relationship would change if the institutions were run by different political parties.
• There need to be clearly defined roles for MPs and AMs and clarity as to what they are expected to achieve as part of their job.
• The Secretary of State is an important link between institutions and would still be needed even if primary legislative powers were devolved.
• When analysing the costs of different forms of devolution, the Commission should consider the 'invisible and non-financial benefits.'
• At the very least, funding of non-devolved areas of policy should be given to the Wales Office and run as separate funding streams.
• There needs to be funding streams available to the voluntary sector that cannot be used for local government activities.
• Overall, the National Assembly needs to take a strategic approach to planning funding streams rather than 'filling in gaps' left by the UK government.

3. Response In Detail

1. The Powers of the Assembly

The practical experience of working with the National Assembly for Wales is that there are some areas where we deal exclusively with Ministers in Cardiff, some areas which require dealings exclusively with Ministers in Westminster and some areas where a mix of powers between Welsh Assembly and UK Parliament means that we are dealing with Ministers in both locations.

The most difficulties are faced when dealing with policy areas where the division between Assembly powers and UK Parliament powers is unclear.

There is a sense in which the effective operation of the Assembly relies more on having clarity in the responsibilities that it exercises than on whether it has primary or secondary legislative powers.

The two most problematic areas are powers relating to the Home Office and those relating to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

The division of powers with regard to the Home Office is difficult in the areas of policing and drugs policies. Fairbridge De Cymru works with young people who may be involved in drugs or other criminal activities and we feel that it is important to be part of the consultation and planning process with regard to these matters.

However, the division of powers is not clear and this relates to funding, staffing and strategic planning.

For instance, the Home Secretary of the UK Government can announce funding for drug prevention work as well as the Minister for Finance, Local Government and Communities in the Assembly. If you are an organisation seeking funding for drug prevention work, this is both confusing and ineffective.

Staffing also raises conflicting issues - there is a Crime Reduction Director employed by the Home Office but who has an office in the Assembly building. There is also a Crime Reduction Unit that appears to be answerable to the Assembly and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships that involve local authorities. The `Communities' part of the Assembly's responsibilities in this instance seems to overlap with the Home Office responsibilities.

In some ways, this might not be a bad thing. After all, it should be perfectly possible for the two governments to work together. However, where responsibilities are shared in areas like this, the blurring of where the boundaries of powers lie is both confusing for outside organisations and a potential problem within the political system.

Co-operation on Home and Communities matters does take place currently but there is a danger of a damaging split if the UK and Welsh Assembly Governments are controlled by different parties.

Overall, there is a sense in which the conduct of Assembly affairs over the last four years has been easier because of the Labour party control of both Westminster and Cardiff. However, even then there is confusion - for example, there are Labour MPs who are prominent speakers on drug prevention as well as Labour AMs.

For an organisation attempting to inform the political debate, there can be an impression that there are two different - at the very worst separate - debates on this issue.

Clearly defined powers would prevent any-future power struggle and it would also save organisations such as Fairbridge De Cymru time and effort in trying to co-ordinate lobbying in two different political arenas.

The second part of the question deals with the 'expectations of the people of Wales'. This is a more complicated question as it could be argued that the expectations of the people of Wales with regard to their Assembly are low, as witnessed by voter turnout and dissatisfaction expressed through opinion polls.

Possibly, the clarity of powers argued for on the previous page might help spread more appreciation of the National Assembly but in general there is a sense among many Welsh people that the Assembly should `do something'. However, this is not necessarily an argument for more powers, it may be that a wider education as to the influence of the National Assembly on Wales is more appropriate. There is, after all, similar voter apathy in Scotland where primary legislative and tax-varying powers are already in place.

Where strengthened powers may well make a difference is outside Wales and the Commission should consider the role that the National Assembly has in presenting Wales to the rest of the United Kingdom.

Many UK organisations have responded to devolution by fully devolving their organisation in Scotland but not in Wales. A recent meeting of charitable organisations in Cardiff confirmed this as a general model. It can therefore be frustrating for the Welsh parts of UK organisations to have to work in a semidevolved state while their Scottish counterparts enjoy a great deal more freedom of action.

Further powers for the National Assembly could create a climate where the political needs of Wales would be taken more seriously by UK organisations.

This is linked to the other area that was mentioned as causing some confusion - the DCMS. The main problem with devolution as regards the DCMS is centred around lottery funding. This is because lottery funding is dealt with in Westminster but often used for projects in areas that fall under the responsibility of the DCMS in Cardiff.

The key to bringing clarity to the powers of the Assembly lies in the Government of Wales Act. Whereas the Scotland Act defined the powers to be held at Westminster with the expectation that all other powers would be exercised in Edinburgh, the Wales Act defined what the National Assembly of Wales could do with the assumption that everything else would be done at Westminster. This has led to considerable uncertainty.

