COMMISSION ON THE POWERS AND ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

of the

EVIDENCE OF:

PROFESSOR VERNON BOGDANOR

held at

THE HILTON HOTEL, NEWPORT

on

23 MAY 2003

In Attendance

Lord Richard, Chair, Richard Commission

Huw Thomas, Richard Commission

Tom Jones, Richard Commission

Paul Valerio, Richard Commission

Vivienne Sugar, Richard Commission

Dr Laura McAllister, Richard Commission

Peter Price, Richard Commission

Sir Michael Wheeler Booth, Richard Commission

Ted Rowlands, Richard Commission

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Lord Richard

Can I start off by thanking you very much for coming? It is very good of you to find the time and I am grateful. Secondly, could I ask you formally to identify yourself for the sake of the transcript and then open up the discussion for us?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

My name is Vernon Bogdanor and I am a Professor of Government at Oxford, but I suspect I am primarily here because I wrote a book on devolution in 1979, which was republished in a second edition in 1999 and called Devolution in the United Kingdom.

I am very grateful to be invited but I hope I am not here under any false pretences because I am not Welsh and I cannot claim to have followed the proceedings of the Assembly in any great detail since it has been set up. As the Commission may know, I am, broadly speaking, sympathetic to devolution for Wales and I would, perhaps, like to begin by making a few comments about it.

It seems to me that the central purpose of devolution was to enable those matters that are domestic matters for Wales to be settled by the Welsh people through their Assembly so as to meet conditions in Wales which may be different from conditions in other parts of the country. The argument was that the Welsh Assembly would understand better what these conditions were and what responses were needed to those conditions, and it seems to me that one of the tests of how the new systems worked ought to be whether it meets that particular criterion.

Furthermore, I think it is worth saying that the Assembly has been set up in comparatively benign conditions, in the sense that you have got an administration in London which was sympathetic to devolution and established it; and is it set it up - also, as it were, broadly politically congruent with what one might call the government of Wales in the Assembly. Of course, those conditions will not always be there and it seems to me that a system, to be robust, has to be able to survive conditions which are not quite so benign – when, for example, there are opposing majorities in London and in Cardiff, and perhaps a majority in London and government in London that is not quite so sympathetic to the government in Wales as the present one is. In other words, the system is going to have to be very robust.

Furthermore, it seems to me that a system, if it is going to be successful, must be clear to the voters, to the people who are going to support it, and we have to remember that most voters are far too sensible to spend much of their time worrying about constitution and political minutiae; they want a system whose logic is very clear and that they can easily understand.

It is a familiar point which MPs make, that they often receive letters from people about matters which are really a local government responsibility; many people are not clear about what is done by central government and what is done by local government. Furthermore, in England - certainly in the part of England I live in - there is a two-tier system of local government, I think many people are not clear what is done by the country council and what is done by the district council. So I think an important criterion by which to judge the arrangements is whether people are clear about what is done by each of three layers of government: Westminster, the Welsh Assembly and local authorities.

I have come to a fairly tentative conclusion that, measured in terms of that logic, there are weaknesses in the settlement which has been set up and there does not seem to me to be any very obvious logic in the system. I think part of the reason for that is it this is an untried system in Britain and in the countries of the Commonwealth. The only areas where the system of executive devolution has been tried out are Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Executive devolution in Britain was derived from the report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, the Kilbrandon Commission in 1973, which I think was not quite aware of the differences between our system and the German system, and in particular that the German system is very strongly buttressed by the second chamber in Germany, the Bundesrat, where the Governments of the ?? (that is, if you like, the provinces or states) are represented and also a constitutional court, so that there is a clear logic between what is in primary legislation and what is in secondary legislation. Of course, our system is very different from that.

At present, it does seem that in the bodies represented in the British/Irish Council, the Governments of Britain and Ireland, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the devolved bodies - the Welsh devolved body is the only body without primary legislative powers; the only body with purely secondary powers. I wonder if that logic is really very clear.

That is all I want to say, I think.

Lord Richard

Thank you very much - that is a good start. Can I really go back to possibly the main point you make, that there is no logicality in the basic settlement? Do you think that can only be solved by devolution of primary powers?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I think it could be solved if there were a clear division of principle between what could go into primary legislation and what could go into secondary legislation. It is possible, I am sure, to draw up principles as to what should go into Westminster legislation, but they would not, of course, be binding. They might be accepted by a sympathetic government, possibly the present government, but they would not necessarily be accepted by an unsympathetic government. Even so, I think one still has to face the problem of making it clear to voters, who do not spend much of their time looking at these matters - they are far too sensible to do so.

Lord Richard

Could you go a bit further down the principles line?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

One might say that primary legislation ought to be of a framework kind. As I understand it, that is the case in Germany. There is a clear principle on what should be in the legislation and what should be in, as it were, the implementation of the legislation.

Lord Richard

That is not a division you would primarily accept, is it, giving the secondary body the right to legislate within a framework?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Indeed, and that would be subordinate legislation, it would not be primary legislation. The primary legislation would be drawn up very broadly - as it is in Germany. That was my example; one can think of all sorts of ways in which this might happen. The Assembly would still retain powers only over secondary legislation, but secondary legislation would cover a very broad area. It is perfectly possible to do so if the government in London is sympathetic to that.

Lord Richard

So it is more than just a statutory instrument?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes, indeed. Certainly. The point I would wish to make is that it would depend very much on the sympathies of the Government in Westminster, and it would always be possible for a government to draw up legislation more tightly because it did not wish the Welsh Assembly to frustrate its legislation. For example, one has seen in the past in England legislation relating to local government drawn up tightly because the Government at Westminster did not trust local authorities of a different political colour to implement their purposes and so they did not want to give them much discretion. So even such a system of a principled division would, I think, depend very much on how sympathetic the Government in London was to devolution. One cannot always assume that the Government would necessarily be sympathetic; there might be great differences of opinion.

It is fair to say - and perhaps I should have mentioned this earlier – it is a very crucial point about Germany. Government depends on consensus between the Federal Government and the Land Governments, and that is secured by interlocking coalitions. There are different coalitions at Land level from that at federal level. For example, when you had the long period of Christian Democrat Government, the Christian Democrats were in coalition with the Free Democrats. In a number of Land governments, however the Free Democrats were in coalition with the Social Democrats, so consensus was needed. The Bundesrat, the Upper House, could veto legislation that it thought was not sympathetic enough to the interests of the lender. We do not have those arrangements in this country and there is probably very little chance of us having them for a long period of time, so we have to shape things in accordance with our own particular structures.

Lord Richard

You cannot just move to a non-conflict type of legislation.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Indeed.

Lord Richard

Some people have given evidence to us that when the Assembly was set up there was a deliberate attempt to make it less consensual than the Westminster model. Do you think that is working?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I think so, both in Wales and in Scotland with its very different structure. As I understand it, the original reason for establishing the Assembly as a corporate body - roughly speaking, similar to a local government structure – was to help secure consensus. Of course, this arrangement was altered on its way through Parliament, but even so the structure is much more consensual. Part of the reason for that, in my opinion, is the fact of proportional representation, which means you are more likely to get a coalition government in Wales - possibly a minority government but perhaps more likely a coalition government - so that you need the support of more than one party to get legislation through. I think that is an important part of it and, there is secondly, the more powerful role of committees in the Welsh system, as compared with Westminster. I think that is something from which the rest of us to learn. I think that is one of the advantages of devolution - that one can see how different types of structure operate within the same country.

Dr Laura McAllister

One of our concerns is to actually upon the criteria by which we can measure whether the Assembly is performing in the way that it was intended, and I am sure that you are aware of the academic debate about whether devolution is good in itself. But the real point is, is devolution worthy in its own right or does it have to be proved consequentially in the sense of what principles has it brought in in terms of good government and responsiveness to Welsh problems? You mentioned that at the very beginning of your session. Can you give us any thoughts on that in terms of where the burden of proof or the existing settlement might lie?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I suppose the electorate would be judging it by whether it makes a substantive difference and survey evidence, both in Wales and, perhaps more surprisingly, in Scotland has shown that people favour devolution - the majority are for devolution - not for, as it were, reasons of principle but for more practical reasons, they believe it will improve government in Wales and also in Scotland - they seek improvements in public services - and many people, perhaps naturally, overestimate what can be achieved through devolution and believe that it can be achieved very quickly, whereas we all know, I think, a new system of government does take some years to settle down and to provide benefits.

With regard to the Assembly, it is very clear from survey evidence that people believe it represents them better than Westminster represents them but that they are uncertain as to what the powers of the Assembly actually are. Some non-voters, it has been discovered by the Electoral Commission, actually believed the Assembly was appointed rather than elected. So there is widespread ignorance and I think it is very easy for us to underestimate that because we are all, by definition, interested in politics and constitutional arrangements.

