A Peter Clark |
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6th February 2003 |
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The Secretary |
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Dear Sir/Madam, |
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I have read the paper about the Commission’s aims and terms of reference and wish to make the following submission. |
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In what practical ways do the powers of the Assembly, or the limits on its powers, impinge on you…….and what are the best examples of this from your point of view? |
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Devolution being something of a novelty in the U.K., it would be surprising if all the arrangements, in every detail, were ‘right first time’. The appointment of a Commission to review the arrangements is therefore timely. |
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One area in which I take an interest, and where the limit on Assembly’s powers definitely does have an impact, is on rail service development. It is essential to consider rail as part of overall transport arrangements, and not as a separate subject. The Assembly, in conjunction with Welsh local authorities, has powers over road transport, including many aspects of bus services provision. By the same means it has some control over rail infrastructure enhancements as these can be, and are, sometimes funded by the transport grant system through LTPs and UDPs. |
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But the Assembly has no control and very little influence over, actual rail service provision in Wales, either in terms of service specification or funding. These powers remain with the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) in London. |
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The result of this division of power is that infrastructure enhancements, including some which have been sponsored by the SWIFT consortium for example, do not realise their potential because the SRA declines to fund the additional services which the upgrades were designed to handle. In other words, the actions (and spending) of one public body are being thwarted by the actions of another. |
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In addition, this means the Assembly is unable to deliver a fully integrated transport system, although this is one of its objectives. |
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These problems were foreseen by many at the time the Assembly was set up, but they have become much more prominent in recent months. The SRA is concentrating its development spending in areas of England, especially the south-east, and has instructed the bidders for the new Wales & Borders franchise to consider funding cuts of up to 20% (which, if implemented, would involve much more than 20% reduction in services, because so much of the operator’s costs are fixed). It has stated that there is little scope for reopening lines or stations. This means that the Assembly is having to use its own money – from the block grant – to ensure that its declared policy of, inter alia, reopening the railway to Ebbw Vale, as part of the regeneration of areas affected by Corus closures, can go ahead. Whilst a laudable action by the Assembly, this is contrary to the devolution arrangements; the SRA ought to be funding the scheme, there being no allowance for rail spending (a non-devolved power) in calculating the block grant. |
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The SRA is obliged to consult the Assembly, whereas in Scotland (for example) the Executive guides and instructs the SRA – a vast difference in powers. |
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I am aware that Scotland’s rail system is more self-contained than that of Wales, but I do not accept that this invalidates the arguments in favour of greater powers for the Assembly. It simply means that the English border counties would need to be involved as partners, in whatever form of institution the Assembly might set up to discharge its powers over rail. |
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There are two possible solutions to this, depending on the extent, if any, to which the Assembly’s powers are increased: |
| If Wales achieves parity with Scotland, to include primary legislation and possibly (though not necessarily) tax-varying powers, then it would be expected that rail powers would also be devolved as they have been in Scotland. Anything less would be unacceptable and would defy logic. |
| At the very least, and maybe as an interim measure, rail funding for Wales needs to be ‘ring-fenced’, by application of ‘Barnett formula’ principles, whether based on population or other measures of need. The application of that funding must be under the Assembly’s control, though close liaison with the SRA would be necessary, having regard to the many cross-border services. |
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It must be remembered that people resident in Wales pay the same rates of taxes as those elsewhere in the U.K., and therefore are entitled to comparable and commensurate public services, including rail. I submit that unless at least the second solution above is adopted, this will not happen. |
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So, for the reasons outlined above, my answer to the second question (does the Government of Wales Act provide the Assembly with the powers it needs to operate effectively and meet the expectations of the people of Wales?) is NO. |
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Moving to a different subject, the Commission’s terms of reference include consideration of the Assembly’s electoral arrangements. Yet there are no questions about this in the main body of the paper. Will there be a separate consultation exercise on this aspect? In case there won’t be, I take the opportunity of commenting on the second and third bullet points on page 8 of the paper (I do not consider myself qualified to comment on the first bullet point). |
| Whether the means of electing the Assembly, including the degree of proportionality, adequately and accurately represents all significant interests in Wales: |
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Not entirely, but it is a major improvement on ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP). So far, it has deprived the dominant party of a majority of seats on a minority of votes, and, very importantly, it has given members of the public a choice of elected representatives to contact on any particular matter – a choice of individual and of party. FPTP gives no such choice of course. |
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One problem is that the proportion of ‘additional members’ is not high enough to achieve true proportionality. The system involves two ballot papers for the two different voting systems, produces two different typos of AMs (constituency and list), and gives rise to the notion (not shared by me) that the ‘list’, or ‘additional’ members, are somehow inferior in status to the constituency members. |
| Whether any changes which may be recommended to the Assembly’s powers make either necessary or desirable changes to the size of the Assembly or the means of electing it: |
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There are two possible answers: |
| 1. If the ‘Additional Member’ electoral system is retained, as noted above the proportion of additional members needs to be increased. This could be achieved by increasing the size of the Assembly, or by enlarging the constituencies such that the balance between constituency and list members is changed but the total number of AMs remains as now. |
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I doubt whether increasing the size of the Assembly would find much public support, outside the political parties, unless it were accompanied by significant extensions of the Assembly’s powers. |
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2. A better electoral system is the Single Transferable Vote (STV), which would remove the problems already mentioned as occurring with the present system. STV provides for multi-member constituencies, and voters rank candidates in order of preference. It has a good record of delivering proportionality, and its adoption would not, per se, necessitate increasing the size of the Assembly. |
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Yours faithfully |
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A P Clark |