Although, it does not necessarily impact on the work of Fairbridge De Cymru directly, the structure of the Assembly and the Assembly Government are important.

There is a sense that the evolution of the working arrangements has reflected both changes in the Assembly itself and also its membership during its first four years. Just as the National Assembly might have different relations with Westminster if it was controlled by a different party, so there might be a different approach to policy making if there was a majority party in the Assembly rather than a governing coalition.

Prior to the creation of 'WAG' (which I am sure that most people would agree should be given an alternative acronym as much as legal status!), the consensual approach had partly been necessary because of the lack of an outright majority for any party. With the exception of the build-up to the election, there is little evidence to say that WAGs existence has changed this a great deal.

However, from a political standpoint it does make sense to have a clear division between the people who are making the decisions and the people who are scrutinising those decisions. In this sense, the division has been useful for our organisation as we can pinpoint not only who is responsible for policy but also who would be able to raise objections in the appropriate committee or in debate.

Possibly one of the benefits of the 'consensual model' first introduced was that it was a step away from the experience of Westminster and might therefore command more respect. However, it is important to make the distinction between a Parliamentary model and a confrontational model.

In this respect, the presence of e-mail communication in the Chamber and the avoidance of the shouting and name-calling that goes on at Westminster has probably done a great deal to preserve both a more consensual approach and the image of the Assembly among some Welsh people.

In this sense, the Parliamentary model is already evolving and will probably continue to do so, whether the Assembly gains more powers or not.

In terms of the gains and losses of moving permanently to a government and Assembly model, one gain might be linked to people's expectations.

The idea of a single, consensual body may be fine as political theory, but people are used to the Parliamentary model that they have seen at Westminster. In some ways, the notion of a 'Welsh Government' might well allow Welsh people to expect more from the body as they recognise its structure as similar.

The presence of the National Assembly has put some organisations in an interesting position in relation to lobbying the UK government. The National Assembly itself is, in some respects, a lobbying organisation that attempts to have its own influence on primary legislation passed at Westminster. Organisations in Wales may find themselves lobbying the Assembly to lobby the UK government.

This is not necessarily an impossible relationship to manage, but it is reliant on goodwill and a willingness to take the Assembly's wishes seriously. There is a real danger that if this does not happen that a certain level of frustration will come into the political system that will be hard to manage.

For instance, the National Assembly for Wales recently voted to ban smoking cigarettes in all public places in Wales. It remains to be seen whether the UK government will allow this to pass as a law at Westminster. However, there is a wider question of why, if the Assembly has devolved powers over Health matters, it should need to lobby the UK government for legislative time to do this.

To someone outside the political process, the above example might raise the question as to why the National Assembly would debate such questions if it knows that the UK government can always refuse legislative time.

The fact that frustration and resentment of the need to lobby the UK government has not crept in is probably a reflection, once again, of the fact that the two organisations are controlled by the same party and there is certain amount of goodwill from the fact that the UK government which established devolved institutions will not want them to seem ineffective.

Consideration needs to be given to how the Westminster/Cardiff relationship would change if the institutions were run by different political parties.

There would certainly be the possibility that the UK government could frustrate the will of the Welsh people as expressed through the Assembly, even on areas where it is perceived that the Assembly has 'responsibility'.

In the above situation, the memory of the flooding of the Tryweryn Valley in the 1960s would surely be brought to mind for many if it seemed as though the National Assembly had voted for a law, only for it to be blocked at Westminster.

The emphasis does not need to be on primary legislative powers (although these would clearly prevent the situation described), more on the need for cooperation between Cardiff and Westminster. For instance, an alternative system might be if the UK government was required to set aside time each year for a debate on matters passed to them by the National Assembly and that Welsh MPs and Peers could then debate these matters and either let them pass to primary legislation or return them to the Assembly for further consideration.

Unfortunately, this is another area where clarity is needed. The Welsh Affairs Select Committee, for instance, recently completed work investigating education in Wales. Surely this was the work of the National Assembly for Wales?

There need to be clearly defined roles for MPs and AMs and clarity as to what they are expected to achieve as part of their job.

To turn this situation around, at the end of February 2003, leuan Wyn Jones AM asked for a debate in the National Assembly on the threat of war with Iraq, giving the reason that'Welsh people need to know how their elected representatives feel about this issue.' Yet, the elected representatives who deal with foreign affairs for Wales are MPs and not AMs. Possibly there is an enhanced role for the Speaker and the Presiding Officer of the respective elected bodies to remind MPs and AMs where their responsibilities start and end.

Finally, it would be hard to justify maintaining the same number of MPs at Westminster if primary legislative powers were devolved, as demonstrated in Scotland.

This section asks about the change in the role of the Secretary of State for Wales if primary legislative powers were devolved to the National Assembly. Currently, the Secretary of State has a role in providing a bridge between the two institutions - he is both Wales's representative in Westminster and also Westminster's representative in Wales.