As I said before - and I think the point cannot be repeated too often - most people are not interested in those arrangements. They want systems which are clear and which they can understand easily. I think the arrangements do not fulfil that criterion. Obviously in an extreme situation, if people did not believe the Welsh Assembly was performing a useful function, they would seek to have it abolished. That, of course, is not the present position. People do believe that it is useful but they do not understand what its powers are and what it is doing. I think that misunderstanding is not helpful to the future of politics in Wales.

Dr Laura McAllister

In terms of a good government agenda, can you see that being helped substantially by the acquisition of primary legislative powers?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes, and I think the prime gain - which I would not underestimate - is the much greater clarity that it would yield as to what the Assembly could do and what it could not do. I think you have got that clarity in Scotland but not in Wales. Part of the problem of devolution is the danger of having to go through three layers of government, possibly with different majorities, different concerns and different interests - Westminster, the Assembly and local authorities - and people not understanding which powers belong to which area. There is also the danger that an unsympathetic government could, under the present arrangements, draw up legislation for Wales so tightly that the powers of the Assembly would be reduced.

I think that this reinforces the point that it is not the fault of the electorate that the powers are not clear; they are not clear because they do depend on particular items of legislation. There is a sense in which legislation drawn up more tightly or less tightly alters the settlement. The settlement could be altered on each item of legislation. That is very different from the way in which it works in Germany because our constitution and traditions are different from those in Germany. My suspicion is that if one asked a large number of people in Wales, a representative sample, what the distinction was between primary and secondary legislation they would not be able to tell you. The only people who would be table to tell you are those who are, as it were, constitution anoraks, which is probably those of us sitting around this table!

Lord Richard

I detect a feeling of slight unfairness in Wales that we did not get the Scottish devolution model. Last night we had a public meeting here in Newport which was extremely hostile, saying the Assembly was useless and so on. At the end, I said "How many of you think we should have the same as Scotland?" and the overwhelming majority said "Yes".

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

That position has been endorsed by survey evidence. It is precisely what people think; they think the Welsh Assembly does not have enough influence, but nevertheless represents them better than Westminster and that therefore it ought to have more influence. People perhaps do not put it in terms of "We would like primary legislative powers", but that is the way that most people think in Wales. I cannot see the logic of the distinction between Scotland and Wales. I can see the obvious difference - Scotland had its own legal system and therefore there have in the past been more Scottish bills - but I cannot see the logic of it because the argument was that Scotland and Wales should be taking more decisions within Scotland and Wales to meet the needs of people in those parts of the United Kingdom. I cannot see why Wales should be regarded, as the White Paper originally said, as a region rather than a nation. In any case, why are these powers more suitable for a region than for a nation? The logic that escapes me.

Ted Rowlands

Can I pursue that? First of all, before people even discuss whether primary or secondary powers, if you take the history of devolution there has been a clear difference of public opinion as to the desirability of devolution, for example with Scotland, for a very long time. There is a very distinctive attitude towards devolution, which goes back a long way?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Certainly.

Ted Rowland

From your evidence, it is clear you do not think there is any difference between the English/Welsh administrative/historical/legal relationship and the Scottish/English one, which would in fact not only reflect the difference of attitude but also reflect the different devolution settlement?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I think it is obviously historically correct that Welsh devolution has been a much more divisive issue for over a hundred years. I think it led to Lloyd George’s first political defeat when he tried to secure it, or secure a commitment to it. That is obviously correct. I think the argument was, therefore, that Wales should have a weaker form of devolution, but I am not sure that this is a weaker form of devolution. It seems to me a more muddled form of devolution. It could be, in the right circumstances, as in Germany, a very strong form of devolution, but I am not sure that it fits in with our political traditions. You may say that if Wales ought to have less devolution than Scotland, then do not devolve as much to Wales as to Scotland - that would be perfectly reasonable.

Ted Rowlands

It is not. We have not devolved administration of justice, for example.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Precisely. But the particular arrangements here make every single bill as it were, a devolution bill. The issue arises with every single bill affecting Wales - how much power is going to be given to the National Assembly? There seems to be no basis of principle easily discernable by which one can determine that. If the Welsh people take the view that they want fewer powers devolved to Wales, that is an understandable position, if that is the position, but this particular arrangement is not quite like that. I think some of the points I expressed in my book, the fears, have actually been met by what has happened.

Lord Richard

You mean that they have come to pass?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes. I think they have come to pass in the sense that people cannot discern a clear basis of principles, as to what should be in the hands of the Welsh Assembly and what should remain with Westminster.

Lord Richard

One of the big points you make is that primary legislation for Wales would have to be drafted much more loosely than London?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I think that would be needed to make it a success. It is understandable that governments of all colours are unwilling to let these things out of their hands. This is one of the reasons for the difficulties in the central/local government relationship. The fact that it has not happened even with a benign government in London makes one wonder what would happen if you had a less benign government. There is the thesis of Redwood’s return (as I think it is called here) - if you had a government in which John Redwood was Prime Minister or Secretary of State for Wales, how would it draw up legislation?

Ted Rowlands

Anyone who receives recommendations of the kind you are recommending to us would have to say "If we transfer primary powers, legislative powers, to a Welsh Assembly, that will expose the West Lothian question much more severely". Somehow, the fact that we have not got a federal structure, which is what you virtually have reached, that will expose the whole issue of the West Lothian question, which somehow everyone managed to fiddle through during the course of the two Devolution Acts we have had?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes. I think too much ink has been expended on the West Lothian question for this reason: remain dependent decisions about the amount of money which the devolved bodies receive would depend upon decisions made at Westminster - on which, of course, English MPs are the vast majority. If, for example, one had a government which decided to cut public expenditure drastically, that would affect the direct fund for Wales, as I understand it. Therefore, it seems to me important that Welsh and Scottish representatives should be at Westminster where these decisions are made.

Ted Rowlands

No-one is saying there should be no Scottish and Welsh representation, they are saying when it comes to a support grant order, it is purely a matter for England now, utterly devolved, purely a piece of English legislation, what is the case for Welsh and Scottish Members to be participating?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

That is a perfectly fair point, but the majority of decisions at Westminster are not of that kind. For example, consider the amount of money spent on health in England. Let us suppose that there was a government determined to set up a different health system which would involve much less public expenditure on health - some form of social insurance system, for example - that, as I understand it, would reduce the block grant going to Wales, although the Welsh Government might not want to accept that system, it might want to continue with the National Health Service as it is now. Therefore, it seems to me that Welsh and Scottish MPs, ought to be present when those decisions are made.

I think the real problem is on matters which do not involve public expenditure. One that has been raised is hunting: it has now been abolished by the Scottish Parliament, but it could also be established in England through Scottish votes in the House of Commons and I think that might lead to an outcry. On that issue, perhaps, there might be a self-denying ordinance on the part of Scottish MPs - I do not get as excited about hunting as many people do, but it obviously is an emotive issue for many people.

Ted Rowlands

I can think of a variety of pieces of legislation. The distribution of money within England that has been agreed is the amount is surely a matter for the English Members?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

The distribution of money within England, but the total amount of money----

Ted Rowlands

Of course.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I agree - on the distribution of resources within England, that is a matter on which the Welsh MPs perhaps ought not to intervene. Obviously, it does raise important issues and a Government may depend on the majority from Wales and Scotland. It is fair to say, and I think the consequences have to be faced that, as in Scotland, if one did have primary legislative power then there would be a case for a reduction in the number of Welsh MPs at Westminster. That could not be avoided, in my opinion; it would be a fair quid pro quo. That would, in some sense, in my opinion, have to be presented to the Welsh people as a package in the form of a referendum - as the Scottish electorate were presented with in 1997.

The argument in Scotland is that there should not be over-representation but that representation should be proportionate to population in England. Of course, under Stormont, Northern Ireland was under-represented. I have to say - and no doubt this is an unpopular thing to say - I think that Scotland and Wales should also be under-represented if they had primary legislative powers, as compared with England. I am aware that is an unpopular argument in Wales. As I understand it, the number would be reduced to around 32, would it not, with representation proportionate to representation in England but my own predilection (which I suspect is not shared by anyone else here) would be to go below that. That would be a fair choice for the Welsh people to face, I think.

Peter Price

Can I take up the unsympathetic government point? As a matter of constitutional principle and thinking in terms of stability in the long term: I would like to just think through this issue. You have highlighted one of the potential consequences and that is the legislation might be so tightly drawn as to minimise discretion. Could you help us to just think through where are the points of likely or potential conflict, and then from that go on to assess what you think in normal circumstances but assuming a government of a different colour at Westminster, what would be the likely use of those various powers? What would actually happen at these flashpoints?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Let me go back to my argument of a Government which came to power in London - it is not inconceivable, I think - that wished radically to alter the National Health Service to a social insurance model. I suspect that would not be acceptable to any likely Welsh Government in the immediate future and therefore such legislation would have effects on public expenditure in Wales. As I said earlier, the amount spent in England would be lessened and so the block grant would automatically fall, as I understand it.

Secondly, such a government may not be willing to allow Wales to continue with a system which it, from its ideological point of view, might regard as wasteful and inefficient, and Wales would not have the power, as I understand it, which Scotland would have, of continuing with its current arrangements even if that is what it wished to do so.

Then there is the whole question, I think, of the role of the Secretary of State for Wales: liaison between the Assembly and the Government might collapse. The normal presumption is that the Secretary of State for Wales has a reasonable sympathy with what the National Assembly is trying to do. That may be the situation at present, but there is no inherent reason why it should always be the situation. The Secretary of State may find himself or herself opposed to what the National Assembly is doing, and I cannot see there how the arrangements that have been established can work effectively, in such a situation.

Ted Rowlands

You presume then that the Government of that day would rip up the general ministerial, council arrangements and all the rest of it, which are kind of in place now but have not been used because of its benign nature. You presume at this stage it would involve ripping up all the Concord Act and everything else?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

All sorts of conventional arrangements could be altered, and if one wants to see how that could happen one can look at the history of central/local relations in England, which I think first took a different turn with the election of the Heath Government in 1970. The Heath Government’s Housing Finance Act wanted to make local authorities charge market rents, or higher rents, for local authority houses. Of course, a number of Labour local authorities were not sympathetic to that and therefore the Heath Government drew up legislation so tightly that it was very difficult for local authorities to exercise any discretion.

1970, I think, was a beginning, but things got much more conflictual after 1979 when the Thatcher administration came in with a very radical programme of public services which many local authorities did not share. A number of what were previously thought to be conventions regulating central/local relations were ignored. I think one cannot overlook the fact that this could happen again. Many of the rules are conventional and the system works well at the moment because (as some would say) there is goodwill on all sides, and also political congruence: people wish to make it work. If the Government is very sympathetic indeed, if you like, it has a political interest in making it work, but that will not always be the case.

Peter Price

You are saying that the ministerial councils-type structure is one which is not a robust system to maintain devolution but one which is simply a part of the conventional-type structure. Is that what you are saying? Shall we say it depends upon goodwill in order to work?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

The way institutions work depends in large put on conventions of goodwill, and therefore the structure may be less important than one thinks. If there is goodwill, really most structures will be able to work, but if there is not there then the fact that structures are in place will make no difference one way or the other. I think the system that there is in Wales will work only as long as there are very benign attitudes on both sides, in London and in Cardiff. It will not work when they are less benign.

Lord Richard

What sort of defensive positions do you want to see established?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I think the arangements can only work successfully if the Welsh Assembly has powers of primary legislation. I am more certain of that now, I think, than when I wrote my book.

Vivienne Sugar

If that was not possible then what could be done in terms of processes, almost to get a greater guarantee of primary legislation in Wales?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

As I said earlier, for certain principles to be established - and they could obviously only be conventional principles: the Government could ignore them. If you had what we might call the benign scenario, they became accepted, it might be more difficult for governments to ignore them. I think one would need some different form of liaison between the Assembly and Central Government and the Secretary of State. I think one would need, perhaps, a greater role for backbench committees in Westminster dealing with Welsh affairs. With more legislation were published in draft form the committees dealing with Welsh Legislation could look at legislation at an early stage; the committees dealing with Welsh legislation might be able to make a great stir if they thought that legislation was too tightly drawn - but that would not give them a guarantee because the Government might say "We have had a mandate to reform the Health Service and we were elected for that purpose and this is what we propose to do. We sorry if there are objections but we intend to carry on".

Ted Rowlands

It is a political constitutional scenario of the kind you are describing - we have had one or two cases ourselves - would imply that the Government is going to be ripping up legislation, a concord act goes out of the window; frankly, if a Welsh Assembly had primary legislative powers under that scenario it would amend the Government of Wales Act to ensure that it had the right to legislate across England and Wales on these issues

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I think it would be much more difficult to effect that. I think it would be much more difficult to legislate for Wales against the interests of Wales, or for Scotland against the interests of Scotland.

Ted Rowland

We are not dealing with Scotland.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

If I can use the example of Northern Ireland, which had a long period of government under Stormont: Parliament did not legislate for Northern Ireland at all without the consent of the Northern Ireland Government.

When you imply that I draw a lurid picture, I do feel I am right to do so because I think any structure of government can work if the goodwill and the right conditions are there. The test of a structure of government is whether it can withstand difficult conditions. Let us take a very lurid and extreme example. Our system of government survived the depression of the 1930s; the German system of government did not. I think that is a reasonable test of government. When conditions are good, there really is not a problem - and conditions have been unexpectedly unusually good over the past few years.

To repeat, there is a benign government, but also there is political congruence and there is an interest in making devolution work. If it failed, the Government at Westminster would lose credibility as well; it would be seen as a criticism of their judgement. So there are unusually benign conditions.

Paul Valerio

That is the point I was going to ask you about. The other real test is when we get into financial stringency?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Indeed.

Paul Valerio

And how well or important would the issue of cash bearing powers be in that test because would it then be legitimate for them to say "You don’t get as much money as we would have liked, so we will try and make up the shortfall"?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

This is a very crucial point, and I think (as I stated in my book) that the financial arrangements of any system of government, and particularly a devolved government, should underpin the constitutional arrangements. In other words, one decides what system would be best and then works out what financial arrangements would best sustain that system.

I come, as you probably know, from Oxfordshire, and the Oxfordshire County Council raises a council tax; roughly about 20% of its revenue comes from council tax. Many people say "That is not enough, we are too dependent on the government for our finance". Oxfordshire is a fairly small area. I am now in Wales I come to talk about a body which represents the people of Wales, and find that it cannot raise any revenue at all. I think even a parish council in England has greater powers than that. This seems to me not to be helpful because it weakens accountability and people are not aware of the true costs of improvements that are offered or promised.

It seems to me a fundamental principle of democratic government that, broadly speaking, those responsible for spending money should, on the whole, be responsible for raising it so that the amount of expenditure can be made clearly subject to democratic control and voters can understand the economic implications of decisions they make. The danger of the current arrangements - and I think the same does apply in Scotland - is that it is very easy to pass the buck; that when things go wrong people say, "Well, this is all due to the meanness of London Government. If only London was more generous we would have better schools, better hospitals etc". It is impossible for the voters to pinpoint whether that is right; whether things are wrong because the Assembly is not as effective as it might be or because Government in London is very mean. So the true costs of Welsh public services are not brought home to the public and it is just not clear where the responsibility lies. So it does seem very peculiar to me that whereas Oxfordshire County Council and the district councils raise revenue, the body that represents the people of Wales as a whole cannot raise revenue.

Paul Valerio

You did say earlier on that one of the important ingredients of success is it is easily understood by the public. People pay tax, they have CAT, they have their council tax; they are now going to add another form of taxation. Does it not start to get a little more complicated?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

That is true, and I wish that had been put to people in the referendum. The argument on the Government side, which I well understand, is that if you put the point about tax-raising powers in Wales and Scotland people would not have wanted devolution. But it is a question of whether people wish to accept responsibility. Responsibility has costs. If you wish to govern yourselves, it has costs. One should not be dependent entirely on another body for raising the revenue which you wish to spend. I think, indeed, the system builds in a further element of unnecessary conflict between Cardiff and London.

Vivienne Sugar

But Wales would not be self-sufficient and not self-contained because of its poverty, so how do you in the system that you are describing still continue a system of cost subsidy between poorer areas?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

You would have to have an equalisation element, obviously. You could not have what Wales could raise from its own resources, there would have to be an element to take account of that fact. Of course, the difficulty of that is working out what it should be; what the needs of Wales are precisely. This is the problem which, obviously, applies to local authority finance, and my understanding of it is that it is very difficult to work out an objective criterion of need to balance out the various elements of need in different parts of the country. But you would obviously have to have that sort of element in a sensible financial system.

Huw Thomas

In one sense it could be argued that Wales already has a tax-bearing power and extra money could perhaps be raised through council tax. I want to go back to that very first point you made, that things had to be clear to voters. Really, it is a question of whether you ascribe the lower turnout in the last election to this lack of clarity or, as other commentators have argued, this is part of the general decrease across the western world?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I do not know in the western world, but in Britain certainly turnout is low now for all elections - local government elections, European elections, elections for the devolved bodies, and in the general election the turnout was 58%, the lowest since 1980. So you cannot say it is specific to any particular issue, whether devolution, or Europe, or local government - it is a general phenomenon.

If I can make a comment about the council tax point: that there would be a kind of covert revenue-raising power by handing less money over to local councils. I wonder if that is a sensible way of acquiring the revenue-raising power, because that could easily lead to conflict between the Assembly and local authorities and further confusion from people if local authorities say "Well, we would have provided better facilities but unfortunately the wicked Assembly has stopped our money". There is conflict everywhere. If you take an extreme example on the other side, you take the American or Australian federal systems: I think on the whole people are less in doubt about one layer of government does and what another layer of government does - in America in particular. There is a crudely drawn line, but people are not clear in Wales - they are much clearer in Scotland, in my opinion.

Sir Michael Wheeler-Booth

Following on that question, if you are going to give an element of financial responsibility and power to the National Assembly for Wales, does it have to be on the pattern of the powers which are given by the Scotland Act to the Scottish Parliament, or is there a better version that could be, and indeed should be, given to the National Assembly?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

As to what revenue-raising power it should have?

Sir Michael Wheeler-Booth

Yes.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes. My own preference is for a Welsh income tax. The level would be for the people to decide: they could decide how they balance tax against improvements - that is what people do at national level, it has inhibited Government from spending more than they might like to spend because they fear people will not pay the extra direct taxation. For example, I think the new arrangements that have been announced for charging students higher fees would not be as they are if Government did not believe they were unable to persuade people to pay more in direct taxation to sustain universities. The general belief is that universities do not have enough money and they need more money, but the view of the Government, I think, is that you will not be able to get that money through direct taxation.

This is the kind of balancing any democratic government has to do - it has to make a judgement. The judgement in Wales may be different; it may be that people in Wales are prepared to pay more in income tax for various improvements, and it may be that Welsh people give a greater priority to higher education than English do. If that is so, that judgement ought to be reflected in the policies of the Assembly. It is difficult to reflect that kind of judgement in the structure as it is at the moment. This is why I think income tax would be sensible.

Vivienne Sugar

Can I just reflect back to you things other people have said about equalisation, that the extent of equalisation required because of the poverty of Wales would not achieve the clarity of accountability that you are suggesting and that a Welsh income tax could actually worsen our economic situation because people who decide to grow businesses will take account of the level of tax in the country that they decided to do it in.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes, that is a fair point. If you were to raise tax that might be one effect, and this would be something the Welsh Government would have to consider and to bear in mind as a possibility.

Paul Valerio

I wanted to move on to the other part of our remit, the electoral arrangements.

Ted Rowlands

Can I just ask one question? Can you give us, with your experience of other federal structures - do we know of any examples of a federal structure which would be as asymmetrical as this one would be?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

There are a number of other systems which have devolution asymmetrically. For example, Denmark gave devolution to the Faroe Islands and Greenland - such a degree of devolution, indeed, that Greenland is not in the European Union. Portugal: the islands have their own authorities. Those are two examples.

Such a structure can work if the will is there to make it work. There is obviously a lack of logic in the system, but I think Disraeli once said that England (he should have said Britain) is governed not by logic but by Parliament. It reflects the practical fact that there is a demand for devolution in Scotland, a demand in Wales and Northern Ireland, and possibly a demand for some sort of devolution in the north of England but not in the part of the country where I come from - if you ask people in Oxfordshire what region they belong to, they will look at you as if you are peculiar.

It is the practical response to a political situation. If you had waited or wanted a symmetrical solution, either you would have to impose something on the south of England they did not want or Wales and Scotland would have to wait forever to get devolution. It is simply a practical response, which will work if there is a willingness there to make it work.

Ted Rowlands

But you have described a structure where there might not be a willingness?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes.

Ted Rowlands

If you have got a structure which is asymmetrical would you not have to start to put in place these mechanisms to buttress your new rate scenario?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I think you would need some sort of insurance against a government at Westminster being able to do too much damage - one of the prime ones I mentioned is primary legislation. It is fair to say that tax-raising powers would also help because it would mean that the effects of a cut in English expenditure would not be felt so drastically in Wales because Wales would not be so dependent on block grants as it is now. I think that would also be an insurance, and I think one can put things there to mean that if one has it a conflict it is not quite so....

Ted Rowlands

An equalisation board of some kind?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Most certainly, yes.

Lord Richard

Can we turn to elections now?

Paul Valerio

The question we will have to ask ourselves shortly is whether we think the site of the existing Assembly is sufficient. Should we come to that conclusion, that it is not large enough, then we have to work out how we can increase it, by what proportions and what systems, again bearing in mind your opening remarks about systems being easily understood by the electorate. We have had some evidence that there is some conflict between the Assembly-elected Members and regional Members. What sort of system would you favour us giving serious consideration to, to try and solve these particular dilemmas?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

On the question of understanding particular electoral systems, the voters, I think, are more sophisticated, perhaps, than many imagine. I see no obvious difficulties that people have had with the new system here. Indeed when, in 1973, in some ways a more complex system called the single transferable vote was introduced in Northern Ireland for Assembly and local government elections, people understood that very rapidly.

I think the main problem with the current system is that it gives too much power to the party machine. That is partly true also of all first past the post systems, if you live in a safe seat your representative is, in effect, chosen for you by the relevant committee of your party, or perhaps your party may have a primary election but it is only party members who vote in it and they, in effect, decide who your MP is. Under the list system, you do not even have the possibility of getting rid of a representative you do not like in a marginal seat, because the party chooses the representative. For example, if one looks at the 1999 election in Wales, there were nine Conservatives elected, one from a constituency and eight from a list. That means there were eight Conservatives who were chosen by the party - they may not be people who the voters wanted at all.

Lord Richard

They could be people who had just been beaten?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes, they could be people who had been beaten.

Lord Richard

There are some now in the Assembly who were.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Indeed.

Paul Valerio

Do you think that is a bad thing?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I do. I think the same argument may not apply to central government although I am in fact, in favour of proportional representation for elections to Westminster. Leaving that aside, I think that in a body that is not part of central government people ought to be able to choose their representatives. I think it ought to weigh as much with voters not only whether someone is Labour, or Conservative, Liberal or Plaid Cymru, but also whether who would be a good representative in the Assembly, whether there should some female candidates, from ethnic minorities etc.

Therefore, I favour a system that puts the choice of representative firmly in the hands of the voters, and in my view that it is best done by the single transferable vote although I think that other systems also achieve that. The system proposed by the Labour Government for European Elections in 1977, but defeated in Parliament, which is based on a system in Finland, whereby you vote for one person in a multi-member constituency would also achieve that result. Of course, it could have the effect that you could retain your parliamentary constituencies, whatever the size of the Assembly, because each parliamentary constituency could be a multi-member constituency from the point of view of the Assembly of whatever size you happen to decide.

The advantage of these systems is that they build in a primary election to a general election and it is a primary election in which everyone takes part. You do not have to be a party member or activist to take part, and so the decision that the voter faces is not only "Which party do I support?" but "Which candidate in which party will make the best Assembly representative who will look after my interests best?"

Lord Richard

The first past the post would go under your system. You are not talking about PR and STV, just for the increase?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

No, the whole system.

Lord Richard

Where do draw the boundaries of the constituencies?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

In a multi-member system you can have the same constituencies as for Westminster and when populations change all you do is add one to the number of members or decrease it, so you do not have to alter boundaries. That is the great advantage, I think, for people used to parliamentary constituencies. A constituency may have, shall we say, for argument’s sake, three members; if the population increases you raise it to four members and you do not have to change the boundaries.

Dr Laura McAllister

The problem we have in Wales in because we only have 40 seats if there was a suggestion to increase the number of AMs to 80 there would be a two-tiered constituency. That introduces proportionality, so it would work more effectively if we had an Assembly of 120 ?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

I am concerned about proportionality but I am not as concerned about proportionality as I am about the voter having a choice of candidate. I think as long as there is a rough and ready proportionality - which, it is fair to say, the current system gives - I do not think people are too worried. They are very worried if, shall we say, on a minority of the vote you had a very large majority in the Assembly - I think that would worry people. They are not worried if, shall we say, 40% of the vote gives you 46% of the AMs. I think it might encourage people to take more interest and participate more if they could choose which candidate was representing them rather than be faced, as they are in parts of Wales, with a safe seat and a list member chosen for them by a political party.

Dr Laura McAllister

What about opening up the party lists?

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Yes, that is also a possibility. I am very much against the closed list.

Paul Valerio

But in practice, when you have an open list, voters normally have the list ordered by a party and can vary it. The evidence across the world is generally that insufficient members vary it and therefore the party list holds good.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

That is one form, but you can also have a form of list where people are required to put a preference in.

Paul Valerio

In which case they are in illogical order.

Professor Vernon Bogdanor

Indeed, that is true, but you can have a random order. Your point is absolutely right. This is why I prefer STV, which is not an ordered list at all, or the system proposed in 1977 by the Labour Government of voting for one candidate in a multi-member constituency, which is the system used in Finland - and works very well, I think.

Lord Richard