Unsurprisingly, successive Secretaries of State have attempted to play down this second role and yet it seems very important and is, again, one that might be vital should there be different parties controlling the UK Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. In this sense, he or she is a vital link between the two bodies.

Losing a Secretary of State, as was suggested by a recent House of Lords investigation, would be detrimental to Wales as it will always be important for Welsh views to be known at the Cabinet table - after all, it was the criticism of the Secretaries of State appointed in the late 1980s and the 1990s that their lack of a Welsh constituency made them unable to promote Welsh concerns in Cabinet (it is not so much important whether this was true or not, simply that it appeared to many Welsh people to be true and thus undermined their credibility).

The Secretary of State is an important link between institutions and would still be needed even if primary legislative powers were devolved.

As an organisation operating in Wales, the Wales Office is a useful link for us to UK government and to policy on non-devolved areas.

The relations between MPs and AMs have been covered in our response to section 3.

Policy development in other areas has improved with the introduction of the National Assembly - there is a feeling for an organisation such as Fairbridge De Cymru that we are closer to the formulation of policy that effects Wales and that we have a greater chance to influence and debate it.

A clearer separation between England and Wales in policy development is, once again, not so much an issue for our organisation as having clearer responsibilities allocated to England and Wales.

The question of the 'costs' of devolution is difficult because although there is a clearly visible financial cost of devolved government, the benefits are often in a less visible format.

These include the benefits of having consultations on major policies take place in Wales and be led by Welsh groups and key figures.

There are also 'invisible and non-financial' costs too - for instance, an increase in the number of AMs and civil servants, however necessary to service an expanded Assembly, would probably not be popular with a sceptical and critical public and may increase resentment of the institution among some people.

Placing a financial value on these matters is difficult, however, it should be noted that more efficient and effective government would be financially beneficial both to Wales and the UK as a whole.

A final point which is not completely covered by this section relates to the funding of the Assembly as a whole. There needs to be recognition that the problems of Wales are greater than many other parts of the UK - ESF Objective 1 funding only came to West Wales and the Valleys because of its GDP being 75% of the UK average. Similar economic statistics apply to the rest of Wales too - with higher levels of poverty and deprivation than found elsewhere in the UK.

It would seem important for all the layers of government in the UK to consider a form of funding for institutions that recognises the problems that they are working with as well as a simple calculation based on population size. However the Assembly is funded and whatever powers it has, recognition needs to be given in the size of the funding to the particular problems that it has to face.

As a charity that attempts to raise a significant amount of money from the statutory sector, the question of where funding streams overlap is an important one for us.

It was noted earlier in this response that there is a particular problem in areas relating to the Home Office and its overlap with the Communities brief and also with regard to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport and lottery funded projects.

As mentioned earlier, there are significant amounts of money available in relation to crime and drug prevention from both the Home Office and the Communities department of the National Assembly.

This can have two effects - the first is that funding initiatives launched in England are not applied to Wales, even though they may concern areas that are not devolved and the second is that there is a growing concern that Welsh organisations are not considered for funding because `they've got the National Assembly.' If the National Assembly does not replicate schemes run in England in non-devolved areas of policy and they are not applied to Wales at a UK level then the result is a serious funding gap for all Welsh organisations.

The confusion can be increased by the UK government's own methods of operation. For instance, the UK government set up a fund to pay for work done on crime prevention through raising money from the sale of criminals' assets. This fund was administered at a UK level and yet the announcement of the successful bids was done by the Wales Office.

This is logical in terms of the role of the Wales Office as representing the UK government in Wales, but it adds to confusion by giving the impression that the final decision has been made in Wales.

At the very least, funding of non-devolved areas of policy should be given to the Wales Office and run as a separate funding stream.

This would also get rid of the myth that there was no need to fund Welsh organisations as 'they have the National Assembly.'

We would add to this that there has been a lack of an overall funding strategy developed by the National Assembly and it is speculation that this might be because that responsibility has been left to the UK-government. The major scheme that has been introduced - Communities First - has concentrated on regeneration at ward level rather than at a longer term strategic level.

The use of a plethora of partnerships has also caused confusion within the funding streams - the Commission will probably be aware of the complaint constantly raised in the voluntary sector that lottery funding is simply used by local government to pay for activities that they should be funding through their central government grant.

There needs to be funding streams available to the voluntary sector that cannot be used for local government activities.

Possibly this is better administered by the National Assembly as it is closer to the voluntary sector in Wales and has more knowledge of it.

The National Assembly needs, however, to consider the role of Young People's Partnerships, Community Consortia for Education and Training, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, Communities First partnerships and so on - organisations that do not have the time or staff to follow all these groups are being effectively excluded from funding streams. These can cause as much confusion as the difference between Assembly scheme and UK schemes.

Overall, the National Assembly needs to take a strategic approach to planning funding streams rather than `filling in gaps' left by the UK government.

David Heald for Fairbridge De Cymru, 02